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ABSTRACT 
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a very challenging mission area in an ever-
increasing net-centric environment, which is inundated with data from many highly 
advanced, capable sensors and communication suites.  With all these technological data 
collection and dissemination advances, the information available is just too voluminous 
for humans alone to process and react to manually, sifting the “wheat from the chaff,” 
and be expected to accomplish effective operational decision making regarding maritime 
threats to national security, as well as to international peace and trade on the high seas. 
This thesis addresses MDA Joint Integrating Concept capability gaps, MDA-003C 
and MDA-004C, for aggregating, analyzing and displaying maritime information in order 
to understand the maritime environment to identify threats and predicting activity within 
the maritime domain. Applying the Systems Engineering process, the concept, 
requirements analysis, architectures, and system design and validation description for a 
systems integration solution is presented. The proposed implementation entails 
integrating autonomous behavior analysis capability that utilizes syntactical grammar-
based spatial-temporal behavior classifications within existing Net-Centric MDA 
environments. 
In attestation to this implementation, this thesis describes the research conducted 
on a demonstrable proof-of-concept laboratory system, the Watchman Maritime Smart 
Environment System, whose representative architecture for specific autonomous behavior 
analysis implementation is provided. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 / Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive HSPD-13 lays out the Maritime Security Policy for the United States.  In that 
document, the U. S. President stated, “It is critical that the United States develop an 
enhanced capability to identify threats to the Maritime Domain as early and as distant 
from our shores as possible…” It is just this type of capability that the President claimed 
the United States must have that this thesis addresses.  This thesis explores the Systems 
Engineering challenge of meeting the stated mission needs of enhancing the capability to 
identify threats in the maritime domain through the employment of the Systems 
Engineering process as applied to a specific research project within the Network-Centric 
Systems Engineering Track of the Systems Engineering Department of the Naval 
Postgraduate School.   
This thesis presents how Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA, can be enhanced 
through the application of SE to create what will be described as a “Maritime Smart 
Environment” (MSE).  This MSE capability is created through the integration of an 
“Automated Behavior Analysis” (ABA) capability, or system, into the current typical 
maritime network of platforms, sensors, and data fusion applications (also known as the 
MDA network) found in a U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Surface Action 
Group (SAG).  A Design Reference Mission (DRM), created for this thesis, defines the 
capabilities, concept of operations (CONOPS), and mission for this type of MDA 
network, and provides the scope, boundary conditions, and context for the clear 
understanding of what MDA capability enhancement the notional MSE, integrating the 
ABA, is intended to achieve. 
This thesis describes the research associated with the Watchman Maritime Smart 
Environment Proof Of Concept System (WMSE POCS) project, along with the SE 
processes used to implement and demonstrate it, in order to establish the feasibility of 
integrating an ABA into an existing Net-Centric environment within the Maritime 
Domain.  The integration of this capability, with its demonstrated potential to recognize 
particular behaviors and alert operators to them, reveals the opportunity to further 
 xxii
develop this technology and systems integration concept to fill sorely needed MDA Joint 
Integrating Concept (JIC) capability gaps of aggregating, displaying, and analyzing 
maritime information in order to understand the maritime environment and identify 
threats (MDA-003C) and predicting activity within the maritime domain (MDA-004C). 
Meeting the numerous MDA mission requirements that these gaps represent will most 
assuredly enhance Maritime Domain Awareness by improving situational awareness, 
better utilizing the capability of networked sensors and the multitude of data they 
provide, as well as making operators more efficient in their duties to respond to real 
threats, rather than ineffectively attempting to manually monitor and react to threats 
arising from the whole of the maritime domain. 
After a brief introduction explaining the operational concept and mission need 
germane to the thesis, the development of the case begins with an explanation of the 
current MDA capabilities and practice with a survey of the various representative 
platforms and sensor systems used to accomplish MDA in the different media within the 
maritime environment, and then takes a brief look at some of the current R&D initiatives 
for MDA enhancement that incorporate or attempt to utilize some form of automation.  
The thesis then discusses the SE approach in the conduct of the actual research, as 
well as how this approach, consisting of a concept and process, could be used as a model 
for physical implementation of real-world mission-capable ABA. The next chapter 
expounds upon a key part of the SE process by describing the development of the WMSE 
POCS system architecture, showing the functional, process, and operational 
decompositions for the initial system, as well as how subsequent iterations of the 
requirements and functional allocations for system upgrades produced refined software 
architecture, as well as an integration architecture.  The following chapter thoroughly 
describes the WMSE POCS, from initial concept to latter upgrades, additional 
capabilities, and improvements, which demonstrated its proven functionality in analyzing 
and recognizing behaviors in a network-centric engineered laboratory environment.  The 
latter portion of this chapter addresses operational implementation of the POCS, by 
describing the two types of operational implementation System Engineers could expect to 
encounter when attempting to implement an ABA capability.  These alternatives were 
 xxiii
analyzed, with the resultant recommendation of the singular integration of an ABA 
capability into the existing NCW environment, as the most cost-effective and mission-
capable implementation solution. 
The task of monitoring the maritime domain and remaining vigilant to the threats 
to our national security that emanate from it will remain a vital mission area for any 
foreseeable future, exemplified by the MDA JIC capability gaps addressed in this thesis.  
The maritime domain is an ever-increasing net-centric environment, with a continually 
growing number of sensors, operating nodes, communications links, providers, and 
consumers of information.  With these growing numbers of both fixed and mobile 
capabilities, there will continue a deficit in humans, bandwidth, power, and intelligent 
centers to deal with this cascade of data. There can be no doubt that MDA is a very 
challenging field, with the majority of the earth’s surface falling under its purview.  
Highlighted in this research are the many advances that have been made in the field, in 
the way of more highly capable, longer range, and extended duration sensors; more 
robust and reliable communications; higher bandwidth and faster networks with 
improved data sharing; and lastly much higher fidelity and accuracy in the fusion of the 
sensor data which is passed among these networks.  With all these advances, the data 
available is just too voluminous for humans alone to process and react to manually, 
sifting the “wheat from the chaff,” and be expected to accomplish effective operational 
decision making regarding maritime threats to national security and international peace 
and trade. 
The ability of integrating an ABA capability through scaled development, as 
presented in this thesis, would certainly enhance the application of MDA through 
fulfillment of stated JIC capability gaps.  This integration methodology, put into 
operational practice, would allow a more seamless implementation of maritime prediction 
capability, less disruption of current sensor data collection capability, processes, and 
operations, and ultimately a satisfaction of the critical mission needs that exist in 
maritime situational awareness, threat recognition and response. 
 xxiv
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The introduction chapter discusses the overview of the thesis, a description of the 
Design Reference Mission (DRM), the thesis research approach, and the outline of the 
thesis.  The overview section includes the rationale for and relevance of the thesis. The 
DRM, its purpose and components, is explained in detail, as it is referenced throughout 
the thesis.  The thesis research approach introduces the systems engineering process, as 
well as its application in the proof of concept system, which is the focus of the research.  
Lastly, the thesis outline briefly describes the content and purpose of each chapter in the 
thesis to guide the reader through the document. 
A. OVERVIEW 
National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 / Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive HSPD-13 lays out the Maritime Security Policy for the United 
States.  In that document, the president stated, “It is critical that the United States develop 
an enhanced capability to identify threats to the Maritime Domain as early and as distant 
from our shores as possible…” This type of needed capability declared by the president is 
what this thesis addresses.  The directive goes on to note, “Due to its complex nature and 
immense size, the Maritime Domain is particularly susceptible to exploitation and 
disruption by individuals, organizations, and States.”  To counter this disruption and 
nefarious use of the Maritime Domain by “terrorists, criminals, and hostile States,” the 
president directed that, “The United States must deploy the full range of its operational 
assets and capabilities,” in accomplishing the task.1  Understanding how capabilities 
needed to meet certain tasks become requirements, and then further understanding how 
those requirements must be refined and turned into a producible, effective, and affordable 
design solution is the purpose of Systems Engineering (SE).2  This thesis explores the 
                                                 
1 National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
HSPD-13, December 2004. 
2 Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 17–18, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2006. 
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Systems Engineering challenge of meeting the stated mission needs of enhancing the 
capability to identify threats in the maritime domain through the employment of the 
Systems Engineering process as applied to a specific research project within the 
Network-Centric Systems Engineering Track of the Systems Engineering Department of 
the Naval Postgraduate School.   
This thesis shows that Maritime Domain Awareness, or MDA, can be enhanced 
through the application of SE to create what will be described as a “Maritime Smart 
Environment” (MSE).  This MSE is created through the integration of an “Automated 
Behavior Analysis” (ABA) capability, or system, into the current typical maritime 
network of platforms, sensors, and data fusion applications (also known as the MDA 
network) found in a U.S. Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Surface Action Group 
(SAG).  A Design Reference Mission (DRM), created for this thesis, will define the 
capabilities, concept of operations (CONOPS), and mission for this type of MDA 
network, and will provide the scope, boundary conditions, and context for the clear 
understanding of what MDA capability enhancement the notional MSE, integrating the 
ABA, is intended to achieve. 
B. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION (DRM) DESCRIPTION 
Defining a DRM is one of the primary pieces of the requirements analysis and 
allocation phase of the SE process.  The entire SE process is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter III. In order to accomplish effectual systems engineering, accurate problem 
definition is required to ensure appropriate problem solving.  A predetermined problem 
solution or a solution that attempts to solve the wrong problem may very well result in a 
biased and/or flawed design.  Defining the problem via the generation of mission needs 
from determined capability gaps will ultimately lead to a more accurate problem solution 
that will be much more likely to support the entire range of stakeholders’ needs. 
The complexity and broad scope of Maritime Domain Awareness makes 
establishing the specific threat type and environment in addressing a particular capability 
gap vital.  The DRM concept is used in order to establish a war fighting CONOPS for a 
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MDA enhancement baseline context.  A DRM defines the operational activities necessary 
to validate required capability attainment.   
The DRM establishes the baseline for subsequent systems engineering 
activities—particularly generation of requirements, refining problem 
definition, development of concepts, and analysis of alternatives, and 
testing and evaluation.  A well-developed DRM will facilitate generation 
of requirements and subsequent system design.3 
For the government led development process, the DRM feeds the 
development and certification of a system functional baseline and provides 
support through the entire life of the program.  Thus the DRM must 
support the program throughout the systems engineering process.4  
Designing a reference mission begins with understanding the environment 
surrounding the mission needs analysis.  The DRM will have a scenario that includes a 
goal, a threat, a deployment of systems, a physical environment in which the mission 
takes place or is executed, and whatever changes the environment may go through as the 
scenario progresses. 
1. Problem Definition 
To protect our vital national interests, high-value assets at sea must be protected, 
and are therefore often nested within a network of internal and external, organic and 
inorganic, manned and unmanned, sea-based and land-based sensors that attempt to 
provide a Common Operational Picture (COP) of the sea surface around the high-value 
unit(s).  These types of sensor networks increasingly have the ability to fuse much, if not 
all, of the sensors’ data flooding in to detect, track, and, to a certain extent, classify the 
surface vessels in the vicinity of these unit(s).  Currently, humans in the loop of these 
sensor networks monitor the contact tracks of these vessels; however, their dense number 
and irregular, indiscernible, and unpredictable movements prevent an early and/or 
accurate detection of threat-like activity by the many contacts that must be monitored in 
the COP.  Automation of these vital, yet mundane, monitoring and threat-detection 
                                                 
3 F. R. Skolnick and P. G. Wilkins (2000),  “Laying the foundation for successful systems 
engineering,” Johns Hopkins Apl Technical Digest  21, no. 2 (2000). 
4 Ibid. 
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activities could potentially enhance greatly the awareness of the maritime domain for the 
protection of friendly forces.  For example, among the many fishing and commercial 
vessels going about their normal routines and other various surface traffic, networked 
sensors may pick up a group of vessels moving in some type of formation, apparently 
approaching the high-value assets. Watch-standers who fail to detect this activity or 
assume that this behavior is no threat due to its indiscernible nature, could delay critical 
seconds in responding, which could lead to a devastating loss of ship and crew.  On the 
other hand, assuming this to be an imminent threat and taking lethal action too quickly 
could cause an adverse international incident if incorrect.  It is just this type of scenario 
that reveals the gap in current capability, which is in providing decision makers with the 
crucial pieces of timely information to discern truly hostile from innocent behavior out of 
the myriad pieces of data available, in order to be able to take appropriate action. 
2. Projected Operational Environment (POE) 
The POE provides information for establishing a context within which operational 
tasks will produce their functional outcomes.  This context is defined by the desired 
capabilities from which the functional outcomes and requisite tasks are derived. These 
desired capabilities are provided via an analysis of the various national security directives 
and the Joint Operations Guidance (JOG) that flows from them.  The Joint Staff is tasked 
with integrating these capabilities across the services and all lines of operation, under the 
JOG, to determine where, operationally, gaps in the desired capabilities exist. From these 
gaps, services then develop requirements, which are then passed on to the systems 
commands to procure solutions to meet those requirements.5  In addressing these gaps, 
the Systems Engineers must analyze the requirements as the initial step of the Systems 
Engineering Process (which is discussed in detail in later chapters) to obtain the optimal 
solution to meet the operational need.   
                                                 
5 CJCSI 3010.02B, Joint Operations Concepts Development Process (JOpsC-DP), January 27, 2006.  
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From this process, the eventual solution (notionally some type of Net-Centric 
Maritime Smart Environment (MSE)) is intended to meet several DoD MDA Joint 
Integrating Concept (JIC) capability gaps, listed below:6 
x MDA-003C — The capabilities to aggregate, display, and analyze 
maritime information in order to understand the maritime environment and 
identify threats. The purpose of this capability is to make maritime 
information available to the MDA network in a useful form.  This involves 
fusing and aggregating data so that users can quickly retrieve all of the 
information related to an entity of interest.  The MDA network must allow 
analysts to easily manipulate information and be flexible enough that they 
can use their own creativity to detect latent patterns of threat behavior. 
x MDA003C-003T — Provide alerts for suspicious vessel behavior in 
particular for small non-emitting vessels. 
x MDA-003C-006T — Archive and make available historical information. 
One important purpose is to support post-event analysis for attack 
attribution. 
x MDA-003C-007T — Push time-critical alerts to decision makers 
x MDA-003C-008T — Analyze all source information to determine which 
cargos are high risk or of interest 
x MDA-003C-009T — And analyze all source information to determine 
which persons are high risk or of interest 
x MDA-003C-010T — Analyze all source information to characterize threat 
networks 
x MDA-004C — The capability to predict activity within the maritime 
domain.  Many non-traditional threats, like terrorism or proliferation, are 
                                                 
6 J7, Joint Force Development and Integration Division (JFDID), Maritime Domain Awareness JIC, 
Version 0.3, January 8, 2009. 
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effective when they operate within the noise level of normal, everyday 
activities.  Detecting these plots often requires merging information from 
all aspects of the maritime domain to detect the subtle signs of threat 
behavior.  The ability for machines to automatically analyze mountains of 
data and detect anomalous behavior will be critical for making sense of the 
vast maritime realm.  Automated threat analysis systems free analysts to 
work on more challenging maritime problems. 
x MDA-004C-001T — Create a baseline of normal maritime behavior for an 
area or conditions of interest 
x MDA-004C-002T — Identify adversary patterns of behavior 
x MDA-004C-003T — Differentiate maritime threats from valid maritime 
commerce 
x MDA-004C-004T — Provide alerts for suspicious behavior 
x MDA-004C-005T — Identify adversary intent, courses of action, 
strengths, and weaknesses 
3. Potential Friendly Targets 
The DRM must define what types of targets the enemy is likely to exploit, in 
order to design accurate scenarios that properly represent the scoped mission need. 
Under this thesis, the MSE would be primarily deployed for force protection and 
so its employment would not include any offensive scenarios. Some possible defensive 
scenarios would include: 
x Protection of fixed at-sea platforms 
x Protection of strike groups or sea bases 
x Surveillance of ports or harbors 
x Providing freedom of navigation through possible choke points 
x ISR missions to locate enemy forces 
x Tracking and interception of suspicious vessels 
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For the scope of this thesis, the DRM will focus only on the protection of strike 
groups or sea bases scenarios, from which the following Operational Situation (OPSIT) 
will be derived. 
4. Operational Situation (OPSIT) 
OPSITs typically detail various cases within a DRM where certain variables can 
change, creating unique OPSITs for a particular mission scenario.  OPSIT outcomes 
derived from simulations can eventually be compared to actual system test data, verifying 
that the system’s operational activities are sufficient to perform the mission effectively.  
Input from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) is imperative for quality OPSIT development.  
OPSITs should be validated by SMEs, ensuring a balance between common and extreme 
cases and variables.7 
The systems engineer must go through a comprehensive planning process to 
understand “how” the mission will be accomplished.  This process is an indispensible 
part of the architecting activity in the SE process, which is discussed in Chapters III and 
IV.  This mission analysis produces a plan with certain tasks to be assigned to the 
operational nodes though operational activities in order to complete a mission.  A mission 
typically will consist of multiple operational activities, involving multiple system 
elements simultaneously conducting a variety of assigned tasks.  These tasks must 
integrated and synchronized in order to accomplish the operational activities necessary to 
achieve the mission. System architectures detail and decompose the relationships 
between the operational nodes, operational activities, tasks, system elements, and 
required system functions.  OPSITs are important to this activity by depicting the tasks 
required to perform the mission commander’s CONOPS.  The commander must 
determine the tasks that are essential to mission success and identifies these as Mission 
Essential Tasks (MET). The MET are typically derived from the Universal Joint Task 
List (UJTL), Universal Naval Task List (UNTL), Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL) and 
the Naval Mission Essential Task List (NMETL), as appropriate. During OPSIT 
                                                 
7 Skolnick and Wilkins, “Laying the foundation.” 
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generation, a set of operational tasks are defined for every operational activity achieved 
by a mission in order to develop a war fighter CONOPS.  Assumptions are developed 
regarding the environment, logistics, deployment, time, and other factors required to 
achieve the mission. Assumptions should be realistic variables designed to afford defined 
parameters for the scenario.  The systems engineer must determine what parameters are 
key to studying system performance and which can be assumed at certain levels.8 
The specific mission for the OPSIT in this thesis is to counter the threats posed by 
a “swarm” attack.  For several years, the U.S. Navy and several international navies have 
identified the attack by large groups (swarms) of small attack boats as a major and 
growing littoral threat.  These attack boats, generally identified as “fast attack craft 
(FAC)” and “fast inshore attack craft (FIAC)” by the U.S. Navy, vary significantly in 
size, speed, crew, and weaponry; and are widely available to small and developing 
nations.  There have been several U.S. Navy studies and experiments that have concluded 
that currently deployed naval weapons, sensors, and Command and Control (C2) systems 
would have difficulty in effectively and reliably countering large FIAC swarm attacks.9 
The emergence of large numbers of FIACs and swarm tactics in Iran and other 
“developing world” countries has highlighted the potential near-term significance of this 
threat.  Thus, there is a requirement to extend the Navy’s current surface warfare 
capability with new defense concepts that will be effective against this established and 
growing asymmetric threat.    
In addition, the other rapidly emerging threat is piracy on the high seas in the 
shipping lanes near the horn of Africa and elsewhere.  The tactical concerns in regards to 
the FIAC threat discussed above are much the same with the pirate threat, only the 
potential targets and motives of the pirate threat are quite different from what would be 
expected in a FIAC attack.  The common mode of employment of pirate attack vessels is 
reported to be larger “mother ships” providing support, command, and control to 
                                                 
8 Skolnick and Wilkins, “Laying the foundation.” 
9 The Office of Naval Research Broad Agency Announcement 09-023, “Multi-Target Track and 
Terminate (MT3),” 2009. 
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numerous other small, fast “take-down” vessels that search out and board commercial 
ships for hijacking and eventual ransom demands.10 
Regardless of the differences in these types of threats, the ability to quickly and 
accurately discern threat behavior, of the particular vessels that seek to do harm versus 
the multitude of other surface traffic around a high-value asset, is required in both cases. 
5. Threat Profile 
In order to understand the tasks required for the mission defined in the DRM, the 
type of threat must be understood.  This understanding comes from describing the 
particular profile of the threat that the mission must counter.  This profile is made up of 
the following components: Assumed General Threat Conditions (Peculiar aspects or 
capabilities of the threat), Threat Approach (where the threat will originate from and how 
it is assumed to approach friendly forces), Threat Characterization (specific 
characteristics that the threat may have with a relative probability of exhibiting those 
characteristics), Threat Tactics, and Attack Timing and Coordination. 
The most likely threat for this DRM is an enemy force (conventional, pirate, or 
terrorist) that can attack by small, fast surface vessels to hijack, damage, or destroy the 
friendly target.  Here following is a delineation of the threat profile elements for this most 
likely threat scenario. 
Assumed Threat General Conditions: 
x A reasonably sophisticated terrorist organization that is non-state 
sponsored 
x A suicide force capable of a covert, coordinated surface attack 
x A small group of pirates armed with small arms and RPGs 
x Attack platforms that are commercially available 
x Surface craft similar in size and appearance to indigenous commercial or 
pleasure boats (but modified for higher performance)  
                                                 
10 W. Thomas Smith Jr., “Pirates in the 21st Century,” July 3, 2006, available at 
http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,103960,00.html, accessed May 20, 2010. 
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x Only conventional explosives and weapons are used 
x Minimal early indicators of a pending attack 
x Attack occurs at any time of day and the weather conditions are clear with 
low wind speeds  
Assumed Threat Approach: 
x Threat surface vehicles transit to the general area of the platform from the 
direction of a nearby commercial fishing fleet in a boat of similar 
appearance 
Threat Characterization: 
Table 1 lists the specific characteristic of speed that the threat may possess with a 
relative probability of exhibiting that characteristic.  Other characteristics, such as 
varying size, shape, crew size, etc. were considered; however, they were deemed to be 
non-essential to characterizing the threat profile, due to the negligible effect those 
characteristics would have on the threat behavior in this scenario, as compared with 
speed. 
 
Threat Speed Probability 
20 knots Low 
30 knots Medium  
Surface Vessel 
40 knots High 
Table 1.   DRM Threat Characteristics 
Threat Tactics: 
Swarm tactics are to conduct a coordinated, simultaneous raid upon their target 
with a certain number of attack vessels.  The number of vessels (n) in the raid may vary 
upon the type of threat (pirate, terrorist, state actor), distance from shore, capabilities, etc. 
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x Assumed raid size possibilities (number vessels = n) 
  6 > n < 10 
  3 > n < 5 
  0 > n < 2 
Attack Timing and Coordination: 
Although typical swarm tactics are to conduct simultaneous raids when 
approaching the target, the actual conduct of the raid as attack vessels engage the target 
can vary.  Possible options include: 
x One at a time 
x All at once in a concentrated location 
x Surround surveillance area and then simultaneous attack 
6. Mission Success Requirements 
As discussed, the OPSIT identifies the individual activities that need to be 
accomplished in order to define the success of the mission.  The activities identified for 
the success of this DRM will be evaluated in these categories: 
x Provide information transfer 
x Conduct information processing 
x Identify and classify targets 
x Provide cueing and targeting info 
x Provide accurate behavior classification of surface threats 
x Facilitate engagement of time sensitive and non-time sensitive targets 
The mission is divided into these categories based on the specific functions that 
each individual operational activity is required to perform.  Each category must be 
completed in order to identify the mission as being successful. 
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7. Mission Definition 
In order to complete the mission success levels, all operational activities are 
utilized.  Each mission included within a DRM scenario can be decomposed into the 
individual operational activities necessary to complete the tasks that the DRM scenario 
requires.  The Joint and Naval Capability Terminology List is a compilation of Joint and 
Navy capabilities areas.  The Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) are broken into Warfighting 
Mission Areas (WMA), which include Joint Training, Command & Control, Force 
Application, Force Protection, Focused Logistics, Battlespace Awareness and Force 
Management.11 The naval capabilities are taken from the U.S. Navy’s transformational 
vision document, Naval Power 21, which is a combination of Sea Power 21 and 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Capabilities. Naval Power 21 has five pillars, which 
are Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Sea Basing, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, and 
FORCEnet.12  
 
Table 2.   Sea Shield Pillar from Naval Power 21 (and Naval Capability 
Terminology List, 2007) (After NEARG)13 
The capabilities focused upon in this case are Sea Shield and FORCEnet, as the 
capabilities encapsulated in those pillars most closely align with the capabilities required 
                                                 
11 CJCSI 3010.02B. 
12 “Sea Power 21 – Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities,” Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy, 
Proceedings, October 2002. 
13 Naval Architecture Elements Reference Guide, https://stalwart.spawar.navy.mil/naerg/. 
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for this DRM, as well as for conducting MDA, in general.14  The missions within that 
capability that is focused upon are Force Protection and Surface  Warfare, as shown in 
Table 2, and all mission areas of FORCEnet as shown in Table 3. These focused mission 
areas were chosen because they specifically address the OPSIT generated under this 




Table 3.   FORCEnet Pillar from Naval Power 21 (and Naval Capability 
Terminology List, 2007) (After NAERG) 
                                                 
14 National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness, December 2007. 
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The Consolidated (formerly called “Common”) Operational Activities List 
(COAL) is part of the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF)15 and is 
used to create a fully integrated joint operational activities list to support the Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM’s) and architecture development.  The COAL supports and 
facilitates the reuse and sharing of joint community architectures, as well as rapid 
prototyping.16 
The DRM is decomposed into the following operational activities, taken from 
(COAL v2.0, 2007):17  
x Provide command and control decision support (COM.1.1) 
o Orient (COM.1.1.1) 
x Conduct ISR/maintain battle-space awareness (Observe, COM.1.2) 
o Perform Shared Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlespace (COM.1.2.1) 
o Depict Location and Activities of all HVTs in Adversary 
Model (COM.1.2.1.4.4.4.4) 
o Develop and maintain shared awareness of the situation 
(COM.1.2.3) 
x Understand the situation (COM.1.3) 
o Recognize threats (COM.1.3.1) 
o Assess Located Targets (COM.1.3.2) 
                                                 
15 The Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) serves as the overarching, 
comprehensive framework and conceptual model enabling the development of architectures to facilitate the 
ability of Department of Defense (DoD) managers at all levels to make key decisions more effectively 
through organized information sharing across the Department, Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), Mission, 
Component, and Program boundaries. 
16 FORCEnet Status Today – Briefing to the Strike, Land Attack & Air Defense (SLAAD) Division, 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, April 29, 2004. 
17 Department of Defense  (September 2007),  “Common Operational Activity List COAL v2.0.”  
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Once all operational activities have been identified, the functions necessary to 
achieve the mission will be identified and documented. 
8. Mission Execution 
Executing the mission will consist of completing certain tasks that can be traced 
back to their respective operational activities, described in the system architecture 
(Chapter IV). The High Level Operational Concept Graphic (OV-1) (Figure 1) shows a 
notional environment for the MSE system. Possible missions relating to this setting could 
be intercepting a single surface vessel that has come within the observation area, or 
several surface vessels that have broken away from within the fishing fleet and are 
heading toward the SAG. 
 
Figure 1.   MSE OV-1 
 16
In any of these situations, the MSE system will respond by completing the tasks it 
was programmed to enact when a threat is identified. The tasks taken from the Navy 
Tactical Task List (NTTL) 3.018 and the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL),19 which will 
be identified for the DRM, are: 
x Process and exploit collected information and intelligence 
x Produce intelligence 
x Provide Indications and Warning (I&W) of Threats 
x Acquire, process, communicate information, and maintain status 
x Analyze and assess situation 
x Disseminate Tactical Warning Information and Attack Assessment 
The CONOPS for these missions and their requisite tasks—being accomplished 
by the Behavior Analysis operational activity via a Behavior Analysis Module (BAM) 
algorithm (discussed in Chapter V)—must, by necessity, encompass more than just the 
BAM itself.20  The BAM must be understood to operate in a larger context of a force 
protection schema, the Maritime Smart Environment (Figure 1), which consists of 
sensors, high-value units, communication, C2 systems, and a network in which all of 
these members communicate and operate.   
This section has described the purpose and scope of a DRM, as well as explained 
the specific DRM for this research, providing a context for the MSE, system architecture, 
and the Proof of Concept System that is described in later chapters. 
                                                 
18 Department of the Navy (August 1, 2004), “Navy Tactical Task List (NTTL),”  NTTL 3.0 (Draft). 
19 Department of the Navy  (April 2007),  “Joint and Naval Capability Terminology Lists (CMCL).”  
20 Rachel E. Goshorn, Deborah E. Goshorn, Joshua L. Goshorn, and Lawrence A. Goshorn, “Behavior 
Modeling for Detection, Identification, Prediction, and Reaction (DIPR) in AI Systems Solutions” 
Handbook of Ambient Intelligence and Smart Environments, Springer Handbook, 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/ n812r0064785g764/ (accessed April 18, 2010).  
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The next section discusses the approach that was pursued in the research for this 
thesis, including the process that was followed, how data was gathered, and the methods 
used in conducting the research. 
C. THESIS RESEARCH APPROACH 
This section discusses the approach that was taken in the conduct of the research 
for this thesis, first introducing the systems engineering process that was followed, and 
then introducing the development and documentation of the proof of concept system that 
was the focal point of the research. 
1. Systems Engineering (SE) Process 
The research for understanding different alternative solutions and finally arriving 
at the Proof of Concept System (POCS) as a model to address the CONOPS has 
progressed through a thorough SE process. As depicted in Figure 2, the Systems 
Engineering “Vee” model21 was applied and followed, with some situational 
modifications.  The first step in developing the POCS was to understand SE fundamentals 
and how to apply them to the design and development of a real, functional system.  
Beginning with requirements analysis, stemming from a needs analysis, and then leading 
to requirements definition and refinement, the concept for the POCS, from various 
alternative system solutions, began to take shape.  From there, the system architecture 
was developed via a process of functional analysis and allocation, which then led to 
preliminary functional and process architectures, facilitating the initial design.  Upon 
refinement of the design, specifications were created to align with requirements, and then 
the hardware installation and software coding processes could begin.  As each hardware 
component was installed, connected, and tested, the various software modules were 
coded and tested independently.  Subsequently, the hardware and software components 
were integrated incrementally, testing connections, interfaces, and increased 
functionality.  As the errors from this incremental testing were corrected, the main 
                                                 
21 Clifford Whitcomb, “Introduction to Systems Engineering” Lecture slides, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2008. 
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modules were integrated, and then final full-up system testing and validation began.   A 
more detailed description of the specific actions accomplished in each step of the SE 
process for each of the various project iterations is discussed in Chapter III. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Systems Engineering "Vee" Model (After Whitcomb) 
After the full system was tested and demonstrated, a series of design iterations 
were implemented, going through a scaled down, yet very similar SE process, as 
described in the previous paragraph.  These iterations were termed “Engineering Change 
Orders” (ECOs) by the advising professor.  As the ECOs were being developed, 
coincident coursework led to a more discretely defined architecture, which yielded 
greater design improvements and efficiencies in the ECO design and integration 
processes. 
A significant ECO improvement was the implementation of an enhanced 
Behavior Analysis algorithm in conjunction with camera calibration, which led to the 
ability of the system to define and analyze more discrete behaviors with higher spatial 
resolution.  Along with these improvements, came the addition of a Wireless Smart 
Sensor Network (WSSN) of autonomous robotic agents for reaction to an identified 
target.  The POCS has been thoroughly documented, and an extensive System 
 19
Description Document (SDD) defining the system’s functional and operational 
architecture has been created.  This process also helped to define requirements metrics for 
the system, as discussed in the DRM and in Chapter IV. 
2. Proof of Concept System (POCS) Development and Documentation 
In order to understand how MDA may be enhanced through the use of a Smart 
Sensor Network in a “Smart Environment,” a POCS was developed and incrementally 
improved during the course of study at NPS.  This POCS implemented a network of 
distributed sensors and processing to demonstrate the functions of the four stages of 
generalized intelligence automation: detection, identification, prediction, and reaction 
(DIPR), discussed in Chapter III.22  This system, dubbed “Watchman,” has been utilized 
for various thesis research projects, but certain aspects have been optimized and focused 
upon to represent a Maritime Smart Environment (MSE), employing BAM algorithms, 
akin to the Operational View depicted in Figure 1. 
In addition to designing and developing the POCS, a full system architecture was 
developed as a result of the functional analysis and allocation steps of the SE process, 
which shows the required functions, processes and operational activities.  These elements 
were derived from the systems requirements and are mapped showing the relationships 
with each other, in addition to the notional components, data elements, and informational 
linkages for a generic, as well as specific system solution. 
Other research work accomplished to date on this project includes hardware and 
software modeling and mapping; documentation of the full POCS, along with changes 
that have been incorporated; a full System Description Document, which fully describes 
the entire system architecture, components and relationships; and finally system 
integration and testing—from component and module level, all the way to system-level 
demonstration testing—has been completed and documented. 
Additionally, a thorough literature research review of current methods in MDA 
has been accomplished.  The review studies governing documents for MDA 
                                                 
22 Goshorn et al., “Behavior Modeling.” 
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requirements, current technology and methods of MDA, current and future technology 
and methods of artificial intelligence and automation, and finally the current and future 
technology and methods of Network-Centric Warfare. 
Furthermore, this thesis has been briefed at the Maritime Defense and Security. 
Research Program (MDSRP) monthly meeting held at the Naval Postgraduate School.  
This briefing was met with great interest and enthusiasm by the program director and 
other research group members in attendance.  So affirming was the response that the 
director requested the research to be featured in an article in the group’s monthly 
newsletter, SITREP.23  From this newsletter article, various sectors have expressed keen 
interest in the promise of this research, from industry partners, to government research 
organizations, an on to Department of Defense requirements and procurement offices.  
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
This section explains how the rest of the thesis is laid out, with a short description 
of each of the rest of the thesis chapters, what those chapters include, and/or intend to 
accomplish for the reader.  
1. The Current Methods of MDA 
Chapter II broadly explains the contemporary types of technologies and systems 
for supporting MDA, with representative examples in order to provide the operational 
context in which MDA may be enhanced through the research explained in the 
succeeding chapters.  It also presents some of the new “cutting edge” research areas in 
the field of automation in MDA. Furthermore, it explains the benefits of having an MSE-
type system to enhance the current systems’ execution of MDA.  
                                                 
23 The NPS Maritime Defense and Security Research. Program Newsletter 43, February 2010, 
available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=1&ved=0CBIQFjAA&url= 
http%3A%2F%2Fwww.hsdl.org%2F%3Fview%26doc%3D119186%26coll%3Dpublic&ei=B4D9S_DrJor
eNZ7Und4H&usg=AFQjCNF6TZQnqM8HqokieLYistNLwP1bpw   (accessed May 4, 2010).  
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2. Systems Engineering Approach Overview 
Chapter III further discusses what SE approach was utilized and how the SE 
process led to the development of the Watchman Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) 
POCS. The chapter also explains how behavior analysis algorithms function in this 
system.  The chapter additionally describes the steps of the SE process, as they  
 
pertained to each phase of development of the POCS.  The details of progression through 
these steps will serve as a potential process model for the eventual integration of a scaled 
operational MSE system.   
3. MSE System Architecture 
Chapter IV presents the functional, process, and operational architectures of the 
WMSE POCS created as part of the functional analysis and allocation steps of the SE 
process.  The chapter describes the architecture development process as a subset of the 
overall SE process for system alternative analysis and design development. The chapter 
further shows how the resultant architecture was ultimately applied in the design, 
building, coding, integration, and testing of the autonomous MSE POCS that represents 
an MDA “smart” environment. 
4. Watchman MSE Proof of Concept System and Proposed Operational 
Implementation 
Chapter V presents and describes the elements of the proof of concept/small scale 
laboratory system.  This description includes the hardware and software design, layout 
(topology), and build, as well as improvements and upgrades made to the system after the 
initial development.  Additionally, the chapter discusses the lessons learned from the 
system design, development, and integration processes, and what technology still needs 
to be refined for potential application and implementation of the system in an operational 
environment. 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter VI reinforces the need for a MSE system to enhance MDA, fulfilling 
certain capability gaps, and the importance of developing the technology to scale the 
POCS for operational use.  The chapter also identifies and describes areas for further 
research, development, and testing. 
This introductory chapter discussed the overview of the thesis, a description of the 
Design Reference Mission (DRM), the thesis research approach, and the outline of the 
thesis.  The next chapter discusses the current methods employed in Maritime Domain 
Awareness. 
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II. CURRENT METHODS OF MDA 
This chapter takes a brief look at some of the current means used to accomplish 
the MDA mission, from the sensors employed and their method of employment to the 
current net-centric operations (NCO) and data processing capabilities currently in the 
hands of our war fighters. Existing capabilities and new technologies are being examined 
to determine the most effective way to proceed in enhancing the ability to detect and 
track vessels and craft on the high seas. For example, large commercial vessels now carry 
a collision avoidance and harbor traffic control device called Automatic Identification 
System (AIS), which is comparable to Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders 
fitted aboard military aircraft and commercial airliners.24 The capabilities listed are not 
intended to be exhaustive, as there are myriad U.S., NATO, and other allied systems of 
many types for many different functions within the MDA sphere.  Instead, this chapter is 
designed to give only a glimpse of the capability and variety of some of the 
representative systems in use for MDA today, in the realms of space, airborne, surface, 
subsurface and coastal. 
Additionally, this chapter conducts a brief overview of some of the most recent 
Research and Development (R&D) initiatives in the world of MDA that are attempting to 
employ automation to accomplish mission tasks and goals. 
A. CURRENT SENSORS AND CAPABILITIES 
This section presents the overview of the representative MDA sensors and 
capabilities in all the media where MDA is conducted: Space, Air, Surface, Subsurface, 
and Coastal. 
1. Space Sensors and Capabilities 
The United States and our allies have launched reconnaissance satellites of 
various types and varying capabilities to provide required intelligence information. This 
                                                 
24 Global Security, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/mda.htm (accessed April 
2, 2010). 
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information includes the activity in the maritime domain.  There are four major types of 
reconnaissance satellites. Early-warning satellites can detect enemy missile launches. 
Nuclear-explosion detection satellites are designed to detect and identify nuclear 
explosions in space. Photo-surveillance satellites, or imagery satellites, provide 
photographs of enemy military activities, e.g., the deployment of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), or the movements of illicit cargoes. There are two subtypes of 
reconnaissance satellites. “Close-look” satellites provide high-resolution photographs that 
are returned to earth via a reentry capsule, whereas “area-survey” satellites provide 
lower-resolution photographs that are transmitted to earth digitally via radio. Later 
satellites have combined these two functions. Other satellites use radar and thermal 
imaging technology to provide images of enemy activity when there is cloud cover or it is 
dark. Electronic-reconnaissance (ferret) satellites pick up and record radio and radar 
transmissions while passing over a foreign country or seagoing vessel.25 
Other initiatives are attempting to enhance the capabilities of space sensors and 
communications to be more readily accessible to operational commanders in an effort to 
meet mission requirements, including MDA.  The signature effort among these is 
Operationally Responsive Space (ORS).  ORS has been broadly defined in DoD as 
assured space power focused on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders’ (JFCs’) 
needs. ORS is thus considered a subset of space activities designed to fulfill JFCs’ needs, 
such as MDA surveillance, communication, and data exchange, while also maintaining 
the ability to address other users’ needs, ultimately improving the responsiveness of 
space capabilities to meet national security requirements. The ORS initiative is intended 
to create opportunities for integration and operational efficiencies needed to ensure 




                                                 
25 “Reconnaissance Satellite,” The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2008. Encyclopedia.com. 
http://www.encyclopedia.com (accessed April 3, 2010).   
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of U.S. diplomatic, information, military, and economic needs, a specific goal of National 
Security Presidential Directive-49 (NSPD-49) on National Space Policy, dated August 
31, 2006.26 
Challenges in global political-military affairs are placing ever-increasing demands 
on the way the U.S. Armed Forces use space capabilities to achieve national security 
objectives, such as MDA. NSPD-49 reaffirms the United States’ commitment to certain 
key principles that guide the conduct of space activities. Adhering to these principles will 
require the implementation of certain courses of action to achieve MDA goals and 
objectives.  This will require additional global situational awareness, as well as 
adaptability to current and emerging threats, while acquiring the ability to advance the 
total suite of space capabilities to deal with these threats in new and innovative ways.27 
 
Figure 3.   Operationally responsive space: view of near-space architecture 
(From ) 
                                                 
26 Plan for Operationally Responsive Space, A Report to Congressional Defense Committees, National 
Security Space Office (NSSO), April 17, 2007,  2, 




One approach to addressing ORS for MDA and other mission needs entails not 
even going to space.  This is based on the fact that terrestrial-based systems or aircraft, 
whether they be manned or unmanned, can meet many “space-type” needs. The Air Force 
has identified the realm above typical operational altitudes for aircraft and below the 
orbital regime (i.e., “space”), generally between 65,000 and 325,000 feet, as “near 
space,” as shown in Figure 3. This very high altitude distinctively favors the operation of 
ISR, battlespace situational awareness, and communications assets, which are all vital to 
the execution of MDA. Unfortunately, near space has not been used extensively for 
military operations to date due to this operational environment’s technical challenges 
(e.g., distance, environmental extremes).  However, new advances in areas such as 
materials, solar collection, and power-storage technology can hopefully offer the 
opportunity to exploit this regime for MDA -applicable missions.28 
2. Airborne Sensors and Capabilities 
There are numerous airborne platforms with a varied collection of extensive 
capabilities that perform a vast array of detection, tracking, fusion, identification, 
classification, and strike functions in the maritime domain.  Here are listed just a few 
prime examples of the current capability and flexibility in terms of broad-range to close-
in-range sensing and engagement platforms. 
The RQ-4A “Global Hawk” is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used by the 
United States Air Force and Navy as surveillance aircraft.  The U.S. Navy had two RQ-
4A air vehicles delivered in 2005, and in April 2008, the U.S. Navy selected the RQ-4N 
marinized variant of the Global Hawk RQ-4B Block 20 for the broad-area maritime 
surveillance (BAMS) unmanned aircraft system (UAS) requirement.  The Global Hawk 
can carry out reconnaissance missions in all types of operations, in all weather and terrain 
conditions. The 14,000nm range and 42-hour endurance of the air vehicle, combined with 
satellite and line-of-sight communication links to ground or maritime forces, permits 
                                                 
28 Les Doggrell, Operationally Responsive Space – A Vision for the Future of Military Space, Air & 
Space Power Journal, Summer 2006, available at 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/doggrell.html (accessed April 9, 2010.)  
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worldwide operation of the system.  High-resolution sensors include visible and electro-
optical / infrared (EO/IR) systems and synthetic aperture radar (SAR). A 10-inch 
reflecting telescope provides a common optics platform for EO and IR sensors. The 
EO/IR sensors operate in the 0.4 to 0.8 micron visible waveband and the 3.6 to 5 micron 
infrared band. In spot collection mode, the coverage is approximately 1,900 spots per 
day, with a spot size of 2km  to a geological accuracy of 20m circular error of probability 
(CEP). In wide-area search mode, the sensors can cover a swath that is 10km wide with 
total coverage at 40,000nm  a day.  The SAR and ground moving target indicator (GMTI)  
operates in the X-band with a 600 MHz bandwidth, at 3.5kW peak power. The system 
can obtain images with 3-ft resolution in the wide-area search mode and 1-ft resolution in 
spot mode.29 
The Navy’s new MH-60R Multi-mission helicopter is a follow-on upgrade to and 
eventual replacement of the current Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Surface 
Warfare (ASUW) helicopters, the SH-60B/F “Seahawk” series.  This upgrade represents 
a significant avionics modification to the SH-60 series aircraft enhancing ASW, ASUW, 
surveillance and identification (ID), as well as power projection missions, supporting the 
operational requirements of full-dimension MDA. The upgrade includes the “dipping” 
Airborne Low Frequency Sonar (ALFS) and greatly increases sonobuoy and acoustic 
signal processing using a Commercial of the Shelf (COTS) Enhanced Modular Signal 
Processor. In addition, the aircraft employs an entirely new Multi-Mode Radar (MMR), 
including Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) detection and imaging and periscope 
detection modes.  The MMR also includes an embedded data fusion system, which 
permits standoff classification of hostile threats, as to specifically what type, class, and 
capability. Also, the Electronic Support Measures (ESM)30 system upgrade now exceeds 
the capabilities found on U.S. Navy surface ships and includes a fully automated and 
                                                 
29 Net Resources International, http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/global/ (accessed  April 
2, 2010. 
30 Electronic Support Measures (ESM) is a passive type of Electronic Warfare (EW) that exploits 
Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), made up of Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) and Communications 
Intelligence (COMINT), in order to locate, identify, and track enemy contacts via their emitted 
electromagnetic radiation signals, http://www.radartutorial.eu/16.eccm/ja05.en.html (accessed April 14, 
2010). 
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integrated Radar Warning System (RWS) for self-protection.31 The AN/ALQ-210 ESM 
system on the MH-60R is a multiple-bandwidth phase, frequency and amplitude-
measuring receiver. Incorporating digital receiver technology, the system utilizes wide 
instantaneous bandwidth to provide enhanced probability of intercept as well as 
frequency-agile emitter acquisition.  Featuring these technologies, it has been observed 
that this ESM system locates both moving and stationary targets to an order of magnitude 
far exceeding the capability of classic Direction-Finding (DF) equipment. Enhanced 
threat identification and mode determination is accomplished via operationally proven 
algorithms and digital parametric accuracy. The AN/ALQ-210 provides autonomous 
processing to reduce operator workload, combined with manual intervention to allow for 
tailoring of parameters.32Additionally, the aircraft employs a Forward Looking Infrared 
(FLIR) sensor, with laser designator/rangefinder, providing the capability to launch 
Hellfire missiles. The MH-60R weapons suite also includes MK-48 and MK-50 analog 
and digital ASW torpedoes.33  
The P-3C “Orion” long-range ASW aircraft is a four-engine turboprop ASW and 
maritime surveillance aircraft.  Originally designed as a land-based, long-range, ASW 
patrol aircraft, the P-3C's mission evolved in the late 1990s and early 21st century to 
include surveillance of the entire battlespace, either at sea or over land or in between, in 
the littorals. The P-3C has advanced submarine detection sensors such as directional 
frequency and ranging (DIFAR) sonobuoys and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) 
equipment. Additionally, the P-3C has improved ASUW capabilities via the Antisurface-
warfare Improvement Program (AIP), which incorporates enhancements in its ASUW 
suite, such as the ASX-6 Multi-Mode Imaging System (MMIS), over-the-horizon 
targeting (OTH-T), command, control, communications and intelligence (C4I), and 
improved survivability. The avionics system is integrated by a general-purpose digital 
                                                 
31 Global Security,  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60r.htm (accessed April 
5, 2010). 
32 Jane's Avionics, Airborne electronic warfare (EW) systems, United States, February 3, 2010, 
http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JDET (accessed  April 5, 2010). 
33 Global Security,  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/sh-60r.htm (accessed April 
5, 2010). 
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computer that supports all of the tactical displays, monitors and can automatically launch 
ordnance, as well as provide flight information to the pilots. In addition, the system 
coordinates navigation information and receives sensor data inputs for tactical display 
and storage. The P-3C can carry a mixed payload of both ASW and ASUW weapons 
internally and on wing pylons.34  
3. Surface Sensors and Capabilities 
As one would expect, the U.S. Navy employs many capabilities for MDA mission 
execution in the primary medium of the maritime environment, the surface of the seas.  
These capabilities are numerous, and deployed aboard the entire range of surface ships, 
from large combatants—such as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, 
amphibious assault ships, and the new multi-mission littoral combat ship—all the way 
down to the smaller mine-sweepers, patrol craft, and even auxiliaries, such as supply and 
hospital ships.  Rather than discussing the specific platforms, and enumerating the myriad 
capabilities resident on each, which would be quite lengthy, we will instead look at some 
of the more common sensors utilized across the spectrum of the U.S. surface fleet, and 
discuss their capabilities in prosecuting threats and other targets of interest in the 
maritime domain. 
The AN/SPY-1 multifunction fixed phased-array radar is the equipment that 
forms the central part of the U.S. Navy's Airborne Early warning/Ground environment 
Integration Segment (AEGIS) fleet air defense system. As applied to the AEGIS cruisers 
and destroyers, the system's phase-scanned arrays are mounted in pairs on the vessel's 
fore and aft deckhouse, in such a way as to provide 360q radar coverage.  The radar’s 
output is measured in megawatts and it operates in the S-band, with the transmitter 
serving several parallel channels simultaneously.  Multiple radiating elements within 
each array are digitally controlled by computer to facilitate the production and steering of 
multiple radar beams for target search, detection, and tracking, as well as the generation 
of target track data for associated ownship missile target illumination and command 
                                                 
34 U.S. Navy Fact File, P-3C Orion, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1 (accessed 5 April 5, 2010). 
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guidance. The AN/SPY-1 had been developed and deployed in a number of variants, 
upgrading capability and functionality, along with the AEGIS system.35 
The AN/SPS-55 solid-state I-band surface search and navigation radar is another 
widely deployed system. It is designed for employment on surface ships of destroyer size 
or above, and has been installed on almost every capital ship in the U.S. Navy. It is 
operationally used for: navigation and pilotage; the detection of small surface targets 
ranging from less than 50m up to the radar horizon; tracking of low-flying aircraft and 
helicopters; detection of submarines at snorkel and periscope depth. The system's 
lightweight, low profile antenna minimizes installation space requirements.  The antenna 
consists of two selectable back-to-back, end-fed, slotted arrays, one with circular and the 
other with linear-horizontal polarization. With a horizontal beamwidth of 1.5º and beam 
“squint” compensation, the system can optimize bearing accuracy over the entire 
operating frequency range. Vertical beamwidth is 20º. The SPS-55's transceiver 
subsystem is housed below-deck in a single cabinet and is capable of operating at any 
selected frequency in the band from 9.05 to 10 GHz, with two pulse-widths (1 and 0.12 
µs) and variable sector radiation provided. The minimum peak transmitter output is 130 
kW. To permit remote operation of the transmitter/receiver and scanner subsystems, a 
separate control unit is provided, as the SPS-55 set does not normally include its own 
display.36 
A newer system, similar to the SPS-55, is the AN/SPS-67(V) surface search radar.  
This is a solid-state G-band system that was originally designed to replace the AN/SPS-
10 surface search radar, the antenna that was initially used with the new equipment. 
Aside from the antenna, the AN/SPS-67 consists of an antenna controller and an antenna 
safety switch, a transceiver, a video processor, and a radar control unit. System 
performance was enhanced for better navigation and improved resolution of small targets 
at short ranges by the addition of a very narrow pulse mode (0.1 µs). In open sea, long 
and medium pulse modes (1 and 0.25 µs) are used for detection of long- and medium-
                                                 
35 Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, March 30, 2010. 
36 Ibid., November 10, 2000. 
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range targets. A digital video clutter suppressor and an interference suppressor further 
improve performance. Jane's sources report that AN/SPS-67(V) series radars have been 
installed aboard the following warships and classes of warship: the aircraft carrier 
Enterprise; Nimitz class aircraft carriers; Arleigh Burke (Flts I, II and IIA)-class 
destroyers; Austin-class amphibious transport docks; Tarawa and Wasp-class amphibious 
assault ships and Mercy-class hospital ships.37 
It is extremely challenging to detect and, especially, identify potential maritime 
threats or illicit behavior in total darkness or in adverse weather conditions. Thermal 
imaging cameras and other Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) systems have been 
developed to help maritime domain operators to meet the demands of identifying contacts 
of interest at night and in other low-light situations. Thermal imaging cameras can be 
integrated with radars and other sensors in the maritime environment in a so-called 
“slew-to-cue” mode, which allows operators to automatically aim the thermal imaging 
system at a radar track for automatic target acquisition and rapid identification.38 
The SAFIRE (AN/AAQ-22)/ SeaFLIR (AN/KAX-1/2)/SeaFLIR III/SEA Star 
SAFIRE III family of systems are surface platform-based infrared sensors for passive 
detection and tracking of surface targets. The four-axis stabilized sensor package in the 
naval version SAFIRE is 38.1 cm in diameter, 44.6 cm high and weighs 38.1 kg. The 
sensor package uses a 4×4 cadmium-mercury-telluride detector array with a split-Stirling, 
closed-cycle, cooling to cover the 8–12 µm spectral band with ×1.9 and ×10.5 
magnification. Naval versions also include de-icing.  The below-deck control unit fits 
into a 19 in (48.3 cm) rack and weighs 12.15 kg, with buttons and a joystick with various 
sizes of monochrome display available. The system uses standard video formats and 
digital interfaces to ESM and navigation systems. Optional extras include a digital auto-
tracking feature, video recording, a MIL STD 1553B data bus interface with ship 
navigation controls and displays tactical symbology. 
                                                 
37 Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, August 14, 2009. 
38 Thermal Imaging Cameras for Border Security and Coastal Surveillance, FLIR Systems, 2010, 
http://www.flir.com/cvs/eurasia/en/content/?id=9652 (accessed April 14, 2010).  
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The SeaFLIR (AN/KAX-1/2) features a smaller, lighter director with a Indium 
Antimonide Focal Plane Array detector (256×256) covering the 3–5 µm wave band, 
having a resolution of 1.2 to 0.12 mrad with 10×1 continuous zoom. The sensor fits into a 
23 cm gimbaled mount. Three versions of SeaFLIR are available; long range color CCD 
TV sensor, with an 8.46 mm, 811 × 608 CCD with 470 line output and 48 × 2.7° field-of-
view, low-light monochrome CCD TV sensor with a 12.7 mm, 768 × 576 CCD with 570 
line output to provide a 29 × 2.9° field-of-view, and laser range-finder, which features a 
1.5 µm eye-safe range-finder with a range resolution of +/-5m.39 
The AN/SLQ-32(V) is the U.S. Navy's standard surface ship radar detection, 
analysis and jamming system. It is a wide-open (in angle and frequency) ESM system 
that covers radar threats within the U.S. Band 3 frequency range. It also provides cues 
and controls for shipboard Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) decoy launchers and, if 
fitted, an active radar jammer. The system is comprised of two multi-beam 
antenna/receiver assemblies, each of which is equipped with a 180° semi-omni sense 
antenna (for instantaneous frequency measurement) and two 90° Direction-Finding (DF) 
lens arrays. It also includes processing and display equipment.  A special purpose digital 
processing subsystem incorporating DF/frequency correlation and digital tracking 
elements correlates coarse frequency and amplitude data, which, together with signal 
time-of-arrival, is used to create a pulse descriptor word. These emitters are then 
catalogued and stored in the emitter file memory of the digital tracker. If three or more 
pulses meeting a specific signature are received within a programmable time span, the 
system's AN/UYK-19 central computer is informed that a new emitter has been detected. 
This detection triggers a command for the digital tracker to provide additional stored 
pulses for full-scale analysis. From this analysis, the threat signal's parameters - pulse 
repetition frequency, scan type, scan rate and frequency—are established in order to 
allow the system to identify the emitter against a digital emitter library. Once the 
                                                 
39 Jane's Naval Weapon Systems, September 16, 2009, http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JDET (accessed  
April 1, 2010). 
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identification process is complete, the system then generates appropriate alert signals to 
system operators and commands for the ECM systems.40 
4. Subsurface Sensors and Capabilities 
Whereas the primary detection medium above the surface of the water is 
exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum, beneath the surface, targets must be 
detected, tracked, classified, and engaged almost exclusively by the use of acoustic 
sensors.  Some of the most effective employment of these types of sensors is through 
those platforms that operate in the same environment as the subsurface threat, which is 
the U.S. submarine force.  Here we will look at some of those subsurface capabilities, 
which are used for MDA in the underwater domain. 
The Virginia Class attack submarine is an advanced, stealthy nuclear-powered 
submarine designed for deep ocean ASW and littoral operations. The Virginia Class 
employs the AN/BQQ-10(V4) sonar processing system for its acoustic sensor suite, 
which includes bow-mounted active and passive arrays, side-mounted wide aperture 
passive array, high-frequency active arrays on keel and fin, TB-16 towed array and the 
TB-29A thin line towed array.  In place of traditional optical periscopes, the 
submarinesare fitted with Kollmorgen AN/BVS-1 photonic mast. The sensors mounted 
on this mast include LLTV (low-light TV), thermal imager and laser rangefinder. To 
facilitate simultaneous communication at super high frequency (SHF) and extremely high 
frequency (EHF), submarine high data rate (sub HDR) multi-band satellite 
communications systems are also mounted on the mast. The Boeing long-term mine 
reconnaissance system (LMRS) will be deployed on the Virginia Class, which includes 
two 6m autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), an 18m robotic recovery 
arm along with support electronics. 
The command and control systems module (CCSM) will integrate all of the 
vessel's systems, to include sensors, countermeasures, navigation, weapon control, and 
                                                 
40 Jane's Avionics, Airborne electronic warfare (EW) systems, United States, December 8, 2008, 
http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JDET (accessed April 5, 2010). 
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will be based on open system architecture (OSA) with Q-70 common display consoles. 
Weapons control will be provided with the AN/BYG-1 combat control system (CCS), a 
derivative of the CCS MK 2 combat system, which is also being fitted to the Australian 
Collins Class submarines.41 
The other cutting edge subsurface platform is the Seawolf attack submarine, 
which was conceived as a faster, better-armed replacement for the Los Angeles Class 
attack submarines.  However, the Seawolf’s intended use as a counter to Soviet 
submarines was deemed not worth the cost, given the end of the Cold War.  This change  
of emphasis to littoral operations led to preferring the smaller and cheaper Virginia Class, 
with only three Seawolves constructed.  
The Seawolf submarines are being upgraded with the LAN/BQQ-10(V4) sonar 
processing system to manage the submarine's sonar suite that includes: BQQ 5D bow-
mounted active / passive arrays and wide aperture passive flank arrays; TB-16 
surveillance and TB-29A thin-line towed array; BQS 24 active sonar for close range 
detection. The CCS is a Lockheed Martin BSY-2 with a network of approximately 70 
68030 Motorola processors. This system will eventually be replaced by the AN/BYG-1 
combat system, with weapons control managed by the MK 2 fire control system.42 
As mentioned previously, there are several air launched or deployed acoustic 
sensors, such as sonobouys and dipping sonar, for detecting and tracking subsurface 
targets.  In addition to these assets, there are also several surface-based acoustic sensors, 
such as hull-mounted and towed array sonar systems.  A few examples of those systems 
are described below. 
The AN/SQS-53 is the most advanced surface ship ASW sonar in the U.S. Navy. 
It is a high-power, long-range system, used both actively and passively to prosecute 
submarine contacts. The SQS-53B, located at the bow of the ship, detects, localizes, 
                                                 
41 NSSN Virginia Class Attack Submarine, USA, http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nssn/ 
(accessed April 7, 2010). 
42 SSN Seawolf Class Attack Submarine, USA,  http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nssn/ 
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classifies, and tracks multiple subsurface contacts. With improved signal processing, this 
sensor was the first sonar in the Navy linked directly to digital computers for rapid and 
accurate target processing. The system also has the capabilities for underwater 
communications, countermeasures against acoustic underwater weapons, and certain 
oceanographic recording.  
The AN/SQS-53C version has both active and passive modes for ASW weapons 
control and guidance. The AN/SQS-53C performs direct path ASW search, detection, 
localization, and tracking from the hull mounted transducer array.  The AN/SQS-53C’s 
computer-aided detection and automatic contact management supports the system’s high 
source level, fully stabilized beams, and wide convergence zone annuli. The AN/SQS-
53C provides apparent range, bearing, and true bearing of contacts in active mode and 
true bearing of contacts in passive mode. The AN/SQS-53C is a digital system with 
stable performance, fail-safe features, and automated performance monitoring/fault 
isolation.43 
Another surface acoustic system is the AN/SQR-19 Tactical Towed Array 
SONAR (TACTAS), which provides very long-range passive detection of subsurface 
contacts. TACTAS consists of a long cable full of hydrophones that is towed about a mile 
behind the surface platform. It is towed far enough behind to prevent ship self-noise from 
interfering with target noise signatures. The system provides the ability to detect, classify, 
and track a large number of submarine contacts at increased ranges. TACTAS is a 
component sensor of the AN/SQQ-89(V)6 ASW Combat System, providing significant 
improvements in passive detection and localization, with 360-degree coverage at tactical 
ship speeds.44 
TACTAS is also employed upon Tactical Auxiliary General Ocean Surveillance 
(T-AGOS) ships, which have the singular mission of gathering underwater acoustical  
 
                                                 
43 Global Security,  http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/an-sqs-53.htm 
(accessed  April 7, 2010). 
44 Military Analysis Network, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-sqr-19.htm 
(accessed  April 7, 2010). 
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data, as part of a system called the Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System, or 
SURTASS. The T-AGOS ships operate to support the anti-submarine warfare mission of 
the Maritime Component Commanders. 
T-AGOS ships are designed to tow several types of underwater listening devices 
to collect acoustical data. They also carry advanced electronic equipment for processing 
and transmitting data for evaluation via satellite to shore stations. Other services provided 
by these civilian contractor-manned ships are oceanographic and hydrographic surveys 
and acoustic research. SURTASS patrols are typically 60 to 90 days in duration.45 
SURTASS is an element of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), 
being developed and deployed for more mobile, tactical capability in the early 1980s, 
providing long-range detection and cuing for tactical weapons platforms against both 
diesel and nuclear submarines. The fixed component of the IUSS is the Sound 
Surveillance System (SOSUS).  SOSUS consists of hydrophone arrays on the sea bottom 
connected by undersea communication cables to facilities ashore.46 With SOSUS arrays 
being placed in a standby status after the end of the Cold War, where data was available 
but arrays were not continuously monitored, SURTASS must provide the undersea 
surveillance necessary to support regional conflicts and Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) protection. 
The SURTASS Block Upgrade expands the capabilities of the towed array 
collection and analysis system on T-AGOS ships. The upgrade improved sensitivity and 
signal processing and use of a reduced diameter hydrophone array with advancements 
against quiet threats. The upgrade added the Reduced Diameter Array (RDA) and a 
COTS processing system that provides improved detection capability and target bearing 
accuracy and better spectrum analysis. Communications upgrades provide additional 
UHF SATCOM voice and data connectivity between T-AGOS and tactical platforms.  
                                                 
45 Navy Fact File, http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/navyfacts/blsurveillanceships.htm 
(accessed  April 7, 2010). 
46 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) VENTS Web site, 
http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/vents/acoustics/sosus.html (accessed  April 16, 2010). 
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The SURTASS Low Frequency Active (LFA) system upgrade is the active 
addition to this towed array. LFA is a long-range active sensor designed to detect even 
quieter threats in the future, including a large source array for active transmissions and an 
array as a separate receiver.  LFA also includes an active signal processing and display 
system, an active transmit array and handling system, power amplification and control 
systems and an environmental analysis system to the SURTASS Upgrade. 47 
5. Coastal Sensors and Capabilities 
Given that the United States is a maritime nation with hundreds and hundreds of 
miles of coastline, coastal sensors for the monitoring of the maritime domain nearest the 
Homeland provide a vital MDA capability.  The implementation of measures for 
maritime security has brought greater attention to the need for coastal surveillance. The 
current implementation of policy on maritime security is also routinely addressing 
operational responses to humanitarian and environmental issues, which drives the 
demand for surveillance data. The apparent lack of information on activities within the 
coastal zone supports the need to develop Coastal Domain Awareness by establishing the 
COP of all potential threats within the coastal zone.48  This section describes a few of the 
representative systems that are utilized to meet the coastal COP development mission. 
Cardion E/F-band (2 to 4 GHz) automatic coastal surveillance radar has been 
developed and produced as a transportable 10cm band coastal defense radar system 
which can rapidly be deployed in remote sites for coastline monitoring and early warning. 
The system includes a Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) system and was designed for 
use at unattended sites with automatic reporting of data and control signals. An extensive 
self-monitoring system has been incorporated into the design, allowing for remote 
deployment and operation. The system automatically reports alerts are transmitted upon 
detections or abnormal conditions. The main radar antenna is a double curvature reflector 
                                                 
47 Military Analysis Network, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/surtass.htm (accessed  April 7, 
2010). 
48Mark Womersley, Protecting Coastal Communities through Civil Maritime Surveillance, 
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/application/nrm/coastal/mnm/art_001pf.htm (accessed  April 7, 2010). 
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design with integrated primary and secondary feed assemblies. A secondary 
omnidirectional antenna is mounted on top of the main antenna and used for sidelobe 
suppression in the SSR. Since the radar is typically employed in a coverage augmentation 
role, the vertical beam has been specifically adapted to provide high detection probability 
of small surface targets and low-altitude aircraft49 
The LCR 2020 is a frequency agile, 2-Dimensional, coastal surveillance radar 
system designed for simultaneous detection of surface and air targets.  The system is 
described as exhibiting “superior” surface detection capabilities, coupled with all-weather 
performance. To accomplish these capabilities, the smart sensor features adaptive 
processing, with a robust land/sea clutter rejection, as well as incorporating a suite of 
jamming detection and anti-jam electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) 
capabilities. Other features include autonomous operation and a network-capable 
architecture.50 
The Orion coastal air defense radar is a pulse-Doppler F-band (3 to 4 GHz) 
coastal surface and low-altitude air radar system. The Orion system is designed to 
provide surveillance coverage over designated land and sea areas through coastal 
surveillance, low-altitude air space surveillance and inshore coastal/harbor traffic 
monitoring. The coastal surveillance function can provide early warning and monitoring 
of all types of large surface vessels, in addition to a variety of small craft. The low-
altitude air surveillance function allows the monitoring of low-flying aircraft and 
helicopters. Orion has been designed for remote operation, to be deployed at unattended 
sites with automated transmission of data and control signals. The system includes the F-
band primary search radar and the D-band (1 to 2 GHz) SSR.   
The Orion system can be deployed in either fixed-site, transportable, or mobile 
installation configurations.  The fixed-site configuration provides persistent surveillance 
of potential threat approaches, with the antenna tower mounted with or without radome, 
                                                 
49 Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems,  November 10, 2000, 
http://www8.janes.com/JDIC/JDET (accessed  April 2, 2010). 
50 Ibid., January 8, 2009. 
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and can break down for transport by land, sea or air.  In the transportable configuration, 
the system may operate from semi-permanent sites, with a telescopic, transportable tower 
that extends the horizon surveillance coverage. The entire system is housed in a military 
equipment shelter, which can also be transported by land, sea, or air.  In the mobile 
configuration, the system is housed and rapidly deployed in a tactical tracked or wheeled 
vehicle, with a vehicle-mounted antenna. This setup is also highly transportable.51  
B. DATA FUSION 
This section discusses the field of data fusion and how it applies to MDA by first 
presenting the theory of data fusion, then explaining data fusion in practice, and 
concluding with examples of data fusion in operational use. 
1. Data Fusion Theory 
Combining various data from sensors (both similar and dissimilar sensors) is 
sensor fusion and combining that data together with current-state and a priori knowledge 
can be considered information fusion.52 Faceli, Carvalho, and Rezende define sensor 
fusion as “the combination of information from different sensors to capture data of the 
environment whose obtaining is beyond the capacity of each sensor individually, mainly 
when reliability and precision are considered.” Sensor fusion, in pulling together and 
combining attributes from many sources, can provide to users new information that none 
of the sensors alone could supply.53 Figure 4 demonstrates a basic architecture of one 
approach to sensor fusion, showing how the many different types of data, each with their 
individual informational attributes, are fused together to create a synergistic product of 
combined characteristics.  These combined characteristics define entirely different, 
additional, and arguably more useful information to the user, than the constituent parts 
could provide separately. 
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Figure 4.   Basic Architecture of Sensor Fusion. (After Schafer) 
Four different types of sensor fusion are specified below:54 
a. Complementary Fusion 
Different types of sensors provide different (complementary) views of the 
environment (e.g., video and audio data provide more accurate data on a target). 
b.  Competitive Fusion 
The goal of competitive fusion is to provide redundant information about 
the area within the environment observed. More than one sensor observes the same 
feature of the environment (e.g., two cameras observing the same space, but obtain 
differing figure of merit, which can be compared for quality of data). 
c. Cooperative Fusion 
Cooperative fusion is the combination of data from independent sensors in 
order to obtain information that could not be obtained by any of the sensors by  
 
 
                                                 
54 K. Faceli, A. C. P. L. F. de Carvalho, and S. O. Rezende, "Combining intelligent techniques for 
sensor fusion," Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Neural Information Processing, 2002 
(ICONIP '02), vol. 4, 1998–2002, IEEE Press, New York, Pub. No. 981-04-7524-1, 2002. 
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themselves (e.g., a radar and an ESM system on either the same or separate platforms 
working in conjunction with one another, sharing target attributes to ascertain a target’s 
identity). 
d.  Independent Fusion 
Unrelated sensors provide information to a common storage location in a 
common data structure (e.g., satellite data and AIS data on a commercial tanker provided 
independently to a database for eventual fusion and pattern learning). 
2. Data Fusion in Practice 
Under the construct of Net-Centric Operations (NCO), “Horizontal Fusion” is 
considered the catalyst for net-centric transformation in DoD. Horizontal Fusion is one of 
the pillars of the Department’s NCW/NCO transformation effort, which includes vital 
infrastructure elements, such as Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-
BE), Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Wideband Satellite Communications 
(SATCOM), Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES), and Information Assurance 
(IA).The goal of Horizontal Fusion is to provide real-time situational awareness (SA) 
through the use of battlespace, “sense-making” tools, collaboration among communities-
of-interest, and the ever-elusive critical intelligence information sharing.  
The term “horizontal” refers to the ability to provide connection and 
communication across traditionally stove-piped peer-to-peer organizations; and “fusion” 
refers to the products and processes that facilitate sensor and information “melding.” It is 
envisioned that users will have the ability to gain access to the additional, augmented 
information that data fusion provides, across the battlespace, through “smart-pull” 
systems and applications for full-spectrum information sharing. DoD’s Office of Force 
Transformation describes this process by the verbs task, post, process, and use (TPPU). 
Through TPPU, users have rapid access to information through “smart-pull” methods. A 
critical aspect to the success of TPPU, is the interoperable infrastructures that are 
required within the DoD and across all associated intelligence-gathering organizations.  
Geographically dispersed commanders and forces will have the power to act as one 
interconnected team through the sharing of the COP.  Another boon to information 
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sharing is the real-time collaboration among users to share best practices and contribute 
to the available body of knowledge, regardless of their respective communities of 
interest. 
This subsection discussed the concept of data fusion and presented different types, 
as well as an operational methodology of data fusion; the next subsection provides 
examples of systems that are currently used to accomplish data fusion in support of 
MDA. 
3. Operational Data Fusion Examples 
The Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M) is the designated 
Command and Control (C2) system for the Navy, as well as the naval implementation of 
the national GCCS. GCCS-M supports numerous operational and intelligence missions 
for commanders at every level, in all naval environments (afloat and ashore) for joint, 
coalition, and allied forces. GCCS-M, implemented across all naval command centers, is 
able to exchange data among approximately 20,000 users for near real-time SA critical to 
operational and tactical analysis and decision making. GCCS-M meets joint and service 
requirements for a single, integrated, scalable C2 system that receives, displays, 
correlates, fuses, and maintains geo-located track information on friendly, hostile, and 
neutral land, sea, and air forces.  It then integrates this track data with available 
intelligence and environmental information. GCCS-M fully supports the developing 
concepts for Network-Centric Operations through the fusing and integrating track, 
intelligence and other available relevant information for the operators.55 
Trusted Information Service (TIS) program is a compilation of the Multi-Level 
Security (MLS) capabilities of the Navy's complementary Ocean Surveillance 
Information System (OSIS) and Radiant Mercury systems. This system will facilitate 
expansion and extension of the Commander's ability to automatically exchange essential 
fused intelligence and operational information with all networked forces. 
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The OSIS Evolutionary Development (OED) system is the DoD's premier C4I 
processing and dissemination system, forming the basis of the automated information 
infrastructure, supporting the COP at U.S. and allied Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). 
OED receives, processes, fuses, and disseminates timely all-source surveillance 
information on fixed and mobile targets of interest, across the maritime domain, within 
an MLS environment. OED facilitates collaboration in multiple domains, via viewing, 
monitoring, and analyzing multiple views of the battle space at all security classification 
levels. The effective communication and fusion subsystems of OED provide extremely 
rapid delivery of battlespace informational products in support of the Unified Combatant 
Commanders, Joint Task Force commanders, individual units, and allies. MLS is 
envisioned as serving as the core fusion and collaboration technology upon which future 
Navy networks and databases across multiple classification levels can be effectively 
joined to allow appropriately cleared operators access to fused data from a single 
workstation. 
Radiant Mercury (RM) provides the vital operations security functions that 
automatically sanitize, transliterate, and downgrade classified, formatted information to 
users at lower classification levels. RM helps ensure critical Indications and Warning 
(I&W) intelligence is provided quickly to operational decision makers at the various 
classification levels. RM is currently fielded in maritime platforms bridging data transfer 
between SCI GCCS-M and GENSER GCCS-M. Radiant Mercury Imagery Guard 
(RMIG) combines a digital signature process with RM allowing the networked transfer of 
imagery between security domains, which can then be fused with other data sources.56 
The next section discusses how all of these capabilities and processes are brought 
together and exploited for power capitalization and projection in the Information Age. 
C. NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE 
Network-Centric Warfare, or “Net-Centric Warfare” (NCW) is a theory of 
warfare that intends to exploit the combat power that can be harnessed and wielded in the 
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effective control of information.  This control stems from being able to link military 
entities in a network, so that they form a connected, information-sharing war fighting 
enterprise. Geographically dispersed entities within the battlespace must be able to share 
and manage a high level of information that can be exploited via self-synchronization and 
other network-centric operations to achieve commanders’ intent. NCW supports the 
requirement to convert superiority of information position to action, enhancing the speed 
of command. NCW can be applied across the spectrum of force size, terrain, location, and 
mission. Additionally, NCW is key to bridging the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels of war.57 
To successfully implement the emerging theory of war and NCW capabilities, 
under the construct of Network Centric Operations, the four domains of warfare—
physical, information, cognitive, and social—must be understood, as well as the 
intersections, or areas of overlap, between the domains. The four basic tenets of NCW, as 
shown in Figure 5, constitute a hypothesis regarding NCW as a source of power.58 
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Figure 5.   The Tenets and Domains of NCW (From DoD OFT) 
D. NETWORK-CENTRIC OPERATIONS 
The implementation of Network Centric Warfare is through Network-Centric or 
“Net-Centric” Operations (NCO).  To conduct NCO, war fighters must apply the tenets 
and principles of NCW. A force that can properly conduct NCO is “more adaptive, ready 
to respond to uncertainty in the very dynamic environment of the future at all levels of 
warfare and across the range of military operations.”59 As joint forces become more 
effectively networked—sharing a common operating picture, and therefore have shared 
situational awareness—they can communicate more efficiently and the operational 
effectiveness of joint force increases.   
A networked Joint Force is able to maintain a more accurate presentation 
of the battlespace built on the ability to integrate intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance, information and total asset visibility. This integrated 
picture allows the [Joint Force Commander] to better employ the right 
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capabilities, at the right place and at the right time. Fully networked forces 
are better able to conduct distributed operations.60  
Data pulled from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (2001–2002) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) (2003) in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, provide case 
studies in the effectiveness in conducting NCO. 
During OEF, the military saw a shift from platform-centric to network-centric 
operations as weapons platforms were successfully networked with sensor platforms.  
Ground units were networked to each other, as well as with aircraft and Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs), which provided commanders a near-real time battlefield situational 
awareness, as well as an unparalleled ability to effectively engage the enemy.  
Improving upon the success gained in OEF, OIF saw not only the fusion of 
sensors within a network, but also a fusion of the war fighter within an integrated 
networked, joint force. Brigadier General Dennis Moran said: “The ability to move  
intelligence rapidly from the sensor to either an analytical decision maker or directly to 
the shooter was the best that we have ever seen... We validated the concept of network-
centric warfare.”61 
The experiences of both OEF and OIF have shown that increasing the capability 
and the quality of networks in all domains, will result in better information sharing, 
enhanced rapidity of communications, and therefore an increased speed of command.  
Even though these experiences demonstrate the validity of NCO in a joint environment, 
one must ask in the context of this thesis, “How is NCO applied specifically in a 
maritime environment? In the next section, the U.S. Navy’s implementation of network-
centric operations is discussed. 
1. FORCENet 
The U.S. Navy’s FORCENet concept is “the operational construct and 
architectural framework for naval warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, 
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sensors, command and control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed 
combat force62.”  Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Michael 
Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, approved the FORCEnet Functional Concept 
in February 2005, in order to provide the shared direction, guiding principles, and future 
capabilities for the Navy and Marine Corps Net-Centric force development, as well as 
network command and control efforts. This concept, derived directly from the Naval 
Operating Concept (2015-2020) for Joint Operations, was developed under the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process and fully supports the 
Navy’s vision of Naval Power 21, as well as the combined strategies of Sea Power 21 and 
Marine Corps Strategy 21. The concept is meant to capitalize on the power of networking  
decision makers, which will increase war fighting capabilities and improve overall 
combat effectiveness and mission accomplishment through a fully integrated and 
interactive fighting force.63 
According to the Navy’s FORCENet Website, “the objective of FORCEnet is to 
provide commanders the means to make better, timelier decisions than they currently can 
and to see to the effective execution of those decisions.” It explains an underlying 
premise called the network effect that makes FORCEnet such a powerful concept.  This 
network effect “causes the value of a product or service in a network to increase 
exponentially as the number of those using it increases.” The concept assumes that most 
headquarters entities are already well connected, so the goal of FORCEnet is to further 
connect the extremities of the force, otherwise known as “disadvantaged users,”64 such as 
individuals, weapons, sensors, platforms, munitions, shipments, end items, parts, and so 
on. FORCEnet is intended to extend visibility and empowerment to these disadvantaged 
                                                 
62 “Sea Power 21, Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities” Admiral Vern Clark, U.S. Navy 
Proceedings, October 2002, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/proceedings.html (accessed April 15, 
2010). 
63 Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/forcenet.htm 
(accessed March 25, 2010). 
64 R. E. Goshorn, "Findings for network-centric systems engineering education," presented at the 
Military Communications (MILCOM) Conference, San Diego, November 2008. 
 48
users.  Senior Navy leadership believes that the concept’s greatest leap forward will be to 
achieve future command and control through “maximum decentralization.”65 
The Functional Concept identifies 15 capabilities that are necessary to implement 
the FORCEnet Concept: 
1. Provide robust, reliable communication to all nodes, based on the 
varying information requirements and capabilities of those nodes. 
2. Provide reliable, accurate and timely location, identity and status 
information on all friendly forces, units, activities and 
entities/individuals. 
3. Provide reliable, accurate and timely location, identification, tracking 
and engagement information on environmental, neutral and hostile 
elements, activities, events, sites, platforms, and individuals. 
4. Store, catalogue and retrieve all information produced by any node on 
the network in a comprehensive, standard repository so that the 
information is readily accessible to all nodes and compatible with the 
forms required by any nodes, within security restrictions. 
5. Process, sort, analyze, evaluate, and synthesize large amounts of 
disparate information while still providing direct access to raw data as 
required. 
6. Provide each decision maker the ability to depict situational 
information in a tailorable, user-defined, shareable, primarily visual 
representation. 
7. Provide distributed groups of decision makers the ability to cooperate 
in the performance of common command and control activities by 
means of a collaborative work environment. 
8. Automate certain lower-order command and control sub-processes and 
to use intelligent agents and automated decision aids to assist people in 
performing higher-order sub-processes, such as gaining situational 
awareness and devising concepts of operations. 
9. Provide information assurance. 
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10. Function in multiple security domains and multiple security levels 
within a domain and manage access dynamically. 
11. Interoperate with command and control systems of very different type 
and level of sophistication. 
12. Allow individual nodes to function while temporarily disconnected 
from the network. 
13. Automatically and adaptively monitor and manage the functioning of 
the command and control system to ensure effective and efficient 
operation and to diagnose problems and make repairs as needed. 
14. Incorporate new capabilities into the system quickly without causing 
undue disruption to the performance of the system. 
15. Provide decision makers the ability to make and implement good 
decisions quickly under conditions of uncertainty, friction, time, 
pressure, and other stresses.66 
Additionally, the concept states that in order to fully realize these capabilities, 
developmental efforts are required across six dimensions:  
1. Physical – The various platforms, weapons, sensors and other entities 
on the operating end of FORCEnet. 
2. Information technology – The communications and network 
infrastructure through which these entities interact. 
3. Data – The common structure and protocols for information handling. 
4. Cognitive – Human judgment and decision making and the human-
computer interfaces that support them. 
5. Organizational – The new force structures and working relationships 
that will be made possible by FORCEnet. 
6. Operating – The emergent methods and concepts by which forces and 
other organizations will accomplish their missions due to the 
capabilities provided by FORCEnet.67 
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The understanding of the power of decentralization in command and control is 
absolutely critical in the implementation of distributed processing, which is, in turn, a key 
architectural tenet of ABA integration.  The concepts of distributed processing and 
integration architecture for system design is explored more fully in Chapters III and IV, 
respectively.  However, suffice it to say at this point that the U.S. Navy’s vision for 
implementation of NCO in the maritime domain under FORCENet is ideal for the 
concept of integration of Automated Behavior Analysis capability within its Net-Centric 
framework. 
Furthermore, this thesis will establish how the concept of ABA integration 
squarely meets the FORCENet implementation capabilities 6, 8, 11, 12, 14, and 15 listed, 
as well as spans all six dimensions of development for those capabilities. 
E. CURRENT AUTOMATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R&D) 
INITIATIVES 
This section highlights some of the most recent and relevant R&D efforts in the 
field of autonomous data fusion and analysis in the maritime domain, to include some 
efforts in automated behavior or pattern analysis.  Although these initiatives all show 
differing levels of technological maturity and focus on several operational concept 
dilemmas in the maritime domain, they do all share the attributes of networked systems 
built for the purpose of automating analysis of vast amounts of maritime data to reduce 
operator workload and enhance threat response.   
The systems engineering involved in the development of these types of systems is 
the subject of a section in Chapter III, so it will not be discussed here.  Also in that 
section, as well as in Chapter V, the key differences between the automation processes 
and the systems engineering approaches of these systems and those of the Watchman 
Maritime Smart Environment Proof of Concept System are thoroughly addressed.  What 
is helpful to note here, is that the research conducted under this thesis is neither redundant 
nor mutually exclusive of any of the projects described herein.  On the contrary, this 
thesis provides a unique approach and perspective that can both benefit from, as well as 
add to the insights that these efforts have garnered in the course of research on the topic.  
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It will be highly recommended that further research stemming from this thesis should 
include collaboration among these promising endeavors. 
1. Predictive Analysis for Naval Deployment Activities (PANDA) 
The PANDA project intends to advance technologies and develop the architecture 
for a system that has the ability to alert watch standers to anomalous ship behavior in real 
time, allowing them to identify potentially dangerous behavior and react in a timely 
manner. The current CONOPS for achieving situational awareness in the maritime 
domain requires close and continuous monitoring of those ships or cargoes that have been 
previously flagged for concern (e.g., a suspected threat or illicit cargo) by some other 
intelligence gathering means. The goal of PANDA is to autonomously assess the 
behavior of all larger surface maritime vessels, to ascertain which vessels might be 
deviating from their normal, patterned behavior that may reveal hostile intent. 
The vision of PANDA is to go beyond merely tracking objects to begin to 
perform autonomous motion-based pattern analysis on those objects' tracks and their 
correlated activities. The goals of autonomous motion-based pattern analysis are to:  
x Learn normal patterns of behavior for objects of interest. 
x Leverage those patterns to perform motion-based anomaly and change 
detection. 
x Provide anticipatory situation awareness by alerting our military forces to 
emerging threats and changes in our enemies' operating patterns. 
To date, the ability to learn motion-based patterns has been hampered by the 
inability to perform persistent surveillance and conduct long-duration tracking on 
contacts of interest. Current enhancements in long-duration surveillance tracking in the 
maritime domain now make this motion-based pattern learning possible. 
The challenges to accomplishing this vision are many.  Activities that are required 
to further the vision and goal are:  
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x Research in Motion-Based Pattern Learning (learn motion-based activity 
models for individual, groups, and/or classes of vessels) 
x Prediction and Activity Monitoring (compare the incoming and emerging 
vessel tracks/behaviors with the existing vessel patterns and determine if 
the current behavior is consistent with the learned pattern) 
x Adaptive Context Modeling (learn, maintain, and efficiently store 
"business process" models related to variations in surface maritime ship 
behavior as well as suspicious behaviors) 
x Anomaly Processing and Presentation (compare anomalies generated to 
the anomaly database to determine if the anomaly is an emerging threat 
and present the results for review/resolution). 
The project scope is segmented into phases, focusing on the various aspects of the 
required activities: Phase I – learning and detection; Phase II – automation; Phase III – 
integration; Phase IV – technology scaling and transition. Throughout the phases of the 
program, technology developers, integrators, and testers will work closely with data 
providers and system end-users to make certain that the system delivered provides the 
essential information and is fully integrated with existing systems. This project will 
eventually transition the technologies and systems to various partners and customers 
throughout the development process, to ensure that the developed system ultimately 
meets user needs.68 
2. Maritime Automated Scene Understanding (ASU) System 
An Automated Scene Understanding (ASU) system is intended, much as the 
PANDA project describes, to relieve watch standers of critical yet mind-numbing 
surveillance and detection duties that free them to focus on threat assessment and 
response. Just as was discussed in the WMSE CONOPS in terms of military assets, 
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government agencies and commercial ports authorities are collecting vast amounts of 
data through the deployment of video, radar, and other sensor assets to monitor the 
maritime domain. As it has already been stated, this incredible amount of data cannot be 
effectively monitored and analyzed by existing manpower.  
SeeCoast is an ASU system designed to provide additional MDA capability. It has 
been developed by BAE Systems under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Science and Technology (S&T) Program. Built from a suite of components developed by 
BAE over the past 12 years, the system is designed to provide a real-time understanding 
of the maritime scene with minimal operator oversight. SeeCoast is designed to detect 
and track vessels (including estimating vessel lengths), fuse tracks, learn normal behavior 
patterns of surface vessels, and generate alerts for anomalous patterns. The data the 
system is designed to provide can ostensibly enhance maritime situational awareness by 
providing comprehensive vessel tracking and alerting operators to unusual vessel 
behaviors. The autonomous nature of the system will hopefully allow operators to focus 
on threat assessment and response rather than surveillance and detection. The system is 
currently being evaluated at Joint Harbor Operation Center (JHOC) Hampton Roads, 
Virginia. 
SeeCoast works by processing many diverse real-time tracks from various sensors 
such as radar, AIS, and cameras. Disparate tracks data is fused to establish a single track 
for each vessel, as well as to increase track confidence and accuracy. Video processing of 
an autonomously controlled network of pan-tilt-zoom camera data can detect, track, and 
estimate lengths of vessel. Camera calibration along with vessel waterline approximation 
technology enables the system to geographically locate tracks, as well as classify vessels 
by size. The situational understanding and alerting module learns normal vessel activity 
to create normalcy models by cataloguing and storing vessel features such as vessel size 
(class), unique ID (AIS), and time period. Vessel feature patterns are analyzed in real-
time against the learned models to detect anomalous behavior and generate alerts. False 
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alert rates are controlled via threshold and model parameter settings. The normalcy 
models can be automatically updated based on operator responses to alerts.69 
3. Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA) 
The CMA Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) was designed to 
rapidly assemble a maritime picture from multiple worldwide data sources through the 
use of automated data acquisition, fusion tools, anomaly detection capabilities, enhanced 
collaboration, and effective net-centric data management strategies. The JCTD’s desired 
end state was to enhance command-level maritime awareness, facilitate operational 
decision making, and increase opportunities for international and interagency maritime 
security cooperation.70 
The CMA system was designed to pull together a comprehensive maritime picture 
from myriad data sources using various technologies to include: data acquisition, 
automated data fusion, vessel behavior anomaly detection, collaboration, and net-centric 
data management. Similar to this thesis research, the goal of CMA is to enhance maritime 
domain awareness via facilitating operational decision making.  A unique aspect of CMA 
is that it also seeks to increase opportunities for international and interagency maritime 
security cooperation. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) authorized the CMA 
JCTD to swiftly field technologies to help reduce the potential maritime threat 
vulnerability of U.S. commercial shipping and ports.  This section discusses the results of 
the last phase of the JCTD, which was an Operational Utility Assessment (OUA)71 in 
which operators used and evaluated the latest development of CMA system capabilities.72 
                                                 
69 Michael Seibert, Bradley J. Rhodes, Neil A. Bomberger, Patricia O. Beane, Jason J. Sroka, Wendy 
Kogel, William Kreamer, Chris Stauffer, Linda Kirschner, Edmond Chalom, Michael Bosse, and Robert 
Tillson, SeeCoast Port Surveillance, Proceedings of SPIE Vol. 6204: Photonics for Port and Harbor 
Security II Orlando, FL, April 18–19, 2006. 
70 CMA JCTD Management Plan (Revision A), February 20, 2007, 1–1. 
71 OUA: An evaluation of operational effectiveness and operational suitability made by an 
independent operational test activity, with user support as required, on other than production systems. 
72 CMA JCTD Operational Utility Assessment Final Report, May 2009, 6. 
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Table 4.   CMA JCTD OUA Overall COI Ratings73 
Based on the OUA, CMA demonstrated an analytical capability enhancement to 
current MDA methods and tools. Table 4 shows the overall ratings for the critical 
operational issues (COIs) during OD4. The fused maritime information provided by 
CMA was considered a noticeable improvement over current capabilities. However, it 
was determined that operational use will be limited until a fully reliable 24/7 data update 
feature with sufficient bandwidth is implemented.74 
                                                 
73 CMA JCTD Operational Utility Assessment Final Report, May 2009, 6. 
74 Ibid., 2. 
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CMA capabilities were noted as facilitating identification of high-interest 
maritime activity by the user and that the capability to identify vessels showing signs of 
anomalous behaviors is a potent instrument for analysts. Users recognized that continued 
development and integration of this capability would be necessary for it to be useful 
operationally. During the demonstrations, significant saving of time was realized through 
CMA’s automated track development, querying, filtering, and display capabilities. Also, 
information sharing and collaboration among participants was successful. 
Based on the assessment results, the Joint Test and Assessment Activity (JTAA) 
recommended that CMA capability be fielded and sustained. The JTAA recognized that 
full capability is yet to be realized.  Several developmental efforts must be undertaken to 
make certain the system provides consistent, reliable data and stable operations 24/7.75 
4. Maritime Automated Super Track Enhanced Reporting (MASTER) 
MASTER was another JCTD commissioned to rapidly field new technology, 
however, the vision of the MASTER JCTD is to improve MDA by drawing from 
multiple data sources from different security levels to support creation of a “Super Track” 
- meaning a track containing vessel data gained from multiple sources which has been 
fused together - integrated on a single, user-defined operational picture at the Top 
Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) level on the Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Preceding the development of MASTER, 
this disparate data was not readily available, if available at all, on a single display. 
MASTER has the ability to automate data fusion by using a metadata fusion engine to 
permit the operator to identify and prioritize maritime threats.76 
 
                                                 
75 CMA JCTD Operational Utility Assessment Final Report, May 2009, 2, 3. 
76 Maritime Automated Super Track Enhanced Reporting (MASTER) Joint Capability Technology 
Demonstration (JCTD) Operational Demonstration 2 Operational Utility Assessment Report, April 2009, 5. 
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Figure 6.   MASTER System View77 
MASTER uses a flexible Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) as the base 
infrastructure for all MASTER services and activities. These include data collection, 
anomaly detection and alerting, support of operator threat assessment, search capabilities, 
and network data sharing. All of these capabilities were available, implemented, and 
assessed in OD2.  MASTER’s SOA directly enables aggregation, access, and handling of 
maritime data by external systems and operators. Analysts at the TS/SCI level on JWICS  
can access integrated sensor data from multiple database sources on MASTER due to the 
design of new hardware and software.  Figure 6 provides a system-level view of 
MASTER.78 
MASTER track data can transmitted to a SIPRnet site from JWICS via approved 
network classification security protocols. These protocols allow secret-level maritime 
                                                 
77 MASTER JCTD Operational Demonstration 2 Operational Utility Assessment Report. 
78 Ibid. 
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data to be used by other MDA systems such as CMA. A significant Open Source 
Intelligence (OSINT) service on NIPRnet provides maritime data from several hundred 
active, open sources for inclusion into the MASTER tool suite. Other protocols are used 
to transmit Open/Sensitive but Unclassified data sources over NIPRnet up to the TS/SCI 
level on JWICS. The Sensitive but Unclassified data can then be passed to the MASTER  
database for fusion with JWICS. MASTER fuses these open data sources with TS/SCI-
level data sources to enable operators to generate a more comprehensive MDA analysis 
picture.79  
Chapter II took a brief look at some of the current means, in both sensors and 
platforms employed, to accomplish the MDA mission.  Additionally, this chapter carried 
out a succinct overview of some of the most recent R&D initiatives in the area of MDA 
that are attempting to employ automation to accomplish mission tasks and goals.  The 
next chapter provides an overview of the SE approach that was utilized and how the SE 
process led to the development of the Watchman Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) 
proof of concept system (POCS). The chapter will further explain how behavior analysis 
algorithms function in this system.  The chapter will additionally describe the steps of the 
SE process, as they pertained to each phase of development of the POCS.   
                                                 
79MASTER JCTD Operational Demonstration 2 Operational Utility Assessment Report. 
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III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH OVERVIEW 
The Systems Engineering (SE) Approach Overview chapter discusses what SE 
approach was utilized and how the SE process led to the development of the Watchman 
Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) proof of concept system (POCS). The chapter 
begins with a generalized view of an SE approach to Artificial Intelligence, in particular 
Behavior Analysis, which will serve to explain how behavior analysis algorithms 
function within this system.  The chapter concludes by describing the steps of the SE 
process, as they pertained to each phase of development of the POCS.   
A. THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 
This section looks at a particular approach to engineering Artificial Intelligence 
systems, known as the “AI Systems Solution Pyramid.”  This look delves in detail into 
one of the pyramid’s levels of generalized intelligence automation fusing, the Detect, 
Identify, Predict, React, or “DIPR” software development construct. 
1. The Artificial Intelligence Systems Pyramid 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have the capability to automate the means by 
which concepts are characterized and represented in order to provide a relevant logic 
mechanism for use in decision making.80 As the maritime domain becomes more 
network-centric and flooded with sensors of all types, the plethora of data (required by 
both the end user/operators and decision-makers) that is produced must be ever more 
efficiently processed. It has become essentially implausible for human operators to 
adequately sift, evaluate, integrate and convey to other operators the appraisal of this 




                                                 
80 G. Winstanley, "Artificial intelligence support for systems engineering," IEE Colloquium on IT 
Support for Systems Engineers,  6/1–6/5, IEEE Press, New York, Pub. No. 3844604, 1990. 
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with the increased reliability and efficiency of data collection and analysis. To harness 
this potential, network-centric systems engineers should have a firm grasp and working 
knowledge of AI systems concepts.81 
One such concept is the innovative perspective on the SE of AI systems that 
forms the basis for the Watchman system, the “AI Systems Solution Pyramid,” shown in 
Figure 7.  This figure demonstrates a generalized view of an AI Systems Solution where 
the levels of the pyramid represent systems that comprise the entire solution.  Behavior 
Analysis, as will be shown, forms an integral part of this system architecture perspective. 
From the discrete mission requirements, the total system solution starts both from 
the “top-down” with one or more tailored applications and from the “bottom-up” with a 
system infrastructure.  Those infrastructures can either be a currently operational, 
modified, or newly developed infrastructure designed and built as part of the system 
solution.  
 
Figure 7.   System of Systems (SoS) Hardware and Software Net-Centric Solution (From 
Goshorn) 
The total solution cannot be realized without the foundational Infrastructure (first 
level of the pyramid) upon which all of the other systems can be built and which allows 
                                                 
81 David C. Schafer, A Systems Engineering Survey of Artificial Intelligence and Smart Sensor 
Networks in a Network-Centric Environment, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2009. 
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them to function.  This infrastructure comprises the essence of NCO, in that it includes all 
of the operational elements that must be networked, as well as the means by which they 
join and remain viable within the network.  These elements include the distributed 
sensors, the communication capabilities, and the platform hardware and software upon 
which the infrastructure is carried and functions.   
The second level of the pyramid is the Detection, Identification, Prediction, and 
Reaction (DIPR) system, along with its requisite subsystems, that form the heart of the AI 
systems solution.  The DIPR system is a generalized (application independent) software 
approach that segregates the AI behavior-modeling problem into four discrete 
intelligence functions to accomplish the AI system’s requirements.  This system is 
discussed more thoroughly in the next section, as this particular systems solution level 
applies most directly to the SE approach for the Watchman POCS. 
 
Figure 8.   DIPR Subsystems (From Goshorn) 
The Application Models, shown as the third level of the pyramid, engineer DIPR 
subsystems to perform in a specific rather than generalized solution. Application Models 
take the general system concepts of DIPR and refine them into more specific solution set 
ideas that then can form the basis of the actual Applications (fourth level of the pyramid) 
that are designed to carry out defined model functions.  Once the Application Models and 
the DIPR subsystems are defined within the specific applications, Customization (fifth 
level of the pyramid) of all level elements for the final solution can be accomplished.82 
 
                                                 
82 Goshom et al., “Behavior Modeling.”  
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Figure 9.   DIPR System Model (From Schafer) 
2. The Detect, Identify, Predict, React (DIPR) Model 
A concise overview of the generalized DIPR system software approach for AI 
systems engineering is discussed in this section.  Figure 8 depicts the flow of data 
through the functional processing blocks that represent model subsystems, each explained 
in the following subsections.  Figure 9 presents a visual synopsis of the system, where 
Schafer relates the DIPR model to a multi-agent system, and the environment shown at 
the center of the diagram represents that domain in which the DIPR must operate, acquire 
information from and react to.83  In the case of the Watchman POCS, this environment is 
the second floor of Bullard Hall at the Naval Postgraduate School. Operationally, under 
the DRM outlined in Chapter I, this would translate to the Maritime Domain.  As shown, 
data is obtained from the environment, processed through the Detection, Identification, 
Prediction, and Reaction subsystems to eventually produce some effect (e.g., predictions 
leading to reactions, based upon rules of engagement) back onto the environment.84 
                                                 
83 Schafer, A Systems Engineering Survey. 
84 Goshorn et al., “Behavior Modeling.” 
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a. Detection Subsystem 
The function of the detection subsystem is to process raw data input from 
networked sensors. From this data, the detect function extracts features from the objects 
sensed.  From this input, the subsystem then outputs a temporal feature matrix (Figure 
10).  A matrix is generated for each time sample.  The rows define object feature types.  
The columns represent disparate spatial regions.  Each time a feature is detected in a 
particular spatial region, the associated matrix element becomes non-zero.  That element 
either becomes 1 to reflect, “detected,” or it becomes a number between 0 and 1 to reflect 
the confidence level in that feature being detected.  In Figure 10, (a) is a simple temporal 
(feature, space) matrix example where features are binary-valued (black and white). 
Matrix (b) is a temporal (feature, space) matrix example where features are either real 
valued and normalized between zero and one (grayscale) or binary (black and white).  
 
 
Figure 10.   Temporal (Feature, Space) Matrix Examples (From Goshorn) 
It is crucial that the detection architecture for the subsystem not only take 
into account the desired feature(s), ranging from low-level simple features to more 
complex high-level features, that should be extracted from the data (e.g., visual data), but 
also the time and space of data extraction for future fusion and correlation of data. For 
each increment of time, the features that are detected are maintained in all their respective 
space increments in a 2-dimensional matrix, which then yields a 3-dimensional matrix 
storing feature values for each time increment, as seen in Figure 11. This sensor data 
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processing of the detect function may be done either locally at the sensor or within a 
sensor node processing center.  This distributed processing is a powerful tool for either 
reducing bandwidth used and processing power used at the node, in the case of local 
processing; or utilizing the generally higher processing power of a node center, in the 
case of node system processing. The systems engineer must be able to understand the 
capabilities of the system elements in order to properly judge the risks and benefits of 
each method. Broadly understood, the primary factor in the functioning of the detection 
sub-system are the“low-level classifiers” that determine the what, when, where in order 
to categorize and process detected features for extraction.85 
 
 
Figure 11.   Spatial-Temporal Feature Matrix. (From Goshorn) 
b. Identification Subsystem 
The primary purpose of the Identification subsystem is to identify specific 
combinations of fused features in time and space.  This fuses the time-space-feature 
matrix elements, depicted by the 3-dimensional spatial-temporal matrix in Figure 11, 
which are outputted from the detection subsystem.  When the fusion function identifies a 
                                                 
85 Goshorn et al., “Behavior Modeling.” 
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particular state of fused spatial-temporal features in one time interval, an “intelligent 
state” or “symbol” is generated.  The fusion functions are called “intelligent rules,” which 
are usually defined by the user, depending upon the application.  An example of a simple 
intelligent rule could be a Boolean expression in which ranges of features are fused 
according to a logical “and” descriptor (i.e., f1(t1,s1) and f2(t2,s2) and f3(t3s3)). The 
clauses in the expression represent the ranges of time/space values for each feature, for 
which the defined rules then describe a particular intelligent state (symbol). For any given 
time interval, the rule is satisfied, and the corresponding intelligent state (symbol) is 
identified when feature 1, f1, is detected at time t1, in spatial region s1 and feature 2, f2, is 
detected at time t2, in spatial region s2, and feature 3, f3, is detected at time t3, in spatial 
region s3.  The output from the “Identification” subsystem is the identified state symbol. 
Therefore, the intelligent states (symbols) at each time step are generated 
simply when the desired features take on the desired range of values for specific spatial 
regions, carried out through the Fusion (Intelligence Rules) Module. The Fusion Module 
is shown in the second stage of the “Identification” subsystem diagram, Figure 12. The 
creation of intelligent states (symbols) in rule definition is governed by the relevance of 
those symbols in ultimately capturing an aspect of a defined behavior.  Thus, the Fusion 
Module identifies intelligent states (symbols) by recognizing only the desired fusion 
(intelligent rules) of temporal feature values at only desired spaces.86 
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Figure 12.    “Identification” subsystem of the DIPR system. (From Goshorn) 
As has been explained, for every time-feature-space matrix inputted, there 
is an intelligent state (symbol) outputted when the fusion (intelligent rules) are met. If the 
rules are not met, a null state (symbol) is outputted. The use of the null state (symbol) is 
key to the “Prediction” subsystem behavior analysis function. For example, the system 
loses track of a contact for a certain time, or has not initiated a track sequence (first 
module of “Prediction”) on a contact. 
In addition to identifying the intelligent state (symbol), the “Identification” 
subsystem creates a three dimensional matrix (feature, space, time) which stores the 2D 
(feature, space) matrix by storing the feature values at different spaces in the matrix at 
every time increment, as seen in Figure 9. This three dimensional matrix is useful for 
intelligent states (symbols) extracted from incremental features in space over time. For 
example, assume feature (fk), estimates velocity derived from the difference in space and 
time of the contact being tracked.  
The creation and storage of this three dimensional matrix is also very 
important for the learning aspect of DIPR.  Automated learning is a vital function in order 
for the system to describe previously unseen intelligent states (symbols) and behaviors.87  
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Lastly, the storage of the values in the three-dimensional matrix form is critical for 
memory and computational efficiency.  Other fusion and identification systems store 
feature data in a list or database formats, which are extremely demanding in memory and 
processor capacity.  Matrix data storage and manipulation is essential to allowing DIPR 
functionality to be integrated on smaller, disadvantaged platforms, as well as to enhance 
DIPR distributed processing. 
c. Prediction Subsystem 
The “Prediction” subsystem is the heart of high-level AI, behavior 
modeling, and analysis and is understandably the most complex subsystem of DIPR. The 
methodology behind this subsystem is what enables the effective systems integration of 
automated behavior analysis (ABA).  The subsystem receives the identified intelligent 
states (symbols) as input from the “Identification” subsystem and outputs predicted 
behavior outcomes. This stage executes high-level behavior classification, as well as 
prediction of the corresponding contact behavior. In order to accomplish these functions, 
sequences of intelligent states (symbols) are first classified into behaviors and then these 
behaviors are inferred (predicted) to be one of the “known,” or pre-defined prediction 
outcomes or potentially the “unknown” prediction outcome. The “Prediction” subsystem 
is comprised of two modules, shown in Figure 13.88 Via the DIPR model, the prediction 
function is executed as fused features (symbols) are tracked over space and time, as 
opposed to tracking the features themselves, as in standard AI approaches.  The latter, 
more typical feature-tracking approach, which is processor and bandwidth intensive, 
presents the greatest challenge, and indeed restriction, to high-level AI behavior analysis.  
The following explanation of the functions of the Prediction modules will demonstrate 
how high-level AI behavior analysis becomes possible with DIPR, in an MDA, or any 
mission environment. 
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Figure 13.    “Prediction” subsystem of the DIPR system. (From Goshorn) 
The initial function within the Behavior Classifier Module (seen in Figure 
11) forms sequences of intelligent states (symbols) in some type of intelligent state 
(symbol) buffer. The second stage of the module is the sequential syntactical behavior 
classifier, explained in subsection (1). The Behavior Classifier Module outputs a behavior 
label. This label is either one of a number of pre-defined or “known” behaviors or an 
unknown behavior.  The behavior will be labeled as “unknown” if the sequence was not 
classified as any of the possible “known” behaviors. The behavior labels are then input to 
the second stage, the Infer Predicted Outcomes Module.  Just as the name suggests, this 
stage infers one of the predicted behavior outcomes. The inferred predicted outcomes are 
based on circumstances specified by the operator, environment, and application.89 
(1) Behavior Classification Module. The Behavior 
Classification Module (BCM) enables ABA systems integration through the efficient 
processing of sequenced symbols, derived from features, rather than the processing of 
features themselves, which, to reiterate, is very memory and processor intensive.  This 
powerful processing tool is found in the BCM second stage, the Sequential Syntactical 
Behavior Classifier (SSBC), which outputs a behavior label upon processing of the input 
sequence of symbols. If a behavior is not classified as one of the predetermined 
behaviors, it will be given the unknown behavior label.  The behavior labels are 
                                                 
89 Goshorn et al., “Behavior Modeling.” 
 69
predefined with user input to the system developer, however this predefinition function 
has the ability to be automated, which is highly desirable for operationally effective 
usage. Ideally, automated behavior definition would occur in two primary ways, through 
automated behavior learning, or intelligence data updates (data “push”). To understand 
the approach to defining behaviors, a brief discussion is provided, excerpted from 
Goshorn, et al. 
Behaviors are represented with a syntactical grammar-based 
approach, where each predefined behavior is modeled as a statistical and cost-weighted 
Finite State Machine (FSM). 
Let the set of all possible intelligent states (herein after referred to 
as “symbols”), which again, are derived from detected features and created in the 
“Identification” subsystem, compose an alphabet Ȉ. An example alphabet is Ȉ = {a1, a2, . . 
. aN } where each letter represents an identified symbol. This is a simplified example, as 
an “alphabet” of symbols could be comprised of members that contain any combination 
of letters and numerals, which could represent certain feature attributes.  Defining more 
complex and meaningful symbols was a large portion of the Watchman ABA research 
effort, and is discussed in Chapter V.  A behavior can then by defined through a set of 
syntax rules that combine the elements of Ȉ into a particular sequence. For example, if a 
is a symbol and we want to model a certain behavior, denoted Bk, which describes when 
only the intelligent state, a, is observed over a period of time, we would model it with the 
following FSM language, shown in Equation [1], where symbol b signifies the intelligent 




In other words, the FSM reads the observed sequence, and the 
sequence is then classified according to the behavior whose corresponding FSM accepts 
[1] 
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the sequence. It is certainly likely that a sequence could not be accepted by any of the 
predefined behaviors, due to the fact that systems are not completely predictable and 
reliable. This unreliability could be attributed to errors in feature detection or collection, 
low-level feature classification, or a behavior pattern statistically deviating from what has 
been defined. 
  
Figure 14.   Augmented FSM M’1 of behavior Bk. The augmented syntax rules are in red, 
and original syntax rules in blue with zero cost (From Goshorn) 
To cope with these inevitable deviations, the FSMs for each 
defined behavior are augmented with “error production” rules. For example, suppose 
symbol a and b are two separate symbols and due to the feature detection errors mentions 
previously, the symbols are sometimes confused for one another and are interchanged. 
Let S(a, b) refer to substituting the true symbol b for the mislabeled symbol a, assigning 
an associated cost CS(b,a) for doing so; and D(a) refers to deleting a mislabeled symbol a 
with ƍan associated cost CD(a). The corresponding modified FSM, Mk is shown in Figure 
14.  The costs for these substitutions and deletions must then aggregated to determine a 
“distance” from the observed sequence to the predefined behavior sequence.90 
Shown by Equation [2], Goshorn calculates this “distance” in the 
following manner: 
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Let the set of possible symbols be Ȉ = r1,r2,···,rN, where N is the 
total number of predefined intelligent states (symbols). With this, the distance from an 
observed sequence of symbols sand a predefined behavior Bl is given by: 
 
where nS(ri,rj) is the number of substitutions of the true symbol rj for mislabeled symbol ri, 
and nD(ri) number of deletions of the mislabeled symbol ri. Assuming K behaviors, each 
behavior and its associated FSM are augmented a priori so that any sequence of 
intelligent symbols is accepted by each behavior, but with a total cost. The augmented 
behaviors are denoted by B1,B2,...BK, and their ƍƍƍK corresponding augmented finite state 
machines are denoted by M’1,M’2,...M’K. ƍAn unknown sequence s of intelligent state 
symbols is then parsed by each Ml , ƍwith a cost d(s,Bl). The sequence s is then classified 
as the behavior Bg, where Bg = mind(s,Bƍl,l = 1,2,···,K), and is the behavior to which it is 
most similar. Therefore, sequences of symbols are classified based upon Maximum 
Similarity Classification (MSC) as seen in Figure 15.91 
                                                 




Figure 15.   Maximum Similarity Classification (MSC) (From Goshorn) 
Automating behavior syntax rule costs is a significant part of the 
behavior modeling process and is discussed generically in this section. Cost automation 
for the increased complexity of the multi-sensor, multi-node, distributed processing 
environment of the Watchman system was a significant challenge; however, it was met 
with a rather elegant solution.  The details of this work are discussed in Chapter V.   
In the general case, the costs can be automated by first considering 
the inherent possibility of confusing two symbols. This possibility of confusion between 
two symbols is valuated with a certain probability between 0 and 1. For example, assume 
that only three predefined symbols, a, b, and c can be identified, and that six possible 
confusions may occur. Let P(a|b) equal a probability that a true symbol a might have 
been confused with the symbol b. The probabilities of all possible symbol pair confusions 
can be represented in a Symbol Confusion Probability matrix, shown in Table 5. 
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 Labeled: a Labeled: b Labeled: c 
True: a P(a|a) P(a|b) P(a|c) 
True: b P(b|a) P(b|b) P(b|c) 
True: c P(c|a) P(c|b) P(c|c) 
Table 5.   Symbol Confusion Probability Matrix (From Goshorn) 
In an ideal world, the Symbol Confusion Probability Matrix would 
be the Identity matrix, where the diagonal entries are one and the off-diagonal entries are 
zero. If there is no prior knowledge about the inherent confusion probabilities between 
symbols, then the identity matrix can be used as a default valuation mechanism for 
automating the costs. Otherwise, prior knowledge of symbol confusion probabilities that 
can be derived or discovered should be utilized to more accurately define the Symbol 
Confusion Matrix for the particular application and environment.  
The substitution costs are defined as the log of the inversion of the 
conditional probability entries in the Symbol Confusion Matrix.92 This is shown in the 
following example, depicted in Equation [3]: The cost for substituting the true symbol b 
for the observed symbol a is a function of the inversion of the probability that the true 
symbol a is confused with the observed symbol b. By representing the conditional 
probabilities P(truesymbol = a|observedsymbol = b) as P(a|b), then the cost for 
substituting a misidentified symbol a with the true symbol b is: 
 
 
Intuitively, if it is highly likely that the true symbol a will be 
confused with symbol b, where P(a|b) is high, then the cost for substituting symbol a for 
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b, CS(b,a), is clearly low. Also, if the probability P(a|b) is nonzero (which is likely, given 
an imperfect world), then P(a|a) is less than one, since, from Equation [4]:93 
 
(2) Infer Predicted Outcomes Module. The “Prediction” 
subsystem first stage, BCM, outputs behavior labels, which are then input for the second 
stage, the Infer Predicted Outcomes Module (IPOM). The IPOM fuses behavior labels 
with particular predefined application or environment knowledge, according to 
predefined inference rules. For example, if a behavior label output was “abnormal 
behavior by group of small surface vessels, excessive speed and common heading 
towards High-value Unit,” an inferred predicted outcome could be: “Swarm Attack.” For 
this example, the inference rule would be: if the behavior label “abnormal behavior by 
group of small surface vessels, excessive speed and common heading towards High-value 
Unit” is given, the inferred predicted outcome is “Swarm Attack.” The inferred outcome, 
“Swarm Attack,” would compel a specified action, which is discussed in the next DIPR 
subsystem of “Reaction.” Certainly, any inference rules applied would be domain and 
application dependent and would most likely require some type of automated learning 
and updating for operational implementation. 
d. Reaction Subsystem 
The primary purpose of the “Reaction” subsystem is to create autonomous 
(though not necessarily without human intervention or oversight) actions in response to 
the predicted behavior outcomes. In other words, the goal of the Reaction subsystem is to 
automate those governing reactionary systems, such as the rules of engagement (ROE), to 
reduce reaction times, and hopefully eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, the human error 
inherent in those systems.  The inputs to “Reaction” are predicted behavior outcomes that 
stem form the “Prediction” subsystem, with outputs of actions. These actions are 
application and domain dependent; therefore, reaction rules are defined as a function of 
                                                 
93 Goshorn et al., “Behavior Modeling.” 
[4] 
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the inputted inferred predicted outcomes, which are also dependent on the same unique 
domain and application factors.  The actions and the rules that define them must have the 
capability of being adapted and learned (either system-wide or user-wide) for their 
specific operational environments to ensure appropriate actions take place. In the 
example given above of an inferred predicted outcome of “Swarm Attack,” the pre-
determined action could be “Set General Quarters and launch counter attack.” This type 
of response would be determined by such discrete environmental factors such as Rules of 
Engagement (ROE), weapons posture, maneuvering constraints, Operational Orders 
(OPORDS), etc.  Not only are these factors environment dependent, but also often 
situation dependent, and can change over time, which requires constant updating for 
optimal implementation, which increases the need for automation in this arena, as well.94 
The Watchman system project also integrated an automated response 
capability to demonstrate the “Reaction” concept of DIPR.  This capability was in the 
form of a Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) of autonomous robot “agents.”  A full 
description of the systems integration and demonstration of this capability is elucidated in 
Chapter V. 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS MODEL 
The WMSE POCS Systems Engineering and Integration project followed a 
somewhat modified version of the classical “Vee” model of Systems Engineering 
depicted in Figure 16.  This project included all aspects of design, build, and test of a 
fully functioning system, to include both hardware and software components, throughout 
several phases.  The project team utilized a modular, object-oriented, agile approach in 
the software development of the system, seeking to pull the best practices from various 
software development processes throughout the course of the project.  The architecture, 
design, build and test of each sub-system functional area were iterated numerous times, 
both within and between project phases.  These iterations included decomposing the 
requirements, functions, and processes, to integrate each subsystem unit into each 
                                                 
94 Goshorn et al., “Behavior Modeling.” 
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subsystem, and then integrating the subsystems into the complete system.  This process 
was re-iterated for each subsequent upgrade and improvement to the various system 
segments.  The segment-lead for each segment/subsystem oversaw and managed the 
planning and execution of each functional area, guiding their team through the steps of 
the SE process.   
 
 
Figure 16.   Systems Engineering “Vee” Process Model (After Whitcomb) 
C. STEPS OF THE “VEE” FOR THE WMSE POCS 
The following is a description of the activities, events, and milestones that were 
met during each stage of development depicted in the SE “Vee” model for each project 
design iteration, or “phase”.  Some stages of the process, as is shown and described, did 
not match identically to the model, as the model was followed more as a guideline than a 
mandated process.  Those stages that were appropriate to the scope and nature of this 
project were adopted, though some with modification, and others were eliminated, such 
as “Operational Test and Evaluation,” given that the system was developed as a proof of 
concept and not for an operational environment.  Stages often ran concurrently, and were 
iterated, as necessary in each project phase, until system units and subsystems were 
completed and tested. 
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As mentioned, the project consisted of several phases, that each progressed 
through the steps of the “Vee” model.  Throughout all of these phases, though a SE 
process was followed, it was not always in precisely the same manner, as each phase was 
a unique design experience. The phases were: Initial Development, Engineering Change 
Order (ECO) Implementation, Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) Integration, and 
ECO refinement.  In the process description that follows, those aspects of each phase that 
required a deviation or alteration to the “standard” or original process is discussed, to 
illustrate the flexible nature of the SE process model and how that flexibility was 
exploited for successful project execution. 
1. Requirements Analysis and Definition 
As the system was first being conceptualized, the requirements that were first 
analyzed were derived from group discussion and consensus among the project team as to 
what a generic surveillance system would need to accomplish in order to be effective.  
Many varied real-world operational needs were discussed, as well.  This process was 
somewhat “having the cart before the horse,” however; new technologies and 
technologically innovative methods must often find a “home” within the universe of 
operational needs before they are found to be germane and useful.   
As the project progressed and individual students began to branch out into 
differing areas of study related to the Watchman capability, other real-world requirements 
began to be looked at for relevance to the project.  For this thesis, the MDA JIC 
capability gaps addressed in the DRM and OV-1 discussion in Chapter I were analyzed 
and defined in terms of the possibility of integrating a Watchman-like behavior analysis 
capability to fulfill those gaps. The analysis of these requirements was conducted in much 
the same process as the generic laboratory requirements, consisting of functional analysis 
and allocation and hierarchical functional decompositions.  This analysis, however, was 
more in depth, and included identification and decomposition of operational activities, 




were all linked within a system architecture definition that is explained in Chapter IV and 
thoroughly detailed in the Watchman MSE System Description Document (SDD), in the 
Appendix. 
2. Architecture (Top Level) Design  
This concept development stage soon evolved into a requirements definition 
stage, where the required functions were identified and decomposed into a functional 
hierarchy that formed the basis of the Watchman subsystem groups that is explained in 
detail in Chapter V.  The project team was then divided amongst the groups, each with a 
team lead, and then each team conducted further requirements definition and analysis 
through continued functional analysis and allocation, which then led to individual group 
functional hierarchies.  Those hierarchies then formed the basis of the functional 
architectures, which then became the foundation of the detailed system specifications 
from which the initial system designs were derived.  These specifications are also 
outlined in Chapter V.  WMSE POCS architecture definition is also discussed in detail in 
Chapter IV. 
The POCS architecture was refined, expanded, and improved for each subsequent 
phase of the project.  After the architecture, development and integration were 
successfully demonstrated in the POCS, the flexible nature of the architecture allowed for 
the incorporation of ECOs, and WSSN functions.  Architecture refinements included a 
more thorough  mapping to requirements, along with revised functional, operational and 
process decompositions, which revealed redundancies, inconsistencies, and inefficiencies 
in requirements and the designs that were addressed in the ensuing project phases.   
3. System (Detail) Design   
With all project phases, the subsystem designs all went through multiple 
iterations, being drafted and then analyzed against the requirements, until prototype units 
could be developed.  These prototype designs contained enough detail to allow the units 
to perform the base functionality delineated in the architecture, but with enough 
flexibility to allow for changes, should the initial design not fully meet the functional 
requirements.  Additionally, each team had to coordinate with the other teams ensure that 
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their designs included the appropriate hardware and software interfaces and data 
structures so that the subsystems could be tested individually, as well as ultimately be 
integrated and function as an overall system. 
During this stage, requirements were further refined, as feasibility of certain 
requirements, given the hardware, software, and time constraints began to materialize.  
Those requirements that were deemed unattainable in the first design iteration were either 
eliminated as redundant or unnecessary to meet the initial conceptual need, or were 
deferred so that they might be accomplished in a future system upgrade.  For those 
requirements that were deferred, allowance was made in the design, in terms of an Open 
System Architecture (OSA) to facilitate the future design of the required functionality. 
4. Fabrication / Coding  
Source code for each individual element had to be developed from the ground up, 
or modified and/or adapted from existing COTS, open source, professor-provided code. 
Implementing each aspect of D-I-P-R meant coding effort for the various subsystem 
elements, whether for the subsystem application itself or for the interfaces between 
subsystems. Additionally, special code had to be written that allowed COTS hardware 
and software to function within this particular project application architecture.  For 
example, for the Detect subsystem, the WiLife cameras produced processed video files in 
the Windows Media Video (.wmv) format as a function of their embedded software. 
However, the software team had to write code that could use those processed files 
downstream in the system to automatically extract contact features that would be inputted 
into the next processing stage to meet Identify subsystem functional requirements.  
Additionally, the proprietary video processing did not allow for capture and further 
processing of live, streaming video data.  This constraint was only discovered during the 
coding of the contact-tracking program (described in Chapter V), and led to a design 
change “work-around” code-test-fix-test iteration toward the end of the first phase.  It is 
this type of flexibility exercised within the model on numerous other occasions that 
testify to the efficiency of the process. 
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Hardware installations and modifications were no less challenging.  Camera 
placement, computer installation and set-up, network wiring and connection to all the 
processing nodes, as well as all nodes to each other was a detailed, painstaking task. 
Nodes were individually set up, tested, and then interconnected one by one, to ensure 
video collection and data transfer quality within nodes and across the network.  
Hardware and Software for the ECO and WSSN integration phases were very 
similar in process, even as the implementation was quite different.  The ECO phase 
required extensive coding of software upgrades, additions, and “fixes” to the initial 
Watchman functionality, while the hardware changes were the addition of an entirely 
new node construct with new types of sensors.  The WSSN phase was unique as it 
introduced a new type of data transfer (Bluetooth) to the system, along with yet another 
new type of sensor node, wireless smart “agents,” in the form of autonomous, self-
navigating and self-prioritizing robots.  The details of the changes for both of these 
phases are discussed in Chapter V.  Despite the radically different achievements for each 
phase, the consistency of the process ensured reliable results. 
5. Unit Testing   
Testing for hardware and software was conducted incrementally as the system 
designs were implemented. Each element was tested individually, then as part of each 
subsystem.  As each subsystem was tested successfully, subsystems were incrementally 
joined, on to another, and tested as integrated components, verifying the designs and 
network infrastructure.  Much of the testing was conducted in parallel with iterative 
design-change coding (code-test-fix-test), in order to provide a more agile development 
approach.  There was much trial and error in this method; however, it allowed for very 
rapid prototyping in each phase that eventually led to the ultimate initial design for each 
subsystem that could then be integrated into the full system. 
6. Integration Testing  
As mentioned previously, units were first individually tested, using dummy input 
and output that mimicked adjoining units.  Once these tests were successful, subsystems 
were then joined from units and subsystem testing was completed, using the same 
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dummy input and output method, mimicking adjoining subsystems.  At the successful 
completion of these tests, subsystems were joined, one at a time, testing all interfaces and 
data transfers, as well as individual process behaviors utilizing real data.  Code that 
interfaced between separate systems was first tested on a small scale; corrected or 
adjusted as needed, and then more comprehensive, end-to-end testing was conducted, 
measuring performance and losses against the derived specs. 
7. System Testing   
Eventually, all systems were joined and tested as a full system, again using a test-
fix-test methodology.  System demonstration (end-to-end, dry-run and for score) tests 
were conducted on all interfaces and individual interface issues (e.g., database writing not 
occurring as expected/needed, files not written to the correct locations, database queries 
incomplete or not running properly, etc.) were corrected. 
8. Acceptance Testing  
The acceptance tests for each subsystem, as well as for the entire system, 
demonstrating full system functionality were conducted in order to validate the system’s 
performance against the requirements was conducted at the end of the initial system 
development process, as well as each subsequent development phase process.   The 
procedures for all of these acceptance tests are described in detail in Chapter V.  These 
system demonstrations for all phases were conducted on several occasions, including 
several “open house” demonstrations, and for numerous individuals, from NPS faculty, 
staff, and students, to curriculum and project sponsors, systems command representatives, 
science and technology community members, as well as members of the technological 
media.  All commented on the innovation of technology represented by the project, the 
uniqueness of the design and implementation approach, and the wide array of mission 
needs, including MDA, that the system concept had the potential to fulfill. 
This chapter discussed the SE approach utilized and how that SE process led to 
the development of the Watchman Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) proof of 
concept system (POCS). The chapter began with a generalized view of an SE approach to 
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Artificial Intelligence, in particular Behavior Analysis, and concluded by describing the 
steps of the SE process, as they pertained to each phase of development of the POCS.   
Chapter IV discusses the various architectures that were created as part of the SE 
process.  The chapter describes the architecture development process as a subset of the 
overall SE process for system alternative analysis and design development, as well as 
shows how the resultant architecture was ultimately applied in developing the WMSE 
POCS. 
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IV. MSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter is intended to describe and present the functional, process and 
operational architectures that were produced as part of the functional analysis and 
allocation steps of the SE process.  The chapter sections describe the initial and 
integration architecture development processes as subsets of the overall SE process for 
system alternative analysis and design development. The chapter further shows how the 
resultant architectures were ultimately applied in the design, building, coding, integration, 
and testing of the autonomous WMSE POCS that is representative of an MDA “smart” 
environment.   
A.  INITIAL ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT 
This section discusses the development of the initial architecture for the WMSE 
POCS, which was created in more of a generalized operational context to allow for 
proper requirements analysis and functional allocation.  The reader should recall from the 
previous chapter that these steps are on the left upper, or beginning, side of the SE “Vee” 
model, and are essential building blocks for any SE design and development project.  The 
section includes definitions of the Operational, Functional, Requirements, and Physical 
architectures, and then concludes the initial architecture development. 
1. Operational Architecture Definition 
The first step in creating the architecture for the Maritime Smart Environment 
(MSE) was to define the top operational activity, and the missions that activity was 
expected to perform, within the scope of this particular part of the entire system.  In order 
to accomplish this, it was necessary to scope and bound the area of responsibility and 
mission focus for this part.  It was therefore determined that this part of the architecture, 
for this thesis, would deal only with the activities required to perform behavior analysis 
on selected target data which would be provided to the module in some type of processed, 
fused form.  The module would then perform the analysis and then output a classification 
and, if required, some type of alert or warning to the user(s) to provide actionable 
intelligence about the target(s) that had been input.  The actual sensors, sensor platforms, 
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their integration and method of data fusion are considered external to the module and 
beyond the scope of the architecture.  Likewise, whatever decisions, plans, actions, 
movements, or engagements occur as a result of the output of the module are also 
considered out of scope and will not be addressed in the architecture. 
With the activity thus bounded, the main activity was named Maritime Behavior 
Analysis, and the mission that this activity achieves is Maritime Domain Awareness.  
This Mission was then decomposed into four constituent missions, derived from two 
pillars of the Naval Power 21 document referenced in the DRM, which are Sea Shield, 
and FORCEnet.  The edits to remove the missions that were deemed not applicable could 
not be done in the table depicted in the DRM, given the format of the Naval Power 21 
artifact used in the document.  However, the sub-capabilities used to define the missions 
achieved by the overarching activity are: Provide Self-Defense Against Surface Threats, 
Protect Against Terrorist Threats, Detect and ID Targets, and Provide Cueing and 
Targeting Information. 
The CONOPS for these missions, being accomplished by the Behavior Analysis 
activity must, by necessity, be somewhat broader than just the BAM itself.  The BAM, 
which is an instantiation of the Predict subsystem from the DIPR software application 
model, must be understood to operate in a larger context of a force protection schema, 
which consists of sensors, high-value units, communication, command and control 
systems, and a network in which all of these members communicate and operate.  This 
schema is depicted in the OV-1 diagram in Figure 17: 
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Figure 17.   WMSE OV-1 
As defined in the DRM, the concept is that there is some type of high-value 
maritime asset, such as an oil platform or Surface Action Group (SAG).  This asset must 
be protected, and is therefore nested within a network of internal and external, organic 
and inorganic, manned and unmanned, sea-based and land-based sensors, which provide 
a Common Operational Picture (COP) of the sea surface around the high-value unit(s).  
This sensor network has the ability to fuse all of the sensors’ data flooding in to detect, 
track, and, to a certain extent, classify the surface vessels in the vicinity of this unit(s).  
Humans in the loop of this sensor network monitor these tracks, however, their dense 
number and irregular, indiscernible, and unpredictable movements prevent an early 
and/or accurate detection of threat-like activity by the many contacts, which must be 
monitored in the COP.  It is at this point that the BAM becomes relevant.  As the data is 
collected, fused, and disseminated, it is passed within the network to a particular friendly 
unit, which has the BAM processing capability on board.  All of the fused track data is 
processed through the BAM and compared to its many friendly, neutral, and threat 
 86
behavior models, where it is statistically analyzed, looking for anomalous behavior.  
Among the many fishing vessels going about their normal routines and other various 
surface vessel traffic, the sensors pick up a group of vessels moving in some type of 
formation, apparently approaching the SAG.  Assuming this is a threat and taking lethal 
action could cause an international embarrassment if incorrect.  However, assuming this 
behavior is no threat could delay critical seconds in responding, which could lead to a 
devastating loss of ship and crew.  It is just this type of scenario that the BAM is meant to 
unfold, providing decision-makers with the crucial pieces of timely information to 
discern truly hostile from innocent behavior, and then to be able to take appropriate 
action. 
The Operational Node that performs the overarching operational activity is the 
Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC).  It is this operational role that is best suited to 
execute the activity of maritime behavior analysis since this entity will be the primary 
consumer of the information that the BAM would provide and would also be the principal 
decision-maker acting upon that information.  There are many other external 
organizations, which would both feed into, as well as extract from the BAM.  Any 
platform or entity that collects, collates, fuses, and disseminates sensor data would be an 
organization that could have an interface with the BAM.  Additionally, any organization 
that would have the responsibility to act upon potential threats to maritime domain assets 
would be a consumer and would therefore require some type of collection or 
dissemination interface with the BAM.  These types of interactions have been depicted in 
the architecture as information inputs and outputs.  Due to the sheer volume of potential 
donors and customers interfacing with the BAM, only those information artifacts were 
discussed.  External system sponsors will have the ability to see these inputs and outputs 
and then make recommendations as to how their systems’ architectures might tie in with 
the BAM’s 
We will now discuss the actual operational architecture structure, with its primary 
operational activities, tasks, and the metrics that have been chosen to eventually evaluate 
those tasks in a modeling scenario.  The initial architecture of the system was completed 
using ViTech’s CORE software by entering and mapping the system’s architecture 
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elements, including the operational, functional, and requirements decomposition, as well 
as all the required linkages, into the program for analysis and documentation. The 
functional allocation and analysis began by looking at the required operational activities 
that would be needed to complete the DRM, according to the OPSIT parameters. Figure 

















Figure 18.   WMSE Operational Architecture (Tier 1) 
The operational activities, which were discussed in the DRM, are in the first level 
of the hierarchy shown.  These activities decompose into several more layers of 
abstraction, showing the several constituent activities, which make up the main activities.  
Figures 19 and 20 show the many sub-tier activities that were decomposed in the 
operational activity analysis, to ensure a thorough treatment of the mission scenario.  
Even with the large number of sub-tier activities that were derived, many of the common 
activities, which were listed in the COAL decompositions of the main and sub-tier 
activities were deleted from the architecture because they were not relevant, according to 
the particular parameters given in the DRM OPSIT.  Often analysts will disregard the 
culling out of these extraneous activities embedded within the COAL decompositions, 
due to the tedious nature of the exercise.  However, this trimming and refining of the 
operational architecture was an extremely important analytical step to ensure that the 























































































































































































































































Figure 20.   WMSE Operational Architecture (Tier 3) 
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It should be readily apparent how quickly untenable this becomes without a very 
large team of individuals working full time to analyze all the activities, map them to 
tasks, come up with the proper MOEs, and then run all the modeling simulations to test if 
the MOEs are even achievable within the architecture.  Therefore, this architecture 
focuses on three primary tasks, which are decomposed by two main Sub-Activities, 
Orient and Understand the Situation.  The first primary task, Orient, breaks down to 
Assess and then further to Assess the Operational Situation (COM.1.1.1.4.3).  From this 
activity, the task Analyze and Assess Situation (NTA 5.2) from the DRM is executed.  
The MOE from this task, which seemed the most relevant and measurable from the list 









































Figure 21.   WMSE Assess OPSIT Decomposition 
The next task is also decomposed from the Assess activity, but the sub-activity is 
the Update COP based on Assessment activity (COM.1.1.1.4.5), shown in Figure 21.  
This task is to Provide Indications and Warning (I&W) of Threat (NTA 2.4.5.3).  Here, 
the MOE, which was relevant and measureable, is M3 – Hours – Lead-time in predicting 
enemy.  The next task is decomposed under a different activity, Understand the Situation 
down to Recognize Threats and then finally down to the Classify Surface Contacts 
(COM.1.4.1.7) activity.  This activity was assigned the task Disseminate Tactical 
Warning Information and Attack Assessment (TA 2.4), from the UJTL.  This task could 
easily have been applied to any or all of the sub-activities under Recognize Threats, 
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however, although it is recognized that the BAM should have the capability to classify all 
the types of contacts listed, we are limiting the scope of the task measurement to surface 
contacts in keeping with the current CONOPS, as defined.  The MOE for this task is: M1 
– Minutes – To disseminate information. The M2 MOE turned out to be too subjective to 
accurately model, and was therefore deleted.  The decomposition for this last task is 






















































Figure 22.   WMSE Understand the Situation (COM.1.4) Decomposition 
2. Functional Architecture Definition 
The process by which the functional architecture and hierarchy were built utilized 
generally the same type of methodology used in building the operational architecture, so 
those details will not be needlessly repeated here.  The main differences in building the 
functional architecture were that the functions were derived by directly tying them to the 
Operational Activities that had the Operational Tasks to be accomplished and measured 
as described in the Operational Architecture described above.  These three activities, 
again, were: Assess the Operational Situation, Update COP based on Assessment 






































Figure 23.   Functional Hierarchy – Tier 3 
 
Figure 23 shows the hierarchy down to the third level of abstraction.  Previously, 
these functions were broken down further, however, this was found to be unnecessary.  In 
Figure 23, the three main functions are labeled 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0.  These functions 
implement the Operational Activities listed previously to accomplish their respective 
Operational Tasks.  Once the top-level functions were mapped to their respective 
activities, they were then decomposed into further sub-functions deemed necessary to 

















































Figure 24.   Functional Hierarchy – System Context 
Once the primary sub-system functions were mapped to their respective 
operational activities, it became apparent that there needed to be a higher functional 
context in which these sub-functions would operate.  Therefore, the system context 
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function was created with external functions to the main MBAM function, such as 
customer functions and Command and Control (C2)/Data Fusion functions.  The external 
C2 function provides the sensor coordination and data fusion for the input data, which 
must be provided to the MBAM.  The Customer functions are vital to provide the context 
of generating requests for and acting as the recipients of the analyzed behavior data that 
the MBAM provides.  It is this context and the interactions of these functions that allow 













































Figure 25.   WMSE System Context EFFBD 
As seen in the functional flow block diagram (FFBD) in Figure 25, fused sensor 
data comes from the Perform C2/DataFusion function and is then fed into the Conduct 
Maritime Behavior Analysis function.  Simultaneously, the data coming into the MBAM 
function signals a trigger from the customer to initiate an Analysis Request.  This request 
begins the process of the linear sub-functions within the MBAM parent function, shown 







































Figure 26.   MBAM Sub-functions 
As these software-driven functions are executed serially, shown in the FFBD, 
they are “capturing” the available resource, which is processing power, according to 
certain random distributions of their expected usage of processing power.  As shown in 
the simulation results, Figure 27, these functions, as they execute, will temporarily 
deplete the available processing capability, as well as take some discrete amount of time 
to complete.  It is this usage of time (and in future research, usage of processing capacity) 
that can be compared against derived operational metrics to obtain the actual measures of 
effectiveness using this notional system architecture.  Once the Requested Information 
item is outputted from the last function, shown in Figure 24, this triggers the customer 
function to then accept the behavior analysis product, which could be in the form of an 
alert message, a contact of interest report, or merely an “ops normal, no threat found” 
report.  At this point in the sequence, the flow and the simulation end.   
Figure 27 presents the graphical simulation output from CORE.  The x-axis is 
time, which is depicted on the scale at the top of the simulation graph.  The y-axis is 
processing capacity, which is depicted as a percentage of the total capacity available.  
Since the actual processing capacity, as well as processing requirements of a real-world 
system is unknown, notional values were derived that seemed to best represent a potential 
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processing capability, as well as estimated processing requirements for the various 
functions.  From the estimated value simulation shown, the time to complete a behavior 
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Figure 27.   CORESim MBAM Simulation Run 
To conclude, it took approximately 1 minute and 15 seconds to return a behavior 
analysis product to the user, and have it accepted, from the time the fused sensor data was 
sent to the MBAM. This value could be judged against the metrics of: Minutes – To 
complete assessment of latest information (cycle time); Hours – Lead-time in predicting 
enemy actions; and Minutes – To disseminate information.  Future work may involve 
studies to determine which actual values for these metrics would be deemed acceptable to 
the user, which would certainly need to be accomplished for effective operational 
validation.  However, from personal professional experience, a one-minute turn-around 
on a complex behavioral classification should be more than acceptable.  The simulation at 
this time only has the capability to simulate the processing on one piece of data at a time.  
Time - seconds 
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Quite a significant amount, but not all of the processing capacity is used as the system is 
stressed.  In order to understand the behavior with more accurate processing capability 
limits and usage rates for the various functions, as well as with multiple data items, the 
use of simultaneous and random discrete event queuing, as well as experimentally 
derived processing capacity and functional data processing values would be required in 
future research to more fully validate this model. 
3. Requirements Architecture Definition 
The requirements that were entered into the CORE application and mapped to the 
Operational Activities were pulled directly from the DRM.  As with the previous 
development processes, the process of mapping the requirements directly to the defined 
activities caused reflection upon the initial requirements and therefore the requirement 
list and the DRM was refined even further.  While pictures are said to be worth a 
thousand words, unfortunately, the format of the CORE hierarchical diagram does not 
make the following depictions in Figures 28 and 29 quite that useful, however, they do 
show at least the general concept of the mapping of the high-level requirements, which, 
as mentioned in the DRM, have been taken directly from the DoD’s MDA Joint 









Figure 28.   MDA-003C –“The capability to aggregate, display, and analyze maritime information in order to understand the maritime 























































Figure 29.   MDA-004C –“The capability to predict activity within the maritime domain” relationships 
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Figures 28 and 29 illustrate the many relationships that the requirements have 
with Functions, Operational Activities, and other refined sub-tier requirements. 
All of the requirements defined were considered to be originating requirements, as 
they originated from outside the architecture or systems development process (as opposed 
to derived requirements, which emanate from within these processes).  Additionally, 
these requirements are considered functional requirements, as they deal with those 
elements, which make the system function in order to meet the required capabilities.  
Non-functional requirements were considered, such as reliability, maintainability, 
availability, and the like, however, not only were those requirements not mentioned in the 
requirement source document, the MDA JIC, but as it was observed that at this early 
stage in the process those non-functional requirements are not yet known, and therefore 
could not be defined and mapped at this time. 
The Measures of Performance (MOP’s) and Technical Performance Measures 
(TPM’s) are derived from the MOE’s defined earlier in Paragraph 1.  Those MOE’s, as 
described before, are:  
x M1 – Minutes – To complete assessment of latest information (cycle time)  
x M3 – Hours – Lead-time in predicting enemy actions  
x M1 – Minutes – To disseminate information 
Some initial possible TPM’s listed below are derived from the translation of the 
MOE’s into the functional model simulation described in the previous section. 
x Data speed into and out of the MBAM (in terms of a baud rate, or amount 
of data per second that can be uploaded to and downloaded from the 
MBAM) 
x Processing speed (in terms of MHz or GHz or seconds) of the MBAM 
hardware 
x Processing capacity (in terms of MBps or GBps) of the MBAM hardware 
x Processing efficiency (in terms of MBps or GBps) of the MBAM software 
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x Speed of alert data generation (several different types of measures could 
be applied here, from time from initial contact notification to alert 
reception by external element outside the BAM, to time of hostile intent 
classification to alert generation and transmittal) 
Some additional notional TPMs that are being considered regarding behavior 
analysis efficiency and accuracy are: 
x Number of contacts processed within a certain time period 
x Number of contacts whose behavior was correctly identified 
x Number of false alerts out of the total number of alerts (error rate) 
It is anticipated that with improvement and expansion of the model in future 
recommended research, as well as with the integration and testing of various new 
software components to validate and improve the behavior models, the MOPs and TPMs 
will be able to be more clearly defined.   
4. System (Physical) Architecture Synthesis 
Given that the functions accomplished by the Maritime Behavior Analysis 
Module (MBAM) will be via software, the only components that made sense to evaluate 
were the hardware components that the software would need to run on in order to both 
execute the MBAM functions.  In addition, this hardware must have network interfaces to 
be able to pull data in to the algorithm to execute the functions, as well as send data out 
once the functions are complete.  Therefore, the components analyzed were the basic 
components of a standard COTS desktop computer, which, fundamentally, would have 
the processing power and capability to run the MBAM software and interface with a 
standard Ethernet-based or wireless network. 
Different types of components which would be needed to process the algorithms, 
in addition to components that would need to interface with input and output external 
networks were analyzed, comparing the various given types and performance features of 




Feature Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Processor Speed 1.6 Ghz 2.4 Ghz 3.2 Ghz 
Bus Speed 400 Mhz 800 Mhz  
RAM Speed 400 Mhz 667 Mhz  
Cache Memory 1 MB 2 MB 4 MB 
Hard Drive 
Capacity 
250 GB 320 GB 500 GB 




Data Link Protocol Gigabit 
Ethernet 
IEEE 802.3u  
Table 6.   Morphological Matrix of Options 
Assuming cost differences in COTS computer components of varying levels of 
performance are roughly negligible, the components with the highest values of the first 
five features, which dealt with processing performance, were chosen as the most 
desirable.  Upon this decision, the remainder of the features, which dealt with networking 
performance and compatibility, was grouped into 4 possible permutations.   
1. Max performance – Bluetooth – Gig Ethernet 
2. Max performance – Bluetooth – 802.3u 
3. Max performance – Integrated Network Card – Gig Ethernet 
4. Max performance – Integrated Network Card  – 802.3u 
The permutation options were then compared using a Pugh selection matrix, 
shown in Table 7.  The first option was chosen as the comparison datum, and then each 
other option was compared to it, based on certain performance criteria.  These criteria 
were selected by consulting with operational SMEs as to the OMOEs that would be 








Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Processing Speed D S S S 
Processing Power A S S S 
Network Interface Speed T - + + 
Network Interface Compatibility U - + + 
Network Interface Reliability M - S + 
SUMS OF POSITIVES  0 2 3 
SUMS OF SAMES  2 3 2 
SUMS OF NEGATIVES  3 0 0 
Table 7.   Pugh Selection Matrix 
Based upon the comparison analysis above, it appears that Option 4, the 
component set with the maximum processing speed and power, combined with an 
Integrated 10/100/1000 Ethernet Network Card and a IEEE 802.3u Network protocol 
would provide the fastest, most stable, and compatible network interface for the MBAM 
to operate most effectively within the overall system.   
Once the component concept generation and selection was complete, the building 
of the physical architecture could begin.  This component selection and build of the 
system from the physical architecture is discussed in the Network Topology section of 
the WMSE Proof of Concept System description in Chapter V.  As with the functional 
architecture, the physical architecture required components in a higher system context in 
which to operate and map back to the functions that they perform.  Figure 30 shows the 



















































Figure 30.   WMSE System Context Component Architecture 
Not every element of this architecture will be explained; however, beginning with 
the first tier, the components include those customer and external components that 
perform the associated functions of passing data to and from the MBAM, as well as 
validating that data, as part of the greater WMSE system.  The next level down 
decomposes component S.1, which is the MBAM System “with services.”  These 
services are not modeled or included in the functional architecture fully as yet, but were 
included as future growth items, assuming that the MBAM data would be desirable to 
external users that would need to subscribe to and be distributed MBAM data analysis 
services.  Finally, the “meat” of the architecture is decomposed as the MBAM itself, with 
its associated hardware (as described in the component selection above) and software 
“modules” that perform the individual MBAM functions, which were modeled in the 















































Figure 31.   WMSE System Context Block Diagram 
Just as the system functions had information linkages, these components have 
physical linkages, which are depicted via various information links.  The relationships of 









































































MBAM Alert Generation Link































Figure 32.   MBAM System with Services Block Diagrams 
5. Initial Architecture Development Conclusion 
These functional and physical architectures, along with their respective 
information and information-carrying links were the final step in building the framework 
upon which the initial modeling of the speed and processing effectiveness of this system 
segment was accomplished.  This work has laid the foundation for what is to come in any 
follow-on projects, which will further refine the system requirements and identify any 
operational or capability shortfalls that exist within the scope of the defined mission and 
architecture.   
The next phase encompassed the implementation of the functional model for the 
Conduct Maritime Behavior Analysis function by the actual demonstration of software 
elements performing those functions in a laboratory environment.  This was 
accomplished with the ultimate goal being met of integrating those functions and 
components into a high-level functional laboratory system, demonstrating the capability 
and feasibility of an entire Smart Sensor Network system.  In addition, the next section  
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shows how the WMSE project team integrated the individual project pieces into a 
complete system operational and functional architecture, which was then demonstrated to 
validate the design of the entire system. 
B. INTEGRATION ARCHITECTURE 
The next step in the systems architecting process was to take the initial 
architecture that was developed and further refine it for integration into an actual, 
functioning system.  This integration architecture shows the refinements and 
improvements which were made to the initial architecture, as a result of the architecture 
design and development process, as well as the inclusion of the other main elements of 
the WMSE system, comprising all of the Detect, Track, Classify, and Respond high-level 
functions.  These high-level functions correspond to the DIPR system construct, 
discussed in Chapter III. 
The integration architecture of the system was also completed using ViTech’s 
CORE software by entering and mapping the system’s architecture elements, including 
the process and functional decomposition into the program for analysis and 
documentation.  Process, functional and component relationships within the system 
architecture, along with enhanced functional flow block diagrams (EFFBD), IDEF0, and 
N2 diagrams depicting these relationships, are provided by the System Description 
Document (SDD) report from CORE.  The SDD is included as an Appendix of this report 
and includes detailed description and illustration of the system’s abstraction, coupling 
and cohesion. 
The functional and process decompositions to the first level of abstraction are 
shown in the following diagrams.  Identifying and decomposing processes, as well as 
mapping them to functions are critical for integration.  While functions relate to “what” 
must be done, processes reveal the “how” the functions are accomplished in a system.  
Each function must have a process; however, extraneous processes must be identified and 
eliminated from the architecture to ensure a robust and efficient integration design.  
Further detail of the lower level abstractions can be found in Section 7 of the SDD.   
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ProcessNumber&Name FunctionNumber&Name
0  Domain Awareness Enhancement Process 0 Enhance Domain Awareness 
1  Contact Detection (WiLife) Activities 1.0 Detect 
1.1  Assign Camera Settings Process 1.5 Manage Video Collection 
1.2  Domain Monitoring Process 1.1 Monitor Domain 
1.2  Node Command Center Activities O Perform Overhead Functions 
1.3  Motion Detection Process 1.2 Determine Contact Presence 
1.4  Video Record Process 1.3 Collect Video Data 
1.5  Video File Write Process 1.4 Store Video Data 
2  Contact Tracking (Blob Tracker) Activities 2.0 Track 
2.1  Read Video File Process 2.1 Read Video Data 
2.2  Process Video File Process 2.2 Process Video Data 
2.3 Build Contact Track 
3  Classification Activities 3.0 Classify (Conduct Behavior Analysis) 
3.1  Server Activities  
3.1.1  Database Activities  
3.1.1.1  DB Read Process 3.1 Read Contact Data Files 
3.1.1.1.1  DB Query Process  
3.1.1.2  DB Write Process  
3.1.1.2.1  DB Add Process  
3.1.1.2.2  DB Update/Modify Process  
3.1.2  GUI Activities 3.4 Perform I&W 
3.1.2.1  GUI Command Process O.3 Accept Mission Plan 
3.1.2.1.1  GUI Push Process  
3.1.2.1.2  GUI Pull Process  
3.1.2.1.2.1  GUI Query Process  
3.1.2.2  GUI Display Process  
3.1.2.3  GUI Alert Process 3.4.3 Alert Generation.NAE.07 
3.1.2.3.1  Send React Order (Abnormal Beh)  
3.1.2.3.2  Send React Request to User (Unknown 
Beh) 
 
3.1.3  BAM Activities 3.2 Analyze Behavior 
3.1.3.1  BAM Pull Data 3.2.1 Read Observed Sequence 
3.2.2 Read Stored Behavior Sequences 
3.1.3.2  BAM Analyze 3.3 Perform Contact Classification 
3.1.3.2.1  Cost Matrix Creation 3.2.4 Build Cost Matrix 
3.1.3.2.2  Production Matrix Creation 3.2.3 Build Production Matrix 
3.1.3.2.2.1  Process Stored Behavior Sequences  
3.1.3.2.2.2  Process Observed Sequence  
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ProcessNumber&Name FunctionNumber&Name
3.1.3.2.2.3  Parse ObsSeq into BehSeqs via State 
Machine 
 
3.1.3.2.3  Cost Calculation 3.2.5 Calculate Costs 
3.1.3.3  BAM Determine Class 3.3.1 Classify Normal 
3.3.2 Classify Abnormal 
3.3.3 Classify Unknown 
3.2  User Activities O.4 Perform User Interface Functions 
3.2.1  System Initialization O.1 Perform Startup 
O.2 Perform Vehicle Subsystem  BIT 
3.2.2  GUI Interface 3.4.2 Evaluate Threat.NAE.07 
3.2.2.1  Monitor GUI  
3.2.2.2  Evaluate Alerts 3.4.2 Evaluate Threat.NAE.07 
3.2.2.3  Alert Response  
3.2.2.3.1  Threat Dismissal  
3.2.2.3.2  Threat Affirmation  
4.0  Response 4.0 Respond 
4.1  WSSN C2 Activities  
4.1.1  WSSN Tasking  
4.1.1.1  WSSN Tasking Order Data Receipt 4.1.1 Receive WSSN Tasking Order Data from 
Watchman Server 
4.1.1.2  WSSN Tasking Order Generation 4.1.2 Generate WSSN Tasking Order 
4.1.1.3  WSSN Tasking Order Transmission 4.1.3 Send WSSN Tasking Order to WSSN 
4.1.2  WSSN Tasking Response  
4.1.2.1  WSSN Tasking Order Response Receipt 4.2.1 Receive WSSN Tasking Order from WSSN 
C2 
4.4.3 Receive WSSN Tasking Order Response 
from WSSN 
4.1.2.2  WSSN Tasking Order Response Processing 4.4.4 Process WSSN Tasking Order Response 
4.2  WSSN Agent Activities  
4.2.1  Initialization O.6 Initialize WSSN Agent 
4.2.1.1  Diagnostics O.6.1.1 Perform Diagnostics 
4.2.1.2  Primary Task Designation O.6.1.2 Designate Primary Tasking 
4.2.1.3  WSSN Tasking Order Receive Mode O.6.3 Enter WSSN Tasking Order Receive Mode 
4.2.2  WSSN Tasking Order Processing  
4.2.2.1  WSSN Tasking Order Receipt  
4.2.2.2  Task Agent Determination 4.2.3 Determine Task Agent 
4.2.2.2.1  Own Battery Voltage Determination 4.2.2.1 Determine Own Battery Voltage 
4.2.2.2.2  Own Battery Voltage Transmission to 
Other Agent 
4.2.2.2 Send Own Battery Voltage to Other Agent 
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ProcessNumber&Name FunctionNumber&Name
4.2.2.2.3  Battery Voltage Receipt from Other Agent 4.2.2.3 Receive Battery Voltage from Other Agent 
4.2.2.2.4  Battery Voltage Comparison 4.2.3.4 Compare Battery Voltages 
4.2.3  WSSN Tasking Order Execution  
4.2.3.1  Positioning for COI Data Collection  
4.2.3.1.1  Navigation to COI Zone  
4.2.3.1.2  Maneuvering to COI 4.3.3 Maneuver to COI 
4.2.3.1.3  COI Detection 4.3.2 Detect COI 
4.2.3.2  COI Data Collection  
4.2.3.2.1  COI Image Collection 4.3.4.1 Collect COI Image 
4.2.3.2.2  COI Color Collection 4.3.4.2 Collect COI Color 
4.2.3.3  WSSN Tasking Order Response 4.4 Respond to WSSN Tasking Order 
4.2.3.3.1  WSSN Task Order Response Generation 4.4.1 Generate WSSN Tasking Order Response 
4.2.3.3.2  WSSN Tasking Order Response 
Transmission 
4.4.2 Send WSSN Tasking Order Response to 
WSSN C2 
Table 8.   Process to Function Allocation Mapping 
In addition, Table 8 shows the relationships of the functions to the processes.  As 
illustrated, not every process is mapped to a function, as there are several subsidiary 
processes that may be decomposed from a higher-level process.  It is the higher-level 
process, in many cases, that is accomplishing the function, supported by the lower level 
process.  This mapping of relationships between functions and processes, accomplished 
through an analysis of process and function abstractions, revealed both redundant and 
overlapping processes, as well as missing processes that had to be accounted for in the 
design.  This allocation process of the integration architecture phase led to an 
improvement of the integration across the entire system, in addition to a much more 
streamlined and effective integration of the WSSN (as an agent-based representation of 
the React DIPR subsystem) into the WMSE POCS.  
1. Functional Decomposition Hierarchies 
This section presents the first level decompositions of the main functions in the 
WMSE POCS system functional architecture.  These decompositions show how the main 
functions are allocated and broken down into their constituent sub-functions, ensuring 
that the higher-level functions can be accomplished in a reasonable fashion.  The first 
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level only is depicted here to give the reader a sense of the decomposition process.  The 
full architecture, showing all the decompositions down to their lowest level of abstraction 
(the system and subsystem execution level) is given in the WMSE POCS description 
document, in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 33.   Enhance Domain Awareness Function – Level 1 
Figure 33 shows the system context, or main, function, which is Enhance Domain 
Awareness, broken down into the four primary system functions, Detect, Track, Classify, 
and Respond, as well as a Perform Overhead Functions function.  This last function is 
distinct from the primary functions in that the primary functions are related to operational 
activities, but Perform Overhead Functions is necessary for system operation by 
accounting for such functions as startup, shutdown, built-in-test (BIT), etc.  The primary 
functions relate directly to the DIPR subsystems necessary for an AI system, and are 
mapped to the operational activities derived from the mission, as described in the 
Operational Architecture section. The main function is related to the overarching 





Figure 34.   Detect Function – Level 1 
Figure 34 depicts the first level decomposition of the first primary function, which 
is Detect. This, intuitively, represents the Detect DIPR subsystem, and its decomposed 
sub-functions show the types of functionality required to accomplish detecting a target. 
 
 
Figure 35.   Track Function – Level 1 
Figure 35, as with the previous figure, depicts the decomposition of the sub-
functions that were determined to be required to accomplish the Track primary function.  
This function would also represent the Identify DIPR subsystem, as this function would 
conduct the feature fusion and intelligent state (symbol) creation required for automation, 
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through the Process Video Data sub-function.  Tracks are derived from fusing different 
types of features detected within the Detect subsystem. Additionally, functions that 
perform more specific feature extraction would have to be superimposed upon the 
Process Video Data sub-function to extract features and perform the transformation of 
those features into intelligent states (symbols) for use by the Classify function, Figure 36. 
  
 
Figure 36.   Classify Function – Level 1 
Figure 36 shows the sub-functions required to perform the functions of a Predict 
DIPR subsystem.  Sub-functions 3.2 and 3.3 correspond to the functions performed in the 
Behavior Classifier Module discussed in the first section of Chapter III, and are critical 
for automated behavior analytical processing.  Sub-function 3.4 corresponds to the Infer 
Prediction Outcomes Module of the Predict model and is the last function in sequence 
that then passes the classification data to the next primary function Respond. 
The Respond function, with its constituent sub-functions, is shown in Figure 37.  
This function, relating to the React subsystem of DIPR, utilizes the functions of the 
integrates WSSN to then perform other sub-functions required to react to the output of 
the Classify function, even if that reaction is to do nothing and continue monitoring the 




Figure 37.   Respond Function – Level 1 
The last function depicted in this section is the Perform Overhead Functions 
function, shown in Figure 38.  As mentioned previously, this function does not relate to 
any particular subsystem of DIPR, but its sub-functions are very important to the routine 
operation and maintenance, the “housekeeping” of the system.  These sub-functions 
include starting up and shutting down the system, performing system BIT, providing a 
user interface to the system, and allowing the user to input a customizable mission plan. 
 
 
Figure 38.   Overhead Function – Level 1 
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2. Process Decomposition Hierarchies 
Quite similar to the previous section, this section presents the first level 
decompositions of the main processes in the WMSE POCS system process architecture.  
These decompositions show how the main system processes are allocated and broken 
down into their constituent sub-processes, ensuring that the higher-level processes can be 
accomplished in a sound manner.  The first level only is depicted to describe the 
decomposition process.  The full architecture, showing all the decompositions down to 
their lowest level of abstraction (the system and subsystem execution level) is given in 
the WMSE POCS description document, in the Appendix. 
The processes shown and that are further decomposed in the SDD do not stand 
alone, but are mapped directly to the system functions described previously.  This 
mapping is shown in Table 8.  The processes are identified and decomposed in the system 
architecture, mapping to functions, to illustrate those means by which the functions of the 
system are actually accomplished.  This process analysis and allocation methodology 
greatly assists the systems engineer in understanding what processes, which often are 
derived from the operational activities, need to occur in order to achieve a particular 
functionality.  By understanding what processes or activities need to occur, as well as 
understanding what processes may be redundant or be applied across more than one 
function, the system can be more efficiently designed and integrated.  This efficiency is 
realized as the processes are allocated across system components and elements to perform 
system functions.  Additionally, as the breakdown of processes is understood across 
system components, system and component interfaces can be much more completely and 
effectively accounted for in the design. 
An important note to the reader:  
The process diagrams in this section were created from the CORE architecture 
development software tool.  The tool is limited in that it does not include a specific 
category for “Process” elements.  Therefore, the only reasonable element category that 
would adequately decompose and depict process elements, as well as properly map them 
to functional elements were Operational Activities.  Thus, although the diagram blocks 
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with the process names are each labeled “OperationalActivity,” they are indeed 
processes, and should not be confused with the actual operational activities of the 
operational domain, which comprise the Operational Architecture, which was discussed 
previously. 
 
Figure 39.   Domain Awareness Enhancement Process – Level 1 
Figure 39 shows the system context, or main, process, which is Enhance Domain 
Awareness Process, broken down into the four primary system processes, or activities, 
Contact Detection, Contact Tracking, Classification, and Response.  These primary 
processes map directly to the primary functions in the first level of the functional 
hierarchy.   
 
Figure 40.   Detection Process – Level 1 
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Figure 40 depicts the decomposition of the first primary process, Contact 
Detection.  All of the subprocesses for this process deal with the functioning of the 
camera system and video capturing functions that are required to accomplish contact 
detection.   
What is not shown, but should be mentioned, is that some of the processes which 
fall under the Detection decomposition, could very well map to the Perform Overhead 
Functions function, and not necessarily to the Detect function, itself.  This relationship 
illustrates that decomposing of processes and mapping those processes to functions are 
related, but not identical, activities.  Processes are decomposed into the abstractions that 
aid in accounting for and allocating those processes to ensure their execution.  However, 
to merely make the process decompositions mirror images of the functional 
decompositions would be a mistake of simplicity which could lead to extraneous 
processes and inefficient design. 
 
Figure 41.   Tracking Process – Level 1 
Figure 41 shows the Contact Tracking process, which is broken down into a Read 
Video File process and a Process Video File process.  These processes are accomplished 
in the “Blob Tracker” software component of the WMSE POCS, which is fully described 




Figure 42.   Classify Process – Level 2a 
The Classification Activities process, shown in Figure 42, is broken down into 
two main sub processes, Server Activities and User Activities, determined as required to 
accomplish Classification.  Figure 42 shows the further decomposition of one of these 
main sub processes, Server Activities, which is broken down into those activities the 
server needs to perform to support Classification, Database, Graphical User Interface 
(GUI), and Behavior Analysis Module (BAM) activities.  All of these activities, and how 
they relate to functional achievement, are discussed in the system development 




Figure 43.   Classify Process – Level 2b 
Figure 43 depicts the other main sub process of Classification, User Activities, 
which are System Initialization and GUI interface.  These sub processes address those 
activities that the user must perform in order to accomplish various system functions.   
Another point to mention is that ideally there will never be more than one process 
allocated to a function, as this would indicate an inefficiency of extraneous resources 
applied to execute a function.  However, it is actually desirable to have more than one 
function allocated to a process, as this condition indicates greater efficiency with one 
activity accomplishing more than one function.  While some multiple process to function 




Figure 44.   Response Process – Level 2a 
The last main sub process, Response, is decomposed into two lower sub 
processes, WSSN C2 Activities, and WSSN Agent Activities.  The decompositions of 
those lower sub processes are shown in Figures 44 and 45, with all of the depicted 
activities regarding the Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) described in Chapter V. 
 
Figure 45.   Response Process – Level 2b 
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3. Physical Integration Architecture 
This subsection describes the processes and components that went into creating 
the physical system by translating the functional and process architectures into a physical 
architecture.  This translation occurred through identifying the resources available, 
system boundaries, subsystem and element boundaries, and finally system constraints.  
a. Integration Resources 
In order to transform the system from a theoretical system to physical 
system, the physical architecture had to be defined and developed from the available 
technologies which were deemed the most feasible to accomplish the specific tasks, as 
well as those components which were selected under the process described in Section 4.  
The arrangement and layout of these physical elements is more thoroughly discussed in 
Chapter V.  However, a short description of the resources used to accomplish the 
integration architecture is given here.  The resources required to complete this project 
include the hardware and software that will be used to develop and integrate the desired 
functionality and further enhancements to the Watchman System.  The resources for this 
architecture project are as follows: 
x Network-Centric Systems Engineering Lab (BU-201L) 
o Watchman System 
 Watchman camera network 
x WiLife Cameras (6/node) 
x IEEE 802.3u compliant cabling and switches (see Option 
Matrix and Pugh Selection Matrix, Tables 6 and 7) 
 Watchman Server 
x MS Access Data Management System (DMS) Application 
x MATLAB BAM Classifier 
x MS SQL Server 
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 Node Command and Control Processors 
x WiLife Command Center 
x Simulink Blob Tracker and associated MATLAB files 
x Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) 
o Smart Sensor Network Agents 
 Lego Mindstorm NXT robots (2 - 4) with required sensors 
b. System Boundaries 
The Watchman Maritime Smart Environment is a network of cameras and 
desktop computers located in Bullard Hall.  The system has six separate detection and 
processing nodes.  Each node has six cameras connected to a dedicated desktop 
computer, referred to as the “Command Center,” via Ethernet cables.  The desktop 
computer for each node is connected to a single server. 
This project focused on one of the six nodes, Node 6, and its interactions 
with the Watchman server.  Node 6 receives input from its six cameras, three of which 
are all located in the “Smart Room,” BU 201L, the Network Centric Systems Engineering 
(NCSE) Lab.  The Node 6 Command Center and the Watchman Server are also 
physically located in the Smart Room.  One unique feature of node 6 is that it contains 
two “Smart Agents.”  The Smart Agents are response robots built from Lego Mindstorm 
kits.  They communicate with the Node 6 Command Center via Bluetooth, and 
accomplish the “Response” function (as a React subsystem), as noted in the functional 
architecture description. 
c. Boundaries of Each Element 
Smart Room: Entry to the NCSE Lab is controlled by key-card.  The 
Watchman Server, the Node 6 Command Center, and the cameras are connected by a 
local private network but are also connected to the Internet.  Penetration into the network 
by an outside party is unlikely but not impossible. 
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Cameras: The three Smart Room cameras of Node 6 are identical, 
and share a similar field of view, albeit from different perspectives:  the center of the 
Smart Room.  They are connected to the Node 6 Command Center via Ethernet cables 
and a network switch, which is also physically located in the Smart Room.  All 
communication between the cameras and the Command Center is done via Internet 
Protocol (IP) through this switch, which physically connects Node 6 to the rest of the 
Watchman Network (five other Nodes, each with their own sets of cameras).  Although 
the Node 6 Cameras are connected to the rest of the network, the cameras do not 
communicate with any of these other nodes or other external networks under the scope of 
this project. 
Node 6 Command Center: The Command Center is connected to the 
Watchman Server and Network via a server switch as well.  The Node 6 Command 
Center does not communicate with any of the other Nodes for the purposes of this project 
(other than administrative file sharing).  Though the Command Center can access the 
Internet, Internet access is not used for any of the Watchman processes.  The Command 
Center Communicates with the Smart Agents via Bluetooth communication.  Bluetooth is 
not used for any other purpose. 
Watchman Server: During normal use, the Watchman Server 
communicates with the six nodes via a server switch.  For this project, the only focus 
regarding communication is between the Watchman Server and the Node 6 Command 
Center.  Though the Watchman Server can access the Internet via a router, Internet access 
is not used for any of the Watchman processes. 
Smart Agents:     The Smart Agents are equipped with color sensors, 
ultrasound range sensors, and a camera (on only one agent).  They communicate with 
each other and the Command Center via Bluetooth.  They do not communicate with any 
other system or entity. 
Bluetooth: This technology is widely used.  The Command Center and 
the Smart Agents do not use encryption in data transfer.  Another interested party on or 
off campus could intercept Bluetooth data; since radiation from Bluetooth sources can be 
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detected many miles away (and may even be picked up by a satellite in orbit). .  
Bluetooth is also vulnerable to interference, either by cross talk from other sources or 
deliberate jamming. 
More details of the physical architecture, layout, design, build, and test 
demonstrations of the WMSE POCS, including the WSSN are found in Chapter V. 
d. System Constraints 
Cameras and Command Center: The Cameras use a proprietary 
program called “WiLife” which handles the video feed by saving it in video frames of 
10-15 seconds in length.  So far, a solution, which provides a direct real-time streaming 
video feed for analysis, has not been found. 
Watchman Server: The Watchman Server uses the Mac OSX operating 
system.  The Watchman Identify, Predict and React software is run through Microsoft 
SQL, Microsoft Access, and MATLAB and must be run through a Windows virtual 
machine.  This uses a great amount of processing power when analyzing the video data 
and could prove problematic when attempting to process a large amount of video.  The 
server is also currently unable to communicate directly with the Smart Agents via 
Bluetooth and must rely on one of the Command Centers to order to communicate with 
the WSSN agents.  The server can then communicate with the Command Center via IP. 
Smart Agents: The two Smart Agents can communicate with the 
Command Center via Bluetooth only.  Over Bluetooth, the transfer rate of data is 
extremely limited.  This limits transmission of video collected by one of the agents to low 
resolution and low frame rate. 
This chapter intended to describe and present the functional, process, and 
operational architectures that were produced as part of the functional analysis and 
allocation steps of the SE process to show how the resultant architectures were ultimately 
applied in the design, building, coding, integration, and testing of the WMSE POCS.   
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The next chapter presents, and describes in detail, this system, as well as 
conducts an analysis and makes recommendations for operational implementation of 
automated behavior analysis capability represented in the system. 
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V. WMSE POCS AND OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Chapter V presents and describes the elements and development of the proof of 
concept (small-scale laboratory) system (POCS) that was dubbed the “Watchman 
Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) in the context of this research. This description 
includes the hardware and software design, layout (topology), and build, as well as 
improvements and upgrades made to the system after the initial development.  In the final 
section, the chapter discusses the lessons learned from the system design, development, 
and integration processes, analyze alternatives for potential operational implementation, 
and make recommendations for the preferred approach.  In addition, the section discusses 
what technology still needs to be refined for potential application and implementation of 
the system in an operational environment. 
The WMSE POCS was born from an elective course in the Network-Centric 
Systems Engineering Track at NPS, Artificial Intelligence (AI) Systems I, and was 
improved and expanded over subsequent, follow-on courses (AI Systems II & III), as 
well as through directed study course blocks.  The AI Systems class series was designed 
to apply the systems engineering process, through artificial intelligence technologies, to 
design, implement and demonstrate a “smart environment” through behavior analysis. 
The courses were formatted as a “skunk-works” type project, and carried the project from 
concept to prototype demonstration, on through Engineering Change Orders (ECO) and 
system upgrades and modifications.  The system was divided into three subsystems – 
Applications Engineering, Network Engineering, and Software Engineering – with 
student teams responsible for each subsystem development. The SE process for the 
system development was fully documented along the way: CONOPS, Request for 
Proposal, Proposal, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, System 
Documentation, Demonstration Proposal. The class had several team review, 
management and interactive meetings while designing and implementing this 
interdisciplinary system. 
My role was the project manager (PM) and team lead for the Applications 
Engineering Subsystem team.  In this role, I coordinated all of the activities mentioned 
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previously, leading the team through all aspects of the SE process, which was discussed 
in Chapter III, as well as ensured proper documentation of all of these activities.  The role 
of PM for the Applications team was unique from the other team leads, in that the 
Applications group, as will be shown, was the focal point and coordinating hub for the 
realization of the system’s main goals.  It was imperative for all subsystem teams to 
coordinate with one another to ensure accurate data flow and correct interfaces between 
subsystems; however, the Applications team was responsible for bringing all of the 
pieces of the system together to make certain that the system was fully integrated and that 
exact information flowed to the right parts of the system in the right way, at the right 
time.   
Due to the fact that the Applications subsystem was where the behavior analysis 
and processing took place, I also became intimately familiar with the ABA algorithms 
(known as the Behavior Analysis Module, or BAM), and became the chief software 
engineer for implementing, upgrading, and expanding the BAM for operation in the 
WMSE POCS.  It is with this experience, coupled to my operational Naval Aviation and 
Carrier Battle Group experience, and my professional acquisition experience that have all 
contributed to the insight in applying this research to the challenges of MDA. 
The entire system is presented and explained here to provide a notional 
“operational network” context for the basis of the research.  My specific research effort in 
this context involved integrating the BAM within the Watchman network system.  
Although I was certainly involved in all aspects of system design and development, my 
area of concentration for this thesis was the portion of the system that dealt with the 
design, integration and performance of a behavior analysis capability in a networked 
environment.  Additional contributions in this regard included the design, development, 
and integration of a Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) to demonstrate how 
behavior analysis output could be integrated with a networked complex reaction 
subsystem; and design and development of a spatial resolution enhancement capability, 
and automated cost calculation algorithms for more discrete behavior analysis. 
 127
A. WMSE POCS 
This section includes an overview of the initial Watchman system, a description 
of each subsystem and its functions, and finally a description of the system upgrades, 
enhancements, and additions that were accomplished. 
1. Watchman System Overview 
This Watchman System (referred to as Watchman) is an automated “smart” 
system, which continuously monitors designated areas in order to identify pre-determined 
individuals or for classifying observed behaviors and alerting operators of observed 
behaviors.  This automated system allows users to react, in a timely manner, to 
“abnormal” behaviors in order to minimize the potential simulated threats that certain 
behaviors could pose.  Many different environments, such as insurgent urban areas, 
military ships and installations, temporal “high-value target” areas (e.g., gatherings of 
international leaders, political events, high-profile sporting or entertainment events, 
events with dignitaries and/or potential targets of terrorist elements, etc), schools, 
government buildings, and others, all require this type of constant behavior surveillance 
and monitoring. 
The initial system was able to identify, classify, and track certain individuals 
(class members) for accountability purposes.  Those individuals were identified by the 
system and their presence in the test environment was then updated into an accountability 
(mustering) system/database.  Once the accountability baseline had been established for 
the indentified individuals, that control group could be monitored in the test environment 
in order to analyze behaviors to collect data on differences between normal and abnormal 
behaviors.   
The system was able to classify behaviors as Normal, Abnormal and Unknown.  
Upon the system gaining enough data to discern which behaviors can be classified, the 
operators could then add additional behaviors into the Watchman behavior database.  
This gives Watchman the ability to adapt to its environment, which would offer system 




Figure 46.   Bullard Hall, Second Floor 
The system has the ability to monitor the control group individuals and send 
alerts, via the server subsystem, to operators to react to those behaviors.  The system 
retains data on the types of behaviors which were classified as abnormal, and when alerts 
were sent. 
Watchman was set up on the Naval Postgraduate School campus on the second 
floor of Bullard Hall (see Figure 46). 
The original Watchman was comprised of three subsystems:  Watchman 
Application Engineering Subsystem (WAES); Watchman Network Engineering 
Subsystem (WNES); and Watchman Software Engineering Subsystem (WSES).  The 





Figure 47.   Watchman Architecture 
The WAES contains the command-and-control center that has two large (30” 
cinema) displays that allows the operators to control and monitor the system.  There is an 
Apple “X-Server” that is interconnected for reliability and that processes the data files 
and video feed pushed by the WNS. 
The WNES provides an Internet Protocol (IP) network engineering physical 
infrastructure to capture video data and relay this data to the command center computers 
for analysis. This infrastructure includes a link between the command and control center 
computers and the master server. The infrastructure consists of IEEE standardized 
Ethernet networking tools—to include cabling, switches, and network interface cards—as 
well as surveillance cameras and data analysis software.  
The WSES requires raw video data input from the surveillance cameras.   Data 
transfer is provided by the network subsystem.  The detection and identification software 
at each PC node for processing receives this data.   The WSES was designed to initially 
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process detection and identification of one (1) person at a time to provide facial 
recognition for identification and mustering and for behavior analysis. 
The detection and identification software processes the input video data to extract 
meaningful identification and tracking information.  This data is aggregated into an 
Structured Query Language (SQL) database, whose data is pushed from each PC node to 
the master server database.   
The software subsystem provides archived video data to the server via the 
network subsystem.  The camera video data is stored by the WSES to allow on-demand 
access by the WAES via the network subsystem.  Additionally, continuous real-time 
streaming video data is available to the server via the network subsystem. 
2. Application Engineering Subsystem 
This subsection describes the Application Engineering Subsystem within the 
WMSE POCS. 
a. Application Engineering Subsystem Overview 
The Watchman Application Engineering Subsystem (WAES) collects, 
collates, and processes target movement and identification data.  The WAES displays 
alerts, identifications, behaviors, and movement patterns to the Watchman operators 
using a graphical user interface (GUI) on the command and control displays that are 
located in Bullard Hall room 201L. 
The WAES receives all data feed from the Watchman Software 
Engineering Subsystem, through the Watchman Network Engineering Subsystem 
infrastructure. Each WSES PC node continually pushes data to the master database 
detection table located on the WAES.  The detection table was originally comprised of 
data entries that contain the following information:  Data Type (Position or 
Identification); Identification (Name); Node and Camera; Figure of Merit (FOM); Date 
and Time.  Database updates are pushed to the WAES at variable times (as determined 
and set by the operator).  Database information collection can also be configured to 
initiate whenever WSES detects an individual in the surveillance area.  
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The database information is used in two ways.  First, the ID Module can 
query the database detection table in order to create muster alerts and a muster report.  
Second, the Position Integration Module (PIM) can query the detection table periodically 
at pre-user-determined time intervals in order to create a time/position vector for use in 
the Behavior Analysis Module (BAM).  During this vector creation query process, the 
query will analyze information in the database using the Position De-confliction Module 
(PDM).  If an individual is detected and reported simultaneously by two different Nodes, 
both nodes will send a database input to the WAES.  If these duplicate inputs have the 
same time data field, the WAES shall select which Node has the higher FOM, and use 
that input as the data for that particular time period in the creation of the time/position 
vector for behavior analysis. 
b. Behavior Analysis 
From the vector creation query, the PIM will process the database query 
and will order the Node and Camera data, by time sequence, into a data array that will 
hold the positions of a contact (identified or un-identified), integrating data over time in 
order to give a slower and more accurate position account of the person being tracked.  
This data set will be written to three separate text files, stored on the server.  The first file 
will contain a string of formatted time and date data, the second will contain a string of 
Node data, and the third will contain camera identification data.  These three files will be 
formatted such that when they are processed, the time and date data in the first file will 
correlate directly to the Node and camera that captured the video data at that particular 
time. The BAM will continually query the storage location directory for the data files.  
When the PIM writes new files to the directory after a database query, the BAM will pull 





Figure 48.   Software Data Processing 
The BAM (Figure 49) will process the data files from the PIM, and 
classify the observed behaviors according to the following sequence:  The BAM will 
compare the observed behavior to the stored behavior model using a sequential 
syntactical classifier algorithm, such as was discussed in Chapter III.  This algorithm is 
based upon alphabetical syntax rules.  An alphabet of symbols is pre-defined 
corresponding to node/camera combinations.  Each behavior is defined by augmented 
syntax rules (e.g., sequences of similar structures) for the symbols.  When a sequence to 
be classified is read into the program, it is parsed according to each predefined behavior, 
which edits the sequence to fit those behaviors.  This “fitting” process assigns a cost (or 
distance) according to the amount, which the parsed string was changed in order to match 
each behavior model.  The algorithm then outputs this distance metric to the Tolerance 
Comparator (TC).  The behavior separation distances will then be compared by the TC to 
ensure that they are smaller than a maximum “threshold”/baseline distance.  If the 
behavior distance is less than the threshold, then the behavior will be classified as either 
normal known behavior, giving the behavior label, I, that corresponds to the min(di), or a 
known abnormal behavior (which would be one of the predefined Behavior , where I = 
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1,2,…,N).  If the behavior distance is greater than the tolerance, then the behavior will be 
classified as unknown (where unknown could be an “unknown normal behavior” or an 
“unknown abnormal behavior”).  
The data output from the BAM will be in the form of a text file that will 
be the result of the analysis of the data input from the PIM files.  This output shall be one 
of four possibilities: NORMAL, ABNORMAL, UNKNOWN, or ERROR.  The first three 
possibilities listed will merely be the classification of the PIM data by the BAM.  The 
final possibility, ERROR, will be the output if the BAM cannot resolve the input data to 
any of the other three possibilities, due to failure or limitation of the algorithm or 
erroneous input data from the PIM.  This output will be stored in the database with a 
date-time tag in order to have a reference to regenerate the PIM query for analysis, if 
required. 
 
Figure 49.   Behavior Analysis Module 
 
The three general behavior classifications:  Normal, Abnormal and 
Unknown are defined below. 
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x Normal Behavior – behavior that the customer/project team deems 
to be acceptable or non-threatening and does not require alerting, 
further tracking, or reporting.     
x Abnormal Behavior – behavior that the customer/project team 
deems to be non-acceptable or potentially threatening and requires 
alerting, immediate further tracking and reporting. 
x Unknown Behavior – behavior that does not meet the thresholds of 
predefined normal or abnormal, and thus will be reported to the 
operators for analysis and further tracking and will be used in the 
future for adaptive learning of the defined behaviors, behavior 
parameters, and TC parameters. 
 
c. Identification and Mustering 
If the data from the WNS has the Identification (ID) data field populated 
(Face Recognition has made a match), then it will be passed onto the ID Module in 
Figure 3.  The ID Module will check the data file ID and compare it to the Daily Muster 
List (DML).  The DML will be active for a 24-hour period starting at 00:00 local time.  
The DML will have all the identified contacts and the date/time stamp of their first 
identification during the 24-hour period.  The ID Module will check the ID of data file 
and will enter the date/time stamp if there is not one for the current 24-hour mustering 
period, or discard the data file if a date/time stamp already exists in the DML. The DML 
will update the DB storage area after each update of the DML. 
d. Command and Control 
The Command and Control Display Module (C2DM) consists of two (30” 
cinema display) monitors that use a GUI to display alerts of any abnormal or unknown 
behavior. The C2DM displays the global view of distributed IP smart camera network, for 
situational awareness of the area of interest (Bullard 2nd floor). The GUI allows 
operators to access and view the streaming video feed from any of the video cameras in 
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each node.  The C2DM design encompasses two main interfaces, which correspond to a 
user-defined preference to reside on either of the two displays.  The two interfaces are the 
System Display Interface (SDI) and the Video Display Interface (VDI).  The CDI is a MS 
Access based form, which will display several system parameters, status, and alerts, as 
well as to provide a user interface to assimilate, process, and react to the data output of 
the Watchman system.  The VDI provides the capability to view video data from each 
Node via the Wi-Life web interface. 
(1) System Display Interface (SDI). The SDI has several graphical 
and user-interactive interfaces shown in Figure 50. 
 
 
Figure 50.   System Display Interface 
(a) SDI Tracking Module 
The SDI Tracking Module, which consists of an interactive map 
display of the second deck of Bullard Hall, takes data from the PIM, and resolves it to a 
regional position on the map corresponding to the camera field of view (FOV) for the 
node in which the PIM reports the target as being detected.  The position on the map will 
be indicated by a time-phased color scheme; black depicting the current position of the 
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target, red being the first time-late position, orange depicting the second time-late 
position, and yellow depicting the third time-late position.   
(b) SDI Alert Module 
The SDI Alert Module takes the output from the BAM described 
above, being triggered by the input of the BAM output data into the PIM database table.  
The SDI uses this data for the alert function.  When data is written to the PIM database 
table, the SDI analyzes the input.  If the input is “NORMAL,” the system STATUS 
indicator will remain green, and no other alerts will be shown.  If the input is 
“UNKNOWN,” the STATUS indicator will turn YELLOW, the ALERT indicator will 
appear and be YELLOW, and the ACKNOWLEDGE  (ACK) button will become active.   
The alert text field under the ALERT indicator will read “UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR 
DETECTED,” and the Operator Action text field above the ACK button will read, 
“INVESTIGATE TARGET EXHIBITING UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR IN NODE (X),” 
“X” being the node in which the target is currently located by the PIM.  These indications 
will remain until the operator initiates the ACK command.  Upon initiation of this 
command, the ALERT will disappear to indicate that the operator has acknowledged the 
ALERT, but the STATUS will remain YELLOW until the system is cleared 
“CONDITIONS NORMAL” by the operator.  In addition, two additional, follow-on 
functions shall become active; CONCUR, and IGNORE.  If the IGNORE function is 
selected, the STATUS will return to GREEN and the system will revert back to 
“CONDITIONS NORMAL.”  If the CONCUR function is selected, the STATUS will 
remain its current color until the system is cleared “CONDITIONS NORMAL” by the 
operator. If the input from the BAM is “ABNORMAL” the system will behave 
identically to the “UNKNOWN” condition, with the exceptions that the ALERT and 
STATUS indicators will be RED, and the Alert text field will read, “ABNORMAL 
BEHAVIOR DETECTED” and the Operator Action text field will read, “INTERCEPT 
TARGET EXHIBITING ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR IN NODE (X).”  At any time, the 
operator can activate the CONDITIONS NORMAL function to return the system to the 
normal operating mode.  In future increments, the CONCUR and IGNORE functions  
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could incorporate the additional capability of providing input to the BAM as to the 
validity and accuracy of the reported behavior in order for the BAM to “learn” and 
continually refine its analysis algorithm. 
(c) SDI Mustering Module 
The SDI displays the information output from the ID Module when 
a target is identified and their data is input to the database detection table.  The SDI will 
display the stored file picture of the individual who has just been added, as well as a 
“muster data tag” (MDT) which consists of their name, rank, date and time of data 
capture, Node and Camera, as well as a confidence factor at the moment data capture 
occurred.  Simultaneously, the MDT will be added to the DML, which will be displayed 
under the incoming MDT and current mustered picture.  As additional individuals are 
identified and mustered, the most current data will replace the picture and MDT, as well 
as to be added cumulatively to the DML. 
e. Application Engineering Subsystem Detailed Engineering 
Specifications 
This subsection itemizes the detailed engineering specifications for the 
WAES, listed as enumerated system requirements. 
Requirement 1.0: 
1.1: The system shall have the ability to receive near real-time video 
and/or feed from any camera node 95% of the time requested. 
1.2: The system shall successfully receive data from camera nodes (vector 
information and time data) 95% of the time requested. 
Requirement 2.0:  
2.1: The system shall meet a threshold requirement to be able to 
successfully identify and match five recognized behaviors (3 “normal” behaviors and 2 
“abnormal” behaviors) to pre-known behaviors 60% of the time it is requested.  A future 
objective of the system is to be able to identify and match ten behaviors (6 “normal” and 
4 “abnormal”) to pre-known behaviors 80% of the time it is requested. 
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2.2: The system shall successfully resolve data conflicts between camera 
nodes 85% of time requested in order to maintain track integrity. 
2.3: The system shall successfully resolve and correct of face recognition 
data 85% of time requested in order to maintain mustering integrity. 
2.4: The system shall be able to successfully report the presence of control 
group personnel, via facial recognition data from the PC nodes and error correction, to a 
personnel accountability system 80% of the time requested. 
2.5: The system Command Control Center shall maintain and display near 
real-time mustering of the area of interest (Bullard 2nd floor) as desired by the system 
operator, 100% availability. 
2.6: The system shall be able to successfully classify target behavior into 
three categories (“normal,” “abnormal” and “unknown”) 80% of time requested.  This 
data will be used identify key metrics and further develop the systems behavioral 
analysis. 
2.7: The system will have an open architecture to allow for future growth 
of the system’s ability to “learn” and auto-update the behavior classification matrix based 
on collected data from PC tracking and reporting and operator inputs. Therefore, with this 
system open architecture, the system has the ability to scale to additional behaviors and in 
the future adaptively learn and update these behaviors, the behavior parameters, and the 
TC parameters. 
Requirement 3.0:  
3.1: The system shall have the ability to command the PC nodes to send 
raw video data (near real-time data or archived data) 95% of the time necessary.  This 
data shall be able to be displayed to the operator at the Command Control Center. 
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Requirement 4.0:  
4.1: The system shall have a 90% rate of successfully transmitting an alert 
of reportable behaviors to an operator at the Command Control Center. The future 
objective of the system is to be able to successfully transmit an alert of reportable 
behaviors with 100% accuracy.   
4.2: The system shall be able to continue normal operations (track and 
reports further reportable behaviors) while prior alerts are being addressed 90% of the 
time. 
Requirement 5.0: 
5.1: The system’s Command Control Center design shall be user-friendly 
and require minimal operator training. 
5.2: The system’s User Interface will be user-friendly, allow users to 
locate a person’s general position (within the range of one node) on Bullard Hall’s 2nd 
floor, and be capable of displaying near real-time video. 
5.3: System data shall be classified and stored on a designated server 
indefinitely.  Operators shall be able to view previously recorded video data, as well as 
near real-time data.  Server back-up capability, or PC reach-back capability, will allow 
the WAES to get database files from each WSES node.  This will protect against lost 
information. 
f. System Demonstration / Subsystem Acceptance Test Procedure 
(ATP) 
This ATP was developed for the purpose of demonstrating the system to 
complete the validation phase of the SE process.  This particular ATP is a system 
demonstration, which validates the functionality of the WAES.  Due to the integrated 
nature of the system, this ATP also validates the functionality of the WNES, and WSES, 
and therefore is a validation of the entire system. 
System Test Scenarios – Data output via GUI is collected in an output data 
file, which provides metric reports on the numbers and types of identifications, 
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classifications, alerts, and system errors.  Scripted sets should be run in the 
following order for the purpose of data analysis and comparison to expected 
results: 
FACIAL RECOGNITION:   
a. Subject will walk within identification range of sensor node (X), 
and continue through node at a normal walking pace until out of the node. During subject 
conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to control station.  
Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute. 
 b. Upload stored image of test observer.  Have observer look into 
operator station camera to be collected, identified, and mustered in the system.   
* Successful test criteria:  
1) Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification that 
individual has been mustered. 
2) Identification Alert shows the correct name, picture, date and 
time information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run 
3) Output data file shows subject in the output data file muster list 
4) Output data file shows correct name, date and time information, 
matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
5) Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
NORMAL BEHAVIOR – 1 NODE:  
Subject walks through Node (Y) along a planned route, 
corresponding to a NORMAL behavior pattern, at a normal walking pace. During subject 
conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to control station.  
Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  Test shall end 
upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (Y). 
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* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
NORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (Y) has facial 
recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data.   
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR –1 NODE:  
Subject walks through Node (Y) along a planned route, 
corresponding to an ABNORMAL behavior pattern, at the proscribed walking pace. 
During subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to 
control station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  
Test shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (Y). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows identified subject (if Node (Y) has facial 
recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
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d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR – 1 NODE:  
Subject walks through Node (Y) along a planned route, 
corresponding to an UNKNOWN behavior pattern, at the proscribed walking pace. 
During subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to 
control station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  
Test shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (Y). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (Y) has facial 
recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
NORMAL BEHAVIOR – 2 NODES:  
Subject walks through Nodes (Y and Z) along a planned route, 
corresponding to a NORMAL behavior pattern, at a normal walking pace. During subject 
conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to control station.  
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Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  Test shall end 
upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (Y or Z). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
NORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (Y or Z) has 
facial recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR – 2 NODES:  
Subject walks through Nodes (Y and Z) along a planned route, 
corresponding to an ABNORMAL behavior pattern, at a normal walking pace. During 
subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to control 
station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  Test 
shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (Y or Z). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (Y or Z) has 
facial recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
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c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR – 2 NODES:  
Subject walks through Nodes (Y and Z) along a planned route, 
corresponding to a UNKNOWN behavior pattern, at a normal walking pace. During 
subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to control 
station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  Test 
shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (Y or Z). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (Y or Z) has 
facial recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
NORMAL BEHAVIOR – MULTIPLE NODES:  
Subject walks through Nodes (Y through Z via C and D) along a 
planned route, corresponding to a NORMAL behavior pattern, at a normal walking pace. 
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During subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed to 
control station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 minute.  
Test shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (C, D, Y or Z). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
NORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (C, D, Y or Z) 
has facial recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR – MULTIPLE NODES:  
Subject walks through Nodes (Y through Z via C and D) along a 
planned route, corresponding to an ABNORMAL behavior pattern, at a normal walking 
pace. During subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed 
to control station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 
minute.  Test shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (C, D, 
Y or Z). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR. 
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b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (C, D, Y or Z) 
has facial recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
UNKNOWN BEHAVIOR – MULTIPLE NODES:  
Subject walks through Nodes (Y through Z via C and D) along a 
planned route, corresponding to an UNKNOWN behavior pattern, at a normal walking 
pace. During subject conduct of test run, operator will send out command for video feed 
to control station.  Operator shall monitor video at their discretion for no less than 1 
minute.  Test shall end upon subject exiting personnel recognition range of Node (C, D, 
Y or Z). 
* Successful test criteria:  
a. Identification alert passed to operator screen with name, 
date/time stamp, video capture image, and stored file picture, with text notification of 
UNKNOWNBEHAVIOR. 
b. Output data file shows subject identified (if Node (C, D, Y or Z) 
has facial recognition capability) and contains behavior classification data. 
c. Output data file shows correct name, date and time, and behavior 
classification information, matched to the subject, date and time of test run. 
d. Data output to operator screen “map” view, which shows correct 
position information of subject throughout conduct of test. 
e. Video is passed to operator display in an uninterrupted data 
stream, which provides a clear, discernable image of the subject and/or test node area. 
 147
End of technical demonstration description 
Upon execution of the system demonstration test procedure for all 
cases, the system passes all test criteria, correctly identifying individuals for mustering 
90% of the time (9/10 test subjects correctly identified), and correctly identifying 
observed behaviors in each test run, for 100% behavior classification.  These results 
exceeded system requirement metric thresholds. 
3. Network Engineering Subsystem 
This subsection describes the Network Engineering Subsystem within the WMSE 
POCS. 
a. Network Engineering Subsystem Overview 
The Watchman Network Engineering Subsystem (WNES) provides a 
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) IP network engineering physical infrastructure to 
capture video data and relays this data to the command center computers for analysis. 
This infrastructure includes local area network links between the command center 
computers and the master server of the WAES, described in the previous section. The 
infrastructure consists of IEEE standardized Ethernet networking tools—to include 
cabling, switches, and network interface cards—as well as WiLife cameras and software. 











Figure 51.   Network subsystem component overview 
b. Physical Network Topology 
The Watchman system uses a switched Ethernet network with the 
capability of being connected to another network or the Internet. All cables are Cat 5e 
compliant, and the network will operate at 100Mbps utilizing IEEE 802.3u compliant 
hardware, as per the component selection process outlined in Chapter IV (Tables 6-7). 
Figure 52 shows a diagram of the network topology. Each of the six cameras in one 
group connects to the WiLife “power injector,” a 12-port switch that provides Power-
over-Ethernet to the cameras per the IEEE 802.3af standard. The remaining six ports in 
the “power injector” switch connected via short patch cables to a D-Link 8-port switch. 
One of the remaining ports in the D-Link switch connects to the “command center” PC 
Central Processing Unit (CPU) for that group of cameras, and the other port is connected 
to a Linksys 8-port switch. This switch is connected to the switch for each camera group 
and to the WAES Mac (Apple) server. This switch is also connected to the NPS network 
via the Linksys router to provide access to the Internet.  Both the D-Link and Linksys 
switches are IEEE 802.3u compliant. 
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The connectivity components within this topology are an example of how 
the physical system components can be traced back to the user need via the SE process 
defined in this thesis.  Beginning with the user need, “Push time-critical alerts to decision 
makers,” MDA-003C-007T, from the JIC, the operational activity, “Assess the 
Operational Situation” (COM 1.1.1.4.3) was derived and then mapped to the identified 
Navy task, “Provide I&W of Threat” (NTA 2.4.5.3).  This task was then mapped to the 
function, “Perform I&W” (3.0) and its constituent subfunction, “Alert Generation” (3.2) 
from the functional architecture, both derived from the Network Engineering Subsystem 
requirement, “Provide stable high-speed (at least 100Mbps) data connectivity for timely 
generation of alerts.”  This requirement led to the criteria for the Morphological Matrix of 
Options shown in Table 6, found in Chapter IV.  From this analysis of options, the 
network components of 802.3u IP and Integrated Network Card were selected and 
implemented in the Network Topology. 
 
 
Figure 52.   Network Subsystem Topology 
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(1)  Computer Placement.  The command centers, switches, and 
server are installed on the workbench in BU201L. This location provides convenience 
and security.  
 
(2)  Cable Routing.  Cables connecting the switches, “power 
injectors,” “command centers,” and server are arranged within the workbench in BU-
201L. Cables connecting the “power injectors” to the individual cameras are routed 
through the existing floor conduit or upward to the existing pipe hangers and outward 
toward the cameras. Cables follow the conduit or pipe hangers as much as possible and 
are securely and aesthetically routed along the ceiling otherwise. Cables are secured with 
plastic tie-wraps. Cable lengths vary between 30 feet and 150 feet and none are greater 
than the maximum length of 300 feet. 
(3)  Cable Construction.   Cables are made from a bulk Cat 5e 
cable spool and standard 8P8C connectors wired to T568B standards. The cable lengths 
are adequate to attach the respective camera to its switch port plus ten feet of cable in 
reserve to allow for minor hardware relocation or changes to cable routing paths, if 
required.  
c. Logical Network Topology 
Due to the interconnection of multiple camera groups with multiple 
command centers, each network host is assigned a static IP address. Camera IP addresses 
are set from their respective command centers using the vendor-provided utility program. 
The addressing scheme adheres to the following pattern:  
x All addresses use the 192.168.0.x class C private IP address space with 
a network mask of 255.255.255.0.  
x The Apple server uses the address 192.168.0.100  
x Each command center uses the address 192.168.0.X0, where X 
corresponds to the number of that command center. (e.g., command 
center #3 will use 192.168.0.30)  
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x Each camera uses the address 192.168.0.XY, where X corresponds to 
the number of the command center and Y corresponds to the number 
of the camera.  
x The router uses the address 192.168.0.1.  This means that the server 
and all command centers will use 192.168.0.1 as their default gateway. 
d. Network Engineering Subsystem Detailed Engineering 
Specifications 
This subsection itemizes the detailed engineering specifications for the 
WNES, listed as enumerated system requirements. 
(1) Requirement 6.0: Hardware List 
The camera network consists of the following hardware: 
x 6, WiLife Master Camera Systems with Command Center 
Software WLPIC-4X6  
x 10, WLIR-50 NightVision Illuminator Kits  
x 10, WiLife WLAL-120 120 degree wide angle lens for indoor 
camera  
x 10, WiLife WLAL-54 54 degree close up lens for indoor 
cameras  
x 10, QuickCam Pro 9000 USB 2.0 Webcam  
x 6, D-Link 8-port 10/100Mbps switches  
x 1, Linksys 8-port 10/100Mbps switch 
x 1, Linksys WRT54G router 
x 3500 feet of CAT5e cabling with 8P8C connectors 
x 6 DELL Precision Workstations, T3400 (375/32bit) 
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Figure 53.   Camera and Network Hardware Placement 
Figure 53 graphically depicts camera and network hardware 
placement. Figures 54 through 59 show each camera group (with up to six cameras each) 
with the approximate field of view from each camera and the cable routing from the 
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equipment cluster to each camera. Cameras have been placed such that most areas will be 
visible by at least two cameras. Cameras are grouped such that every group has some 
coverage overlap with at least one other group. Stairwell areas and the hallway across 
from the freight elevator use camera placement optimized for a close-up view of the faces 
of people entering the area. 
 
 








































































Figure 58.   Camera Group 5 
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Figure 59.   Camera Group 6 
(3) Requirement 8.0: Camera Installation 
Cameras are fastened to 4-inch square pieces of thin Plexiglas 
using the included mounting hardware.  This Plexiglas mounting plate uses adhesive-
backed Velcro to attach to the wall mounting points. 
(4)  Requirement 9.0: Data Rate Capacity 
Network shall provide stable high-speed (at least 100Mbps) data 
connectivity for the following data transfer requirements: 
x Transfer of Video Data 
x Transfer of Processed Contact Data 
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x Transfer of Behavior Classification Data 
x Timely Generation of Alerts 
e. Subsystem Acceptance Test 
The full subsystem acceptance test was accomplished to complete the 
verification step of the SE Process by verifying that all components of the system were 
properly functioning and communicating with each other.  The following test procedure 
is included to describe the verification steps, which were taken for this subsystem of the 
entire system.  This step was a key component that led to the overall verification and 
validation during the full system acceptance test procedure. 
1. Power test:  
x Power up the server, command centers, switches, and cameras and 
verify proper indications.  
x The server and command centers should exhibit a normal power-
on self-test sequence.  
x The switches should show power LED lit.  
x The cameras should show the network connectivity LED lit at its 
port on its switch.  
2. Connectivity test:  
x From the server, issue a ping command to each network adapter.  
x Each command center and camera should return a successful ping 
reply. 
3. Video data test:  
x Start the WiLife application on each command center to verify the 
reception of video data from each camera.  
x Each command center should display a video image from each 
attached camera.  
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4. Hardware installation review:  
x Inspect all hardware, including network cabling, to verify that 
hardware is properly, securely, and aesthetically installed.  
x Computers should be stable, have efficient cable routing, and have 
adequate airflow. Keyboards and monitors should be 
ergonomically operable from the expected user stations.  
x Network cables should be securely fastened to walls and structures. 
They should not present a safety hazard (trip hazard or 
entanglement). They should present an aesthetic and professional 
appearance.  
Cameras should be securely mounted to their attachment points.  
4. Software Engineering Subsystem 
This subsection describes the Software Engineering Subsystem within the WMSE 
POCS. 
a. Software Engineering Subsystem Overview 
The Watchman Software Engineering Subsystem (WSES) (Figure 60) 
receives raw video data input from the WiLife DLC-810i indoor cameras.   Data transfer 
is provided by the WNES. The detection and identification software at each PC node 
receives this data for processing. The WSES processes the video input to extract 
meaningful detection and identification data.  This data is aggregated and stored in the 
WSES database and the WAES databases for access by the server for higher-level 
processing by the WAES.  The data stored in the subsystem databases originally 
included: 
x Unique Identifier (UID):  unique identifier. 
x Date:  System date at processing. 
x Time:  System time at processing. 
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x Node (N#):  PC node number. 
x Camera (C#):  Camera number. 
x Field of View (FOV) vector containing:  
x Area:  Area of blob detected 
x Histogram:  Histogram of blob detected. 
x Face Detected:  True or False. 
x Figure of Merit (FOM): calculated FOM using FOV and FR data  
x ID: Identification from Personnel Database. 
x Confidence Factor (CF):  Facial Recognition match percentile for 
ID. 
The WSES was initially be designed to process detection and 
identification for one (1) person at a time to provide 80% facial recognition accuracy for 
identification and mustering and 90% detection for behavior analysis.  These 
performance metrics were ultimately derived from the operational user requirements 
under the DRM, which are the MDA JIC capability gaps.  The specific gaps that these 
metrics address is MDA 004C-002T/003T, “Identify adversary patterns of behavior,” and 
“Differentiate maritime threats from valid maritime commerce.”  The facial recognition 
metric is a measure of achieving the differentiation need, while the behavior analysis 
metric measures achievement of the behavior pattern recognition need. Access to 
archived video data will be available to the server via the network subsystem.  The 
camera video data is stored and managed by the WiLife Command Center to allow 
protection and on-demand access by the server.  Additionally, continuous real-time 
streaming video data is available to the server via the network subsystem. 
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Figure 60.   Watchman Software Subsystem (WSS) overview 
b. List of Software 
The Software Subsystem utilizes both commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
and locally generated software for implementation.  This software was required to be 
loaded on each Node Personal Computer (PC) in order to perform the required 
processing. 
(1) Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) Software.  The COTS 
software utilized within this subsystem consists of the following components with their 
requisite purposes: 
x WiLife Command Center: camera setup and video archive 
management. 
x MATLAB 
o Blob Analysis. 
o Histogram. 
o Face Detection. 
o Face Recognition. 
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x MS SQL Server Express: data warehouse. 
Software requirements not met using COTS software were locally 
generated to capture, create, and store data in the databases and perform several other 
housekeeping functions that were required. 
(2) Software Installation. The Node PCs are running the 
Windows XP operating System.  NPS Information Technology and Communications 
Services (ITACS) personnel loaded MATLAB 2008a, MS Office and MS SQL Server 
Express on each Node PC.  Additional software has been and can continue to be loaded 
on the Node PCs and WAES Mac Server by the WSES team as required, due to the open 





Figure 61.   Watchman Software Engineering Subsystem (WSES) block diagram 
c. Software Engineering Subsystem Detailed Engineering 
Specifications 
This subsection itemizes the detailed engineering specifications for the 




(1)  Requirement 10.0: WiLife DLC-810i Indoor Cameras. Video 
input will be received from the WiLife cameras via the WNS for storage and processing 
within the WSS. WiLife camera specifications are listing in Table 9. 
 
Processing Power: 400 MHz DSP  
Onboard Image Encoding: Windows Media Video 9  
Onboard Image Processing: Motion detection up to 16 zones, auto-brightness  
Resolution: 320 x 240 or 640 x 480 pixels 
 Frame Rate: 5, 10 or 15 frames per second,/font> 
Bit Rate: 150 kbs to 800 kbs,/font> 
Color Depth: 10 bits 
Focus: User-adjustable  
Viewing Angle: 80° (diagonal)  
Pan Angle: 50° (manual) 
 Firmware Updates: Manual or Automatic 
 Communications: Ethernet, TCP/IP 
 Power Consumption: 15 Watts 
Table 9.   WiLife DLC-810i Indoor Cameras Specifications 
(2)  Requirement 11.0: WiLife Command Center. The WiLife 
Command Center software was installed on each node PC and automatically stores the 
video input in Windows Media Player 9 (.wmv) format files on the local hard drive when 
the cameras detect motion.  The software will also organize the files and manage the 
allocated video storage.  Hard drive storage space is allocated for video files within the 
software and when the video files fill up the allocated space the software automatically 
removes the oldest files to make room for new recordings.  Each Node PC must remain 
on for the system to work and record video.  
The software interface is user-friendly.  Monitoring of cameras or 
playback of archived video clips is possible from any or all of the cameras connected to 
each Node PC.  Additionally, the software allows for saving video clips and still frame 
images (jpg, gif, png, tiff, etc).  The system can easily be configured to automatically 
send an e-mail or cell phone alert with a video clip or still frame when motion is detected, 




Figure 62.   WiLife Command Center Software screen capture. 
i. Requirement 12.0: Field of View (FOV)  
x Function: Analyze node camera live video inputs to 
calculate the FOM vector data for each camera's input that 
contains; object area, color histogram, face detected, and 
FOM. 
x Inputs: Live video feed in Windows Media Video 9 format 
from all node cameras.   
x Output: UID, Date, Time, Node#, C#, Area, Color 
Histogram, Face Detected, and FOM. 




Figure 63.   Field of View (FOV) data flow chart 
 
ii. Requirement 13.0: Facial Recognition (FR)  
x Function: Given a live video feed with a properly 
positioned camera provide 80% facial recognition 
accuracy. 
x Input: Database of Faces with Names, Live Windows 
Media Video 9 (WMV) video feed output from FOV if a 
face is detected. 
x Output: Potential Match with UID, Time, Node#, C#, ID, 
and Confidence Factor (CF) of match. 




Figure 64.   Face Recognition (FR) data flow chart 
iii. Requirement 14.0: Aggregate Data  
x Function: Filter data using a precedence scheme and 
Network Time Scale (NTS) to store the best FOV and FR 
data in the databases on the server and Node PCs. 
x Input: FOV and FR data. 
x Output: "Best" data over a set time interval to server and 
local database in a given format for the data information 
package: [UID, Time, N#, C#, Area, Color Histogram, Face 
Detected, FOM, ID, CF]. 
x Software:  MATLAB. 
iv. Requirement 15.0: Data Warehouse  
The data storage requirements are accomplished using a 
database within each Node PC as well as an aggregate database on the WAES 
server that will contain the data from each Node PC.  The personnel data for each 
individual will be stored in the database in the table named Personnel.  The 
detection data will be stored in the database in the table named Detection.    
v. Requirement 16.0: Detection Table  
x Function: Store Facial views for usage by facial recognition 
software. 
x Input: Multiple Facial Profiles for a Given Test Group. 
x Output: Pass Data as called for by Facial Recognition 
Software. 




Table name:  Detection 
Primary Key:  UID 
 
Field Type Nulls? 
UID int No 
Time date/time No 
Node (N#) int No 
Camera (C#) int No 
ID int Yes 
FR_CF percentage Yes 
Height double No 
Width double No 
Color double No 
FOM double  No 
  
Index Name Unique Clustered Fields 
PK_Detection Yes Yes UID 
Time No No Time 








Table 10.   Detection Table from the Detection Database 






FK_Detection_Personnel PersID Personnel 
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vi. Requirement 17.0: Detection Database  
x Function: Store data to allow for behavior analysis and 
mustering. 
x Input: Data fields from the aggregate data software: [UID, 
Time, N#, C#, Area, Color Histogram, Face Detected, 
FOM, ID, CF] 
x Output: Data to behavioral analysis software at server for 
processing. 
x Software: MS Access 
Data Dictionary 
Table name:  Personnel 
Primary Key:  PersID 
 
Field Type Nulls? 
PersID int No 
First_Name text (15) No 
M_I text (1) No 
Last_Name text (25) No 
Email text (25) No 
 
 Index Name Unique Clustered Fields 
PK_Personnel Yes No PersID 
 






FK_Personnel_Detection Detection ID 
Table 11.   Personnel Table from the Detection Database 
vii. Requirement 18.0: Video Data Store  
x Function: Provide the server access to video data files 
saved on the Node PCs by the WiLife Command Center 
software. Allow data files to be protected to prevent 
automatic overwrite. 
x Input: Recorded video in Windows Media Player 9 format 
from WiLife Command Center, Protection requests. 
x Output: Saved video file in Windows Media Player 9 
format on local hard drive of each Node PC. 
x Software: WiLife COTS Software package 
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5. Upgrades to the Initial Watchman System 
This section will describe some of the significant Engineering Change Orders 
(ECOs) which were implemented in enhance the base capability of the Watchman 
Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) concept development and demonstration system, 
as well as additional system elements which were integrated into the original Watchman 
system to expand the capability of the POCS.  The following section of this chapter will 
discuss how these enhancements and expansions affect the recommended method for 
operational implementation of the system. 
a. Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) 
(1)  Update Behavior Analysis Code.  This ECO was required to 
accomplish the upgrading and enhancing of the Behavior Analysis Module (BAM) of the 
Watchman System to implement additional aspects of functionality that was not 
implemented in the first quarter phase of the project.  Due to the anticipated impact to the 
interfaces of the BAM with other system elements, e.g., the Position Integration Module 
(PIM), the server, and the Detection database, the BAM code had to be updated to ensure 
that not only did the BAM utilize the increased functionality derived from the other 
ECOs, but also that the BAM still functioned as designed, given the expected interface 
changes.    
In particular, Watchman ECO 3, Camera Calibration, enhanced the 
system’s ability to more precisely locate the tracked target in the surveillance area.  This 
enhanced position information was provided to the BAM, which then had to process this 
data in order to capitalize on the greater fidelity of behavior pattern recognition that the 
higher position resolution provided.  Figure 65 shows the mapping of the “Zones” which 
were created via the camera calibration procedure, which were in turn translated into a 




Figure 65.   Camera Calibration “Zone Mapping” 
(2)  Camera Calibration.  The Camera Calibration ECO was 
implemented to correct the Watchman System’s inability to precisely determine the 
position of a track within the Watchman System’s surveillance area.  The original 
Watchman configuration gave only a general location for the track, this general location 
being the field of view of the system camera that had the largest image (blob size) of the 
track, and therefore the highest FOM.  The original general location varied from a 400 
square-foot (sq-ft) area (the Watchman Lab) to a 200 sq-ft hallway to a 60 sq-ft stairwell.   
To provide the ability to analyze more discrete behaviors, the 
system had to be able to provide a refined, more accurate location of the target (in this 
case, a person) being tracked.  In other words, an enhanced position detection function.   
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This refined position detection allowed the Watchman System to 
more accurately capture the movements of the track as it moved within the surveillance 
area.  This afforded the added advantage of permitting the system to have more precise 
behaviors identified, documented, and captured in the BAM, thus allowing the system to 
be more agile and effective at recognizing more detailed Normal, Abnormal and 
Unknown behaviors. 
The initial calibration procedure was a very labor-intensive process 
of mapping out each camera’s FOV with markers to identify the zones, and then 
laboriously manually processing the resulting image to allow the calibration program 
from MATLAB to automatically scan and identify the markers from within the image, as 
shown in Figure 66, then write them to a file. 
 
Figure 66.   Camera Calibration Image Processing 
These marker positions, as identified by the MATLAB automatic 
image scan, then had to be manually cross-referenced and re-ordered into the actual zones 
as they appear in the camera FOV to the human eye perspective, by creating matrices of 
the (X,Y) coordinates for all the marker positions.  To ensure that all the zones were 
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correctly entered into the matrices, a figure of the polygons using MATLAB had to be 
plotted.  The matrices were saved in text files that could be read in by a MATLAB 
function to evaluate if a blob’s position is inside any of the zones. 
 
 
Figure 67.   Camera Calibration Zone Cross-referencing 
A main MATLAB function within the Blob Tracking program, 
called “GetZone” had to be created that uses the MATLAB “inpolygon” formula to 
evaluate if the lower middle position (LMP) of the blob (video track) is within any of the 
polygons of the specified camera’s FOV. 
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Figure 68.   MATLAB "inpolygon" function depiction 
The “GetZone” function returns, to the blob tracker, the zone 
where the LMP of the blob was located.  The output is the designated number that 
represents one of the unique zones of all the zones in the camera’s FOV.  Each camera 
has a unique FOV, and thus can have a unique number of zones. 
This very labor-intensive process for mapping each camera FOV to 
obtain the calibrated zones was modified to include a routine that allowed the user to 
merely use the computer mouse to identify the zone boundaries for all the zones in a 
FOV.  This is still, unfortunately, a manual process at this point, however, it only requires 
one step, which is to click, in order, the points which define each zone in a FOV.  Once 
this procedure is complete, the matrices and associated files for the blob tracker program 
are automatically generated, which is a huge improvement in time savings and accuracy 
over the initial process. 
Verification testing was conducted for the behavior analysis of 
targets with the new calibrated camera processed video data.  Nine runs were conducted 
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with three sets of three separate behavior cases, Normal, Abnormal, and Unknown.  The 
system correctly classified the observed target behavior nine out of nine times, for 100% 
accuracy, exceeding the 90% detection threshold requirement for behavior analysis. 
(3)  Addition of Video and Audio collection “Kiosk.”  The goal of 
the Kiosk ECO was to extend the Watchman network, adding interactive video face 
recognition and audio recording and analysis capability.  This ECO also clearly 
demonstrated the open architecture design of the Watchman, with the ease that an 
additional sensor and distributed processing suite could be integrated into the original 
system.  This architecture is key to the WMSE POCS, showing how overall system 
functionality is enhanced, not degraded, by the integration of key capabilities into the 
system architecture. 
 
Figure 69.   Video and Audio Kiosk layout 
The audio/video kiosk consists of two cameras and eight 
microphones connected to two laptop computers, as depicted in Figure 69. The cameras 
and computers are connected by an Ethernet switch to the rest of the Watchman network, 
allowing the computers to share detection and analysis data with the Watchman server. 
The cameras are Sony SNCRZ30N pan/tilt/zoom motorized 
cameras.  They provide images to the video-controlling laptop using an Ethernet 
connection.  They can be configured to send images at regular intervals or when they 
detect motion, and they can be controlled automatically or manually from the computer. 
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The microphones are connected to a MOTU audio mixer, which is then connected to the 
audio-controlling laptop via a FireWire connection.  Software on the computer records 
audio information and displays a spectrogram during playback for analysis. 
The video-controlling laptop uses timer objects in MATLAB to 
read and display the images sent by the cameras.  Images are named with the time they 
were taken, and the MATLAB program searches for images with names matching the 
current time.  Once a matching image is found, the MATLAB program runs the face 
detection algorithm.  If the program finds a face, it commands the camera to zoom in on 
the face and provide more images.  These new images are sent to the face recognition 
algorithm to record the subject’s identity. 
The MATLAB program that detects and recognizes faces also 
sends movement commands to the cameras to make them zoom in for a high-quality 
image.  It uses Common Gateway Interface (CGI) commands sent using the Hypertext 
Transport Protocol (HTTP) commonly used to load web pages from the Internet. 
The Audacity software program on the audio-controlling laptop 
controls the recording process and performs analysis of the recorded audio streams.  
These recordings can be saved an analyzed later to help verify the identity of the speaker.  
The Audacity software records from two of the eight microphones.  Once an audio file is 
created, a MATLAB program converts the recording into a spectrogram showing the 
relative signal strength over the frequency spectrum as the audio stream changes over 
time.  This spectrogram is illustrated in Figure 70. 
Should they be desired for further project research, the existing 
kiosk provides the architecture for adding more advanced capabilities in the future.  
Video and audio capture and analysis can be improved and new functions added 
according to the needs of the user. 
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Identified potential upgrades include: 
x Automatic mustering. Where the video-controlling laptop 
can perform its face recognition algorithm and then report 
its findings to the Watchman server for mustering purposes. 
x Automatic audio recording, where the audio-controlling 
laptop can monitor background noise levels and capture 
audio streams only when it detects a significant rise in the 
audio signal. 
x Audio source location. Where all eight microphones can 
compare the minute differences in the time of receipt of an 
audio signal to calculate the spatial position of the audio 
source.  This position can then be translated into a vector 
for the cameras, which can pan toward the source and 
record video data. 
 
Figure 70.   Audio Spectrogram 
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(4)  Blob Tracker upgrade to generate a color histogram.  The 
Watchman blob tracker subsystem was upgraded to have the ability to generate a color 
histogram of detected targets (“blobs”). These changes allow more accurate blob 
differentiation and position analysis. More accurate blob differentiation will allow the 
system to be updated in the future to track multiple blobs simultaneously.  The tracker 
accomplishes this by having the ability to recognize one blob from another by color 
differentiation.  This capability, coupled with the more accurate position analysis will 
allow the watchman system behavior analysis subsystem to better classify a tracked 
blob's behavior. 
The proposed functionality will create a color histogram by 
cropping a red, green, blue (RGB) color video still with rectangular coordinates.  Those 
coordinates, [x y rows columns], will be provided by the existing blob tracker subsystem.  
The subsystem then performs a color histogram analysis of the cropped image using the 
MATLAB histogram function. The program will then provide a matrix at the network 
time interval summarizing this data and sending it to the Watchman server subsystem for 
eventual use by the BAM. 
(5)  Update WAES Server.   This ECO incorporates the Watchman 
Server Microsoft SQL Server database and Microsoft Access frontend application 
updates required to support the other ongoing ECOs.  This ECO included update to the 
current server data storage, processing and display.  Specifically, modification of the 
database; tables and queries, forms and reports, and event code was required.  The 
updates to the server database and application are listed below with their associated ECO. 
x Microsoft SQL Server 2005 database 
o Detection table (tblDetection) 
 Camera Calibration (ECO 3) 
x Add field for zone 
o Color Histogram (ECO 7) 
 Add fields for histogram bins;  
x Eight (8) red channels 
x Eight (8) green channels 
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x Eight (8) blue channels 
x Field of View Optimization (ECO 1) 
o Add fields for x and y position of blob tracker 
x Microsoft Access Project frontend application 
o Muster subform (frmMuster) 
 Camera Calibration (ECO 3) 
x Update to display zone for muster 
(i.e., 5.1.A, where 5 is the node, 1 is 
the camera and A is the zone) 
o Node Tracker subform (frmBullardSecondFloor) 
 Camera Calibration (ECO 3) 
x Update to display zone for tracking 
x Previously the greatest resolution the 
tracker could display was the 
camera’s entire field of view 
o Behavior Analysis Monitoring (BAM) subform 
(frmBAM) 
 Camera Calibration (ECO 3) 






x Add zone to queries 
 Behavior Code (ECO 12) 
x Behavior Analysis Monitoring 
Export Reports 
x Add report to export zone to BAM 
for analysis (rptBAMzone) exported 
to “BAMzone.txt” 
 
The existing interfaces, shown in Figure 71, between MATLAB, 
the SQL Server and the Access frontend application for writing to the database, as well as 
between the Access frontend application and the SQL Server for displaying data from the 
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database were not modified.  This demonstrates how significant upgrades to functionality 
within the system can be accomplished without the necessity to modify existing 
interfaces, which is a mark of robust design architecture. 
 
Figure 71.   Watchman Server Interface Block Diagram 
b. Integration of the Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) 
This follow-on Systems Integration upgrade project focused on three 
primary enhancements to the current Watchman Maritime Smart Environment (WMSE) 
concept development and demonstration system.  The WMSE system was meant to 
demonstrate the capabilities required to meet a target behavior analysis problem on a 
small, measurable scale as a proof of concept that could reasonably be expanded and 
developed into a full-scale prototype development system. 
These enhancements are within the Analyze/Classify, Provide Indication 
and Warning (I&W), and Respond functions of the system architecture.  A primary 
purpose of this project is the addition of the Wireless Smart Sensor Network (WSSN) to 
include upgrades to the Behavior Analysis Module (BAM) analysis and integration with 
the I&W system. 
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Integration of the WSSN and the upgraded BAM to the current Watchman 
System was accomplished using a systematic, modular approach by which the separate 
system functions were developed and implemented individually.  Integration was 
accomplished after initial functions and interfaces were in place and tested.  A summary 
of the required enhancements that were achieved follows: 
1. Analyze/Classify 
o Behavior Analysis Module (BAM) 
 Update BAM software to more accurately analyze targets 
2. Provide I&W 
o Expand Command and Control (C2) network to disseminate I&W data and 
issue tasking 
 Update Watchman Application to disseminate I&W data and issue 
tasking to the WSSN 
3. Respond 
o Develop a WSSN of response agents to collect additional data as required 
on a Contact of Interest (COI), as directed by the Watchman System 
 Integrate WSSN response agents to react to identified COI as 
required 
 
Minimizing the scope of this project maintained the project within the 
Network-Centric Systems Engineering (NCSE) Lab in Bullard Hall, room 201L.  Figure 
72 shows the layout of the NCSE Lab and positions of the cameras.  For this project, 
Camera 6.1 and Camera 6.6 were utilized to capture the video of the COI for processing 




Figure 72.   COI video processing 
 
To recapitulate basic system operation: video from the Node cameras is 
sent to the Node C2 computer where the COI detection and tracking takes place.  The 
intelligence is extracted and written to the Watchman Server Database.  The Watchman 
Application queries the data, creates the BAM utilization files and exports them to the 
BAM Classifier.  The BAM Classifier analyzes the behavior strings from the BAM files 
and writes the classification to the Watchman Server Database.  The Watchman 
Application then provides analysis for COI classification (Normal, Abnormal, Unknown) 




Figure 73.   COI detection, tracking and classification 
As part of the Respond function addition to the Watchman for this project, 
the Watchman Application sends a Tasking Message with the location of the target 
(zone) and task (data requirement) to the agents within the WSSN.  This message is sent 
automatically for an “Abnormal” classification.  For an “Unknown” classification, the 
system will ask for operator initiation (at their discretion) of the Tasking Message. 
 
 
Figure 74.   Tasking Message sent to WSSN 
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The WSSN consists of agents of two configurations for accomplishment 
of different tasks.  The agents within the network determine which agent will accomplish 
the task required from the Tasking Message.  The agent maneuvers to the COI, performs 
the required task and sends the data back to the server for processing. 
 
 
Figure 75.   WSSN agent responds to Tasking Message 
An overview of the current Watchman System and integration 
requirements for the project are described in Figure 76, the Watchman Integration 
Upgrade System Overview.  The red and yellow arrows illustrate the two primary 
integration points for the system.  The first integration requirement for the system, 
indicated by the red arrow, was the automated non-real time import of the video files 
from the fixed WiLife cameras into MATLAB for processing.  This requirement 
necessitated design and implementation of new software to accomplish the integration, 
however this function was later determined to not be required for WSSN integration, and 
was therefore deferred to a later upgrade project. No hardware requirements were 
identified during the analysis as required for this deferred integration requirement.  The 
yellow arrows and text indicate the second integration requirement, which was 
implemented.  First, the MATLAB BAM Classifier had to be updated to support 
integration of Node 6 zone mapping for Behavior Classification.  Next, the initiation of 
the WSSN Tasking Order from the DMS Application to the WSSN C2 Node and 
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transmission to the WSSN Agents had to be automated.  Finally, the WSSN Agent reply 
to the Tasking Order also required automation to support full integration.  This second 
integration requirement was accomplished by new and modified software development 
with only the minimal hardware requirement of an installed COTS Bluetooth 
communication Universal Serial Bus (USB) device. 
 
 
Figure 76.   Watchman Integration Upgrade System Overview 
A system demonstration test was conducted to validate the functionality of 
the WSSN subsystem.  Four runs were conducted under the criteria for Alert-Type Task 
Initiation (Abnormal alert or Unknown alert) and Data Collection Task Type (Image or 
Histogram).  The system conducted all four runs successfully with the agents correctly 
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receiving each tasking order based upon alert message type; correctly determining which 
agent would respond through autonomous communication and decision making; correctly 
navigating to the target; and correctly collecting and transmitting the requested target data 
from the tasking message. 
This section discussed the WMSE POCS in order to provide the network 
context as the basis of the ABA integration research effort, which is the focus of this 
thesis.  The system was designed, developed and tested as a proof of concept, and all 
systems and subsystems were tested and validated according to the determined 
requirements under controlled laboratory conditions. The next section discusses the 
implementation of the WMSE POCS concept in a notional operational environment, 
analyzing the possible alternative approaches that could be taken in that implementation.  
This implementation discussion will expound upon the MBAM portion of the system and 
how it can integrate into an MDA network as the specific area of concentration for the 
thesis research concept. 
B. OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Although the WMSE POCS was successfully evaluated, exceeding all 
performance metrics in a laboratory environment as established in the previous section, 
the crux of this thesis is not necessarily the success or failure of the WMSE POCS itself, 
from a standpoint of some new, cutting edge capability that can be brought to the fight of 
MDA.  While the WMSE POCS, in itself, does represent some move forward in the field 
of automated behavior analysis and processing, the real issue for stakeholders is how this 
type of capability, whether it is a future iteration or increment of the WMSE system or 
one of the other behavior analysis capabilities discussed earlier, such as PANDA or 
CMA, may be actually fielded to meet the requirements of the users that need them.  This 
challenge is uniquely a Systems Engineering one, and one which this thesis works to 
address, in understanding and analyzing the process of transitioning from user needs to 
requirements analysis, right on through architecting, design, build, and integration, and 
finally verification and validation of the systems solution to meet the original specified 
user need.  Using the SE Process lessons learned for the WMSE POCS, which were 
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outlined in Chapter III, this section explores the most feasible means of bringing a MDA 
enhancing capability, via a MSE, from concept to operation by properly applying sound 
SE principles. 
The two main SE methods by which a MSE could be implemented for operational 
use are either a complete, end-to-end, “from the ground-up” system development, or a 
smaller scale integration of solely the Maritime Behavior Analysis Module (MBAM) into 
the current Maritime Network architecture that accomplishes MDA.  The first method 
would encompass the original development of every aspect of the entire MSE.  This 
would include new or upgraded sensors of all types, new or upgraded data fusion, 
behavior analysis, reporting, and reaction capabilities, along with all of the requisite 
network communications, command, and control (C3), and the very latest in distributed 
data processing that would make a cutting-edge MSE network function.  The second 
method would only require the single MBAM (a “new” component) to be added and 
integrated into the current Maritime Network, under the FORCENet construct.  However, 
as simple as this may sound, in order for this integration to be successful, the MBAM  
would have to be compatible with all of the legacy interfaces of the network that will 
have inputs to and receive outputs from the MBAM, without adversely impacting the 
other critical functions of the network. 
The next two sections look at these two implementation methods from a SE 
perspective and discusses the pros and cons of each, making recommendations for which 
circumstances each method would be preferred. 
1. Complete “From the Ground-Up” System Development 
This method has several advantages from an SE point of view; the most obvious 
being that this method allows for all elements, components, and subsystems to be 
developed, designed, and integrated as a complete system, from “cradle to grave.”  This 
method, when time and budget allow (which unfortunately is often not the case) is the 
most preferable for Systems Engineers.  This is due to the fact that all systems elements, 
such as interfaces, hardware components, software languages and modules, etcetera can 
be architected, designed, built, and tested in a simultaneous, coherent, and coordinated 
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manner.  This simultaneous SE development across the whole of the system leads to a 
greater understanding and knowledge by Systems Engineers of the system, as well as 
greater access to and control over the many systems’ aspects, such as hardware and 
software functional and interface design, system-wide test planning and execution, 
system-wide requirements definition, and many others.  Having a thorough knowledge of, 
and greater access to and control over all various systems components helps to prevent 
many of the mistakes that occur throughout the SE process, such as misunderstood 
requirements, missing or incomplete architecture linkages, poor design direction, 
incomplete or inadequate interfaces, inadequate or ineffective testing, and much more. 
Another advantage found with this type of total system project is that the effort is 
at least managed, if not executed, by the same organization, such that the same 
individuals in the project office are working and coordinating on all aspects of the 
system, providing continuity throughout the entire SE development process. Even though 
these types of very large, comprehensive projects can span many years through the 
development cycle, which means turnover of engineers, project managers, and others, 
very rarely is there wholesale turnover of all the personnel in an office or organization. 
This means that there always exists some “corporate knowledge” of the technical aspects 
of the project throughout the development lifecycle process, which greatly reduces the 
chance of error in Systems Engineers “relearning” the same mistakes over and over 
again. 
Quite possibly the principal advantage to engineering an entire AI system to 
create an end-to-end MSE would be the ability to architect, design, and build the 
infrastructure upon which the remainder of the AI systems solution could be built, a’ la 
the AI Systems Solution Pyramid model discussed in Chapter III.  This total systems 
solution model affords a customized infrastructure whereby the intelligence automation 
application subsystems (i.e. DIPR) could be superimposed and would ideally function 
much more flawlessly, not requiring additional (and quite possibly complex) interface 
hardware and software.  In this model, given the availability of all required concurrent 
technologies (a considerable assumption), the detection sensors, identification (symbol 
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production) processing, prediction algorithms, and reaction systems all could run on the 
backbone of an AI systems infrastructure tailored for their unique operation. 
The main disadvantage from this approach is the inordinate and often prohibitive 
cost in time and money that such a large undertaking incurs.  These very large and 
comprehensive projects are so vast in scope that initial cost estimates cause budgetary 
“sticker shock” for stakeholders, making these worthwhile projects very difficult fiscally 
to garner enough budget support to get off the ground.  Additionally, project stakeholders 
also want needed capability in the hands of users quickly, which makes this type of full-
scope approach unattractive.  The time that such a development effort takes, in order to 
fully build all the architectures, design all of the components and interfaces, then fully 
test and validate, with ample additional amounts of time for fixes and re-testing, frustrate 
the efforts of the project to maintain the favor of stakeholders with competing priorities.   
This disadvantage can sometimes be overcome by using SE development 
strategies such as “evolutionary acquisition” or “spiral development” or any of the other 
terms, which happen to be in vogue at the time for incremental development.95  If the 
total system scope can be broken up into phases, with different levels of capability 
developed and delivered to the user over time, then the comprehensive system approach 
has a much better chance of showing a more near-term return on investment for the 
stakeholders, and therefore offering a much better chance of programmatic success, 
regardless of the technical advantages. 
Despite the technical synergistic advantages of the complete systems approach, 
certainly there are drawbacks as well, considering the complexity of such a large 
endeavor.  As with any system of systems (SoS), the more systems involved, the more 
complex the overall SoS will be.96  Given the inherent complexity of the types of 
individual systems within this type of SoS, and the coupling and cohesion that must occur 
with any networked SoS, the combined complexity of a comprehensive MSE SoS would 
be very complex, indeed.  It is this complexity that leads to the long systems development 
                                                 
95 INCOSE Systems Engineering Handbook, version 3, June 2006, Edited by: Cecilia Haskins 
96 Ibid. 
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cycle and extraordinary cost, which was mentioned earlier.  System stakeholders would 
be required to conduct an analysis of the trade-offs between complexity, schedule, and 
cost, as compared with the advantages of control, coherency, and coordination and of a 
total system development concept before committing to that path. 
An example of this type of approach may very well be the CMA JCTD that was 
discussed in Chapter II.  This system is a comprehensive MDA enhancement system, 
which was tested and intended for fielding as a total network solution, complete with 
functionality for autonomously aiding operators in determining intent, much like the 
MBAM of the WMSE.  It is unknown how long this system will take to fully develop and 
implement, or if an acquisition strategy has been adequately developed with proper SE 
input and oversight to come up with an effective evolutionary capability-phased approach 
to development that will allow this promising suite of capabilities to get into the hands of 
MDA practitioners in a reasonable time frame in an environment of constricting 
resources.  Nonetheless, it would not be recommended to apply this type of approach to 
the WMSE POCS, or any other MDA enhancement system, until the technology for all 
elements of the architecture are mature enough to support system-wide development and 
implementation. 
2. Integration of MBAM Into Current Maritime Networks 
The other method of implementation that will be explored is the integration of a 
matured Maritime Behavior Analysis Module (MBAM) into a local tactical MDA 
network, such as was described in the DRM OV-1 diagram, to create a MSE.  This 
method would utilize all of the current and future expanding MDA capabilities, within 
existing net-centric architecture, to enhance the MDA mission with the addition of an 
ABA capability.  First discussed are the pros and cons of this approach, and then an 
example is offered of how this might be accomplished with the WMSE POCS 
architecture as a model of a notional operational implementation. 
The main advantage of this method is the minimization of schedule and cost by 
utilizing existing MDA sensors, data processing and management networks, C2 
structures, etcetera.  This cost minimization is not only found by avoiding additional 
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R&D costs of new MDA network assets, but also in the deployment, training, 
sustainment, and all of the other life-cycle costs associated with the deployment of new 
systems.  Of course older systems become obsolete and can therefore become more 
expensive to sustain; however, the proper integration of an MBAM capability should 
employ open-architecture principles97 such that older components of the overall MDA 
network can be removed, replaced, and/or upgraded with minimal to no impact to the 
MBAM interfaces and associated capability. 
The schedule minimization advantage can be found in the fact that the MBAM 
integration can be a stand-alone effort, without any impact to the current systems or their 
operation.  By understanding the type and format of input that the MBAM requires, as 
well as the output it delivers, “bridge” code could be developed to translate current 
sensors fused track data into the format that could be processed by the MBAM.  
Likewise, additional bridge code would be developed to take the MBAM output and 
provide it, in the form of alerts, to the current C2 systems’ GUIs for operator action.  All 
that would be required would be the interface data exchange information (which should 
not have a proprietary access restriction, due to “open architecture” acquisition rules)98 so 
that software development engineers have accurate insight into the data fusion outputs 
and the C2 GUI inputs.  Once the input and output bridge code was tested and validated 
with the MBAM functionality, the system could be installed and deployed. 
A consideration that should not be taken lightly is the challenge of customizing 
the MBAM for use in its particular tactical environment.  Recalling from the AI Systems 
Solution Pyramid presented in Chapter III, the top level represents the customization of 
applications that are required for their specific implementation.  Certainly this would be 
true for any MBAM application, as the behaviors of potential threats in the Straits of 
Hormuz, for example, would be quite different than those of the Caribbean, as well as 
those off the coast of Somalia.  Part of the entire implementation process would be the 
creation of databases for both normal, abnormal, and known threat behavior for any 
                                                 
97 Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook, version 1.1, October 25, 2007, PEO-IWS 7. 
98 PEO IWS, Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook. 
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potential theater MDA network into which the MBAM would be integrated.  These 
databases would also need to include customized cost calculations correlated to the 
unique behaviors and environments in which those behaviors would be found. While this 
challenge is by no means a simple one, it is the same challenge that would be found and 
necessary to overcome with a “ground-up” full system development implementation.  
The ability to customize the MBAM as a stand-alone application that can then integrate 
into existing networks is still a significant advantage for cost and schedule reduction. 
Another advantage of MBAM integration is a technical advantage, which was 
alluded to previously.  The MBAM would bring a significant capability to enhancing 
MDA, however, it would not necessitate the excessive alteration of any existing 
interfacing systems.  To the contrary, the only anticipated change to existing 
infrastructure would be the space allowance for the system, data connections for network 
connectivity with the system, and upgrades to the C2 system to allow for display of 
MBAM output alert data. Additionally, the physical locations (e.g., databases) of features 
preexisting would need to be known in order for the MBAM to access them. 
Given the state of technology today, as well as emerging technologies, it is 
recognized that there are varying degrees of automation that may be found in the systems 
present in any given MDA network, when attempting to integrate ABA capability.  This 
variability will lead to different cases that must be dealt with in the implementation.  
Figure 77 depicts the integration of a MBAM under the DIPR construct, utilizing 
the bridge code under differing technical circumstances, as previously described.  The 
legend in the diagram shows those software elements that would be required to 
implement bridge code in order for the MBAM to function within the existing MDA 
network.  As the diagram shows, all of the interfaces with existing or “legacy” systems 
would require bridge code in every case, for MBAM functionality without legacy system 
or network disruption.  In addition to interfaces, bridge code would be required to 
accomplish the Identify function of DIPR in every case, which is, in effect, the translation 
of fused sensor data into intelligent states (symbols), as discussed in Chapter III.  This 
implementation of Identify for symbol creation would be the translation of fused sensor 
data into MBAM-usable format, described in the previous paragraph. 
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Figure 77.   Integration of a MBAM Through the Use of “Bridge Code”  
There are some cases, however in which bridge code may or not be required for 
the legacy systems themselves in order for the MBAM to function properly and 
effectively.  These cases are depicted in the diagram by the rounded rectangles with 
arrows directed to the systems that would be affected.  For example, older legacy systems 
that perform the Detect function may not have the capability to process raw sensor data 
for feature extraction or they may not have the capability to fuse those features.  Bridge 
code could be applied “upstream” of the Identify function that would process the sensor 
data to extract the features required and/or fuse those features to provide fused contact 
data in the format that then could be processed by the Identify function for further 
transmission to the MBAM.  If the Detect system(s) have this automated feature 
extraction and fusion capability already, this step of integration would not be required. 
In other cases, stakeholders may desire for the React subsystems to have more 
automated capability, or for the user interface(s) to have some automated alerting 
capability or features to allow the user to customize the defined behaviors.  In these 
cases, bridge code could be applied to the GUI or React subsystem, as shown in Figure 
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77, where integration of tailored tactical display interface functionality, or integration of 
an automated reaction subsystem, such as the WSSN described earlier in the chapter, 
could occur. 
Given the fact that the MBAM is essentially a processing capability, physically 
integrating it would entail installing a platform of sufficient memory and processing 
power to hold and process the data for the hundreds, if not thousands of eventual 
maritime behaviors it would need to analyze, along with the requisite data connections.    
Display data could be accomplished via two means.  One way would be via a stand-alone 
monitor system, which would be easiest and quickest to install and integrate, yet would 
require additional training and monitoring, and is therefore not recommended.  The 
preferred method would be to provide output data information to the display software 
vendor via the output bridge code and work with that vendor to incorporate MBAM 
output data through the bridge code as part of the current display format (see Figure 77).   
A disadvantage that arises from integration into an existing network is the danger 
of data corruption from the introduction of a non-compatible system and therefore 
performance degradation of the existing systems.  For example, if the preferred method 
of MBAM output data integration were to change the software of the C2 displays to 
accommodate MBAM alert data, this change to would require ongoing software 
maintenance of the C2 software as it pertained to changes in the MBAM software that 
affected output to the C2.  This additional functionality would potentially increase the 
chances of software failure due to the incorporation and maintenance processes.  Though 
this would increase the maintenance burden and the risk of failure to a degree, 
incorporating this small additional maintenance task would still be far outweighed by the 
benefit of seamlessly integrating MBAM data into the C2 picture for MDA. However, 
this risk is avoided altogether through the use of bridge code to translate the output data 
into that standard display input format.  Other data corruption risks are minimized, if not 
eliminated, by the fact that interfacing with the MBAM does not directly influence the 
existing systems.  Of course, full risk mitigation of network corruption could be 
accomplished through the implementation of some type of hardware or software 
“bypass,” whereby operators could effectively remove the MBAM from the network at 
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any time, should data corruption or functional degradation as a result of MBAM be 
suspected. Nonetheless, through the use of bridge code, the existing systems maintain 
their data and functional integrity, without being required to alter their interfaces or data 
processing structures. 
Consider now how this might be accomplished with the WMSE POCS 
architecture as a model of a notional operational implementation, referring to the diagram 
of the functional architecture for “Enhance Domain Awareness,” Figure 77.  The 
“Classify” function is expanded to show its required sub-functions.  The “Detect,” 
“Track,” “Respond,” and “Perform Overhead Functions” main functions represent those 
functions that would be performed in a current, real-world, MDA network.  The Detect 
function would be accomplished via any of the various sensors inked into the network, 
such as radar on an MPA aircraft, FLIR from a rotary-wing UAV, ESM from a surface 
combatant vessel, etc.  The Track function could be performed by any of the platforms 
mentioned with their onboard processing capability, as well as through sharing the 
information via data links, and fusing the data into a COP.  The Respond function could 
also be accomplished by any of the platforms already mentioned, as well as other 
platforms or assets, air, surface, or subsurface, within this particular network.  The 
Perform Overhead Functions function would be the shared responsibility of all assets and 




Figure 78.   Enhance Domain Awareness, Classify Expanded 
It becomes evident now, how the MBAM function fits within this architecture, 
performing the “Classify” function.  There are certainly many means of classification, 
such as friendly, neutral, surface, air, commercial shipping, fishing vessel, etc.; however, 
for this architecture discussion, “Classify (Conduct Behavior Analysis)” will be limited to 
just what the label implies, conducting behavior analysis for the purpose of classifying a 
contact of interest (COI) as a threat, potential threat, or non-threat.  As we look at the 
sub-functions of Classify that need to be performed, we can see that those sub-functions 
would be accomplished as described previously, by the MBAM and the required bridge 
code to interface with the other functions.  “Read Contact Data Files” would be a bridge 
code function, taking the track data from the Track function and converting it into a 
database format that the MBAM could then pull from and execute the “Analyze 
Behavior” and “Perform Contact Classification” sub-functions.  Then the “Perform I & 
W” sub-function would be yet another bridge code function that would take the MBAM 
classification data, convert it to a format that the C2 display system could process, and 
then output it to the C2 system for the “Respond” function to react. 
This notional operational implementation is identical to the NCSE Laboratory 
implementation, where COTS cameras provided pre-formatted video data, and bridge 
code was created to take that video data and convert it to a format (i.e., Detect and 
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Identify of DIPR) that the BAM could process, with no degradation or change in the 
cameras’ base functionality.  Likewise, the BAM output (i.e., Predict of DIPR) was 
converted, via additional bridge code, to a format that the existing C2 system could 
process and display for operators, and then automated robotic sensors, to react (i.e., React 
of DIPR).  The proof of this concept provides a promising Systems Engineering path for 
bringing much needed MDA JIC capability to the fleet in a very effective manner. 
This chapter presented the elements and development of the WMSE POCS and an 
analysis of potential operational implementation.  The next and final chapter summarizes 
the information presented in this thesis, as well as provides conclusions and recommends 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter VI summarizes this work by reinforcing the need for a Maritime Smart 
Environment (MSE) system through integration of Automated Behavior Analysis (ABA) 
capability into existing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) networks to enhance MDA.  
The chapter reiterates how this approach will fulfill certain capability gaps, and the 
importance of developing the technology to scale and refine the Proof of Concept System 
(POCS), and the Maritime Behavior Analysis Module (MBAM) in particular, for 
operational use.  The chapter also identifies and describes areas with potential for further 
research, development, and testing. 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis described the research associated with the Watchman Maritime Smart 
Environment (WMSE) POCS project, along with the SE processes used to implement and 
demonstrate it, in order to establish the feasibility of integrating an ABA capability (akin 
to the MBAM) into an existing Net-Centric environment within the Maritime Domain. 
The integration of this capability, with its demonstrated potential to recognize particular 
behaviors and alert operators to them, reveals the opportunity to further develop this 
technology and systems integration concept to fill sorely needed MDA Joint Integrating 
Concept (JIC) capability gaps of aggregating, displaying, and analyzing maritime 
information in order to understand the maritime environment and identify threats (MDA-
003C) and predicting activity within the maritime domain (MDA-004C). Meeting the 
numerous MDA mission requirements that these gaps represent will most assuredly 
enhance Maritime Domain Awareness by improving situational awareness, better 
utilizing the capability of networked sensors and the multitude of data they provide, as 
well as making operators more efficient in their duties to respond to real threats, rather 
than ineffectively attempting to manually monitor and react to threats arising from the 
whole of the maritime domain. 
In brief summation: The Systems Engineering (SE) process was executed, 
iteratively, beginning with the user needs from the MDA JIC capability gaps, leading to 
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the required operational activities to fill those gaps, which then derived and then mapped 
to the identified particular standard Navy tasks required.  These tasks were then mapped 
to the functions and subfunctions, creating a functional architecture, that linked to 
subsystem processes and requirements, These required processes and system 
performances requirements led to analysis of options for components in several areas of 
the system.  Ultimately this selection, combined with the constraints of pre-determined 
subsystems and system components (e.g. COTS hardware and software) the physical 
architecture was implemented in the design, build, integration, and eventually test and 
validation of the POCS. 
After a brief introduction explaining the operational concept and mission need 
germane to the thesis, the development of the case began with an explanation of the 
current MDA capabilities and practice with a survey of the various representative 
platforms and sensor systems used to accomplish MDA in the different media - space, air, 
land (coastal), surface, and subsurface—within the maritime environment. This survey 
also took a brief look at some of the current Research and Development (R&D) initiatives 
for MDA enhancement that incorporate or attempt to utilize some form of automation for 
sensor data processing and fusion, as well as feature extraction and pattern or behavior 
recognition and analysis.  These initiatives are at differing stages of development, and 
have each demonstrated varying levels of success in their implementation.  The common 
thread with all of these systems, however, is that they utilize a “whole system” 
development approach, rather than attempting to integrate a single, specific capability, 
such as data fusion, or behavior analysis, into the existing MDA net-centric environment.  
This distinction was key to explain the unique SE approach for ABA that this thesis 
presents, as distinguished from other ABA-type initiatives.  Additionally, although these 
systems employ a greater degree of automation than with previous systems, they still lack 
the complete, end-to-end automated intelligence system (from sensors all the way 
through to reaction systems) represented in the Detect, Identify, Predict, React (DIPR) 
model discussed in this thesis. Even though the approach recommended here is 
integrating ABA (Predict) capability into what would typically be a primarily non-
automated network, any introduction of or increases in automation in the other subsystem 
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areas (Detect, Identify, React) is highly desirable and would greatly increase the 
effectiveness of the ABA capability. For example, the more object (e.g., small vessel 
contact) features that are automatically extracted, the less manpower required to detect, 
identify, extract, and process the required features to support ABA. 
It was then vitally important to discuss the SE approach in the conduct of the 
actual research, as well as how this approach, consisting of a concept and process, could 
be used as a model for physical implementation of real-world mission-capable ABA.  
This explanation was accomplished by first discussing the SE of Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) and ABA systems in general, exploring a notional automated net-centric system 
under the AI Systems Engineering ‘pyramid’ construct, and its fundamental component, 
the DIPR AI software approach model.  From this foundation, the application of these 
concepts in a SE process model for the specific WMSE POCS was elucidated, presenting 
the type of model used, then describing each step as it pertained to the POCS, as well as 
process deviations, improvements, and lessons learned. 
The next chapter expounded upon a key part of the SE process by describing the 
development of the WMSE POCS system architecture.  This architecture description 
showed the functional, process, and operational decompositions that led to the design and 
build of the initial Watchman system.  The description further explained how subsequent 
iterations of the requirements and functional allocations for system upgrades produced 
refined software architecture, as well as an integration architecture.  This architecture, as 
well as its process of development is a vitally important element of ABA operational 
implementation.  The specifics of this architecture are outlined in the very detailed 
System Description Document (SDD). 
The next chapter thoroughly described the entire Watchman POCS, from initial 
concept to latter upgrades, additional capabilities, and improvements, which 
demonstrated its proven functionality in analyzing and recognizing behaviors in a 
network-centric engineered laboratory environment.  The chapter documented the test 
results from both the initial system, as well as system upgrade testing.  Test results of 
90% facial recognition success, 100% behavior analysis success (both with initial and 
upgraded MBAM with enhanced spatial resolution), and 100% Wireless Smart Sensor 
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Network (WSSN) response success, confirmed the system, in all its design iterations, 
exceeding determined performance metrics. Delineating all of the components and 
aspects of the system was necessary to provide the evidence for the SE approach concept 
of integrating and ABA capability into a Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) milieu.  The latter 
portion of the chapter addressed operational implementation of the POCS, by describing 
the two types of operational implementation System Engineers could expect to encounter 
when attempting to implement an ABA capability.  These alternatives were analyzed, 
with the resultant recommendation of the singular integration of an ABA capability into 
the existing NCW environment, as the most cost-effective and mission-capable 
implementation solution. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The task of monitoring the maritime domain and remaining vigilant to the threats 
to our national security explanation that emanate from it will remain a vital mission area 
for any foreseeable future, exemplified by the description of the MDA JIC capability 
gaps and how they were addressed in this thesis, summarized in the previous section.  
The maritime domain is an ever-increasing net-centric environment, with a continually 
growing number of sensors, operating nodes, communications links, providers, and 
consumers of information.  With these growing numbers of both fixed and mobile 
capabilities, there will continue a deficit in humans, bandwidth, power, and intelligent 
centers to deal with this cascade of data.99 There can be no doubt that MDA is a very 
challenging field, with the majority of the earth’s surface falling under its purview.  
Highlighted in this research are the many advances that have been made in the field, in 
the way of more highly capable, longer range, and extended duration sensors; more 
robust and reliable communications; higher bandwidth and faster networks with 
improved data sharing; and lastly much higher fidelity and accuracy in the fusion of the 
sensor data which is passed among these networks.  With all these advances, the data 
available is just too voluminous for humans alone to process and react to manually,  
 
                                                 
99 R. Goshorn, “Smart Robot Workshop,” Introduction Brief, Naval Postgraduate School, April 2010.  
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sifting the “wheat from the chaff,” and be expected to accomplish effective operational 
decision making regarding maritime threats to national security and international peace 
and trade. 
The ability, through scaled development, of integrating a DIPR-type ABA 
capability would certainly enhance the application of MDA through fulfillment of stated 
JIC capability gaps.  This integration methodology, put into operational practice, would 
allow a more seamless implementation of maritime prediction capability, less disruption 
of current sensor data collection capability, processes, and operations, and ultimately a 
satisfaction of the critical mission needs that exist in maritime situational awareness, 
threat recognition and response. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Throughout the course of this thesis research, several other areas related to, but 
outside the scope of this project arose that merit further study and exposition.  A few of 
the most promising and pertinent topics are offered here for the reader to pursue, as 
desired. 
The first important area for future work is the enabling of a “learning” function 
within the Watchman BAM.  A starting point for developing this capability would be the 
discussion on “learning” from Goshorn et al.’s chapter on behavior modeling in AI 
systems solutions. This learning function could be integrated in conjunction with 
upgrading the Graphical User Interface (GUI).  The researcher would need to update and 
re-engineer the GUI to make it more interactive and easily configurable, perhaps using a 
different software application or programming language, such as MATLAB.  This re-
engineered GUI would allow for a much more dynamic operator interface to customize 
behaviors, update behaviors, and set recognition and learning conditions for the sensor 
processing, as well as the behavior analysis algorithms.  This learning function would 
also need to incorporate safeguards to prevent enemy manipulation of the behavior 
learning processes, in an attempt to “spoof” the behavior analysis system. 
A future phase in continuation of this thesis research would be implementation, 
testing and demonstration of further improvements to the POCS, to include incorporating 
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automation in the updating and processing of behaviors, as well as the updating and 
processing of environment map data and calibrated camera data.  In addition, an 
improved “near-real-time” video processing functionality has also been planned for 
implementation and testing as part of this future phase of research.  It is anticipated that 
these improvements will serve to transition the POCS to a prototype system, as well as 
more readily show the scalability of the POCS to an operationally viable system. 
Another very vital research topic to propel the implementation of ABA in a MDA, 
as well as other, environments and mission applications, would be developing a mobile 
platform that hosts the ABA capability.  Much work is currently being done in the field 
of automated robotics in the Network-Centric System Engineering (NCSE) Lab within 
the NCSE Track at NPS.  This research could be expanded to include hosting a small 
processing capability on one or more robotic agents that would then require the capability 
to autonomously orient and update their surroundings in real time to understand behavior 
patterns of tracks that are moving in relation to their own position in space and time.  
Some of this work has already begun in the development of the Wireless Smart Sensor 
Network (WSSN), which self-orients and communicates its position to other agents in the 
network.  If these evolutions were scaled and expanded to include the communication of 
real-time updates in calibrated sensor (camera) “map” data, the agent(s) would then have 
a basis from which to process and analyze track data for behavior analysis and 
classification.  This very important step would pave the way for integrating ABA on any 
type of mobile platform, greatly expanding the portability and flexibility of behavior 
analysis to create “Smart Environments” within any Net-Centric environment. 
Yet another key research field would involve improved automated cost 
calculation routines and methods within the BAM.  Possibly a collaborative work 
between the disciplines of defense analysis, mathematics and computer science, but 
applied via SE, would be developing robust algorithms (e.g., neural networks) for 
learning and then applying advanced statistical methods to smart environments, which 
would collect and process the statistical data for various behaviors as part of the behavior 
pattern recognition and learning function. This learned statistical data could then be 
applied in automating cost calculation when determining relative “distances” from 
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observed behaviors to stored/learned behaviors.  This automated cost calculation method 
would greatly improve accuracy and currency of behavior analysis and relieve operators 
and maintainers from tedious manual updates of behavior software in a highly dynamic 
environment. 
Lastly, to fully capitalize on the breadth of ongoing research regarding automation 
in MDA, NPS SE researchers should seek collaboration opportunities with current 
automation R&D initiatives in the MDA realm.  Discussion and information sharing with 
the developers of such system solution projects such as Predictive Analysis for Naval 
Deployment Activities (PANDA), Comprehensive Maritime Awareness (CMA), and 
Automated Scene Understanding (ASU), could yield very promising results in launching 
from the successes that those initiatives have shown.   Applying the principles of DIPR to 
these initiatives, namely the automated feature fusion to syntactical grammar-based 
intelligent states (symbols) for behavior analysis, which more easily facilitates ABA 
integration into existing MDA networks, could offer great dividends in reducing 
processing and memory requirements, as well as speeding implementation of needed 
capabilities.  This collaboration has the potential to produce very promising results in 
automating and enhancing many MDA functions across the spectrum of MDA 
environments. 
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APPENDIX 
The Watchman Maritime Smart Environment Proof of Concept System 
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